ovpn_tcp_read_sock() uses sock->peer without taking a reference.
ovpn_peer_del() can drop the last hash-table reference while the
TCP data_ready callback is still attached, so peer->refcount may
already be zero when ovpn_peer_hold() is later called for
ovpn_recv(). That leads to a WARN_ON and a refcount underflow when
the async path puts the peer.
Take the peer reference under rcu_read_lock() before leaving the
RCU critical section, and drop it on all exit paths. If the peer
is already being destroyed, stop consuming the stream quietly.
Fixes: 209247cf6d47 ("ovpn-dco: implement TCP transport support")
Signed-off-by: liuchong <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c b/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c
index fe095f9..d8f9afd 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c
@@ -35,15 +35,26 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_read_sock(read_descriptor_t *desc,
struct sk_buff *in_skb,
rcu_read_lock();
sock = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
pr_err("ovpn: read_sock triggered for socket with no
metadata\n");
desc->error = -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
+ /* Take a reference while still under RCU: ovpn_peer_del() may drop the
+ * last hash-table reference before socket callbacks are restored in
+ * ovpn_peer_release(). Without this hold, a concurrent delete leaves
+ * peer->refcount at 0 while this callback still runs, causing
+ * ovpn_peer_hold() for ovpn_recv() to fail and a later put to
underflow.
+ */
peer = sock->peer;
+ if (unlikely(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ /* Peer is already being destroyed; stop consuming the stream.
*/
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
while (in_len > 0) {
/* no skb allocated means that we have to read (or finish
reading) the 2 bytes
@@ -103,11 +114,10 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_read_sock(read_descriptor_t *desc,
struct sk_buff *in_skb,
* Queue skb for sending to userspace via recvmsg on
the socket
*/
if (likely(ovpn_opcode_from_skb(peer->tcp.skb, 0) ==
OVPN_DATA_V2)) {
- /* hold reference to peer as required by
ovpn_recv().
+ /* Extra reference required by ovpn_recv() /
decrypt_work.
*
- * NOTE: in this context we should already be
holding a
- * reference to this peer, therefore
ovpn_peer_hold() is
- * not expected to fail
+ * NOTE: this cannot fail as this function
already holds a
+ * reference to the peer.
*/
WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer));
status = ovpn_recv(peer->ovpn, peer,
peer->tcp.skb);
@@ -140,10 +150,12 @@ next_read:
copied += chunk;
}
+ ovpn_peer_put(peer);
return copied;
err:
netdev_err(peer->ovpn->dev, "cannot process incoming TCP data: %d\n",
desc->error);
ovpn_peer_del(peer, OVPN_DEL_PEER_REASON_TRANSPORT_ERROR);
+ ovpn_peer_put(peer);
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
_______________________________________________
Openvpn-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel