This whole discussion is basically pointless because the ebtables work isn't even done. There is no merged ebtables fix to back-port.
>Additionally, some of us don’t want to run OVS Well OVS is the reference right now. If you choose to use something else, there are going to be feature gaps like this. Did you consider this before trying to remove OVS? >so an OVS only solution is effectively imho - crap You mean for people that choose not to use the gate-tested reference driver? Anyone can just as easily argue that an ebtables solution is crap because it assumes a filtering bridge so it doesn't work with any direct plugging setups. However, we try to discourage attacking contributions that didn't happen to fit a narrow use-case. It's unproductive and poisonous behavior that discourages people from doing anything. >you need to run OVS - seems like a stretch if you aren't using GRE/vxlan >tunneling for all of your guests. Tunneling has little to do with OVS. Linux bridge also supports vxlan and GRE. You can just say why you don't like OVS (e.g. hard to debug, tooling is different, admins don't know how to use it, etc). This can help motivate the movement to restart development on the linux bridge driver. >Since, flat networks are a 100% supported Who is supporting Linux bridge used as a backend for shared networks and is claiming they are secure? Whoever is doing that should be on the receiving end of your complaints. Please be clear about what you really want here. It sounds like you want ARP filtering support in the Linux bridge driver. Is that correct? On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 12:22 AM, Kris G. Lindgren <[email protected]> wrote: > I always thought that ebtables was below the stack in the iptables schema - > but still part of netfilter - thus should be reasonably fast (I would argue > faster than a user space lookup to openvswitchd). Considering the rules > being added are small in number and trivial (on this port allow src/dst mac > of blah). Do you have any performance data showing that its slow? A quick > google search shows nothing relevant :-). Additionally, libvirt > anti-spoofing rules configured via nova using nwfilter uses ebtables to do > the anti spoofing rules. No one seems to complain about the performance of > that... > > Additionally, some of us don’t want to run OVS, so an OVS only solution is > effectively imho - crap. We are actively looking at removing OVS from our > environment due to a number of reasons. So saying if you run neutron and > care to have *REAL* network protection - you need to run OVS - seems like a > stretch if you aren't using GRE/vxlan tunneling for all of your guests. > > I personally agree with George, this stance of "We never said that neutron > would provide anti-spoofing on flat networks thus we wont backport this, > because it now brings into scope ebtables", seems to be a pretty huge gap in > what neutron says it does and the protection it actually provides. We > supply security group rules, but stealing someone else's IP or the gateway > that doesn't belong to you - yep that totally cool with us. It strikes me > that neutrons goal to deliver networking is basically two fold. 1.) Provide > multi-tenant networking 2.) Make sure tenants cant stomp on each other. > Without number 2 (anti-spoofing) you kinda fail to provide number 1. Since, > flat networks are a 100% supported and viable way of doing tenant networking > I would say that this is a bug and should be backported to kilo/juno. > > I don’t personly buy the new dependency reason, new to neutron - maybe - but > not new to people running nova/libvirt. Ebtables is used by libvirt for > nwfilter, assuming an pretty standard libvirt install ebtables should be > installed by default. Additionally, this would have already been a > dependency in nova-compute due to anti-spoofing support there. > ____________________________________________ > > Kris Lindgren > Senior Linux Systems Engineer > GoDaddy, LLC. > > > From: Miguel Ángel Ajo <[email protected]> > Date: Sunday, May 17, 2015 at 6:33 AM > To: George Shuklin <[email protected]> > Cc: "[email protected]" > <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Openstack-operators] Raising the degree of the scandal > > Probably the solution is not selected to be backported because: > > * It’s an intrusive change > * Introduces new dependencies > * Probably it’s going to introduce a performance penalty because eatables > is slow. > > I’m asking in reviews for this feature to be enabled/disabled via a flag. > > In the future I hope OVS with connection tracking to be merged, so then we > can > finally have a proper openvswitch_firewall_driver supporting stateful > firewalling > without reflective rules or flag matching (one is slow, the other is > insecure…) > > Miguel Ángel Ajo > > On Saturday, 16 de May de 2015 at 23:28, George Shuklin wrote: > > On 05/15/2015 07:48 PM, Jay Pipes wrote: > > On 05/15/2015 12:38 PM, George Shuklin wrote: > > Just to let everyone know: broken antispoofing is not an 'security > issue' and the fix is not planned to be backported to Juno/kilo. > > https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1274034 > > What can I say? All hail devstack! Who care about production? > > > George, I can understand you are frustrated with this issue and feel > strongly about it. However, I don't think notes like this are all that > productive. > > Would a more productive action be to tell the operator community a bit > about the vulnerability and suggest appropriate remedies to take? > > Ok, sorry. > > Short issue: If few tenants use same network (shared network) one tenant > may disrupt network activities of other tenant by sending a specially > crafted ARP packets on behave of the victim. Normally, Openstack > prohibit usage of unauthorized addresses (this feature is called > 'antispoofing' and it is essential for multi-tenant clouds). This > feature were subtly broken (malicious tenant may not use other addresses > but still may disrupt activities of other tenants). > > Finally, that bug has been fixed. But now they says 'oh, it is not that > important, we will not backport it to current releases, only to > "Libery"' because of new etables dependency. > > > _______________________________________________ > OpenStack-operators mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-operators > > > > _______________________________________________ > OpenStack-operators mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-operators > -- Kevin Benton _______________________________________________ OpenStack-operators mailing list [email protected] http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-operators
