Thanks for taking on this work and to Alan for the initial round of comments.  
I've read this draft, and below are my comments as a contributor/individual.

===

Section 3

s/encrypted connections as defined/obfuscated connections as defined/

You mix encrypt and obfuscate in this document a few times, and I think, after 
the long conversations on this, we should stick to obfuscate where it applies 
to base T+.

===

Section 3.2

You make reference to the proper "TACACS+ Session", but there is no reference 
either in your terminology section or to the T+ RFC.  I feel a reference is 
needed here.

===

Section 4's title should use Obfuscation instead of Encryption

===

Section 4

You mix the terms deprecate and obsolete, which have been used in other areas 
like SNMP MIBs and YANG modules to mean “present but not recommend” and “not 
present; not functional” respectively.  I would think that in T+/TLS these 
mechanisms are obsolete and must be dropped.

===

Section 4

"The TACACS+ server or client receiving TACACS+ Packets MUST process
   the packet as if TAC_PLUS_UNENCRYPTED_FLAG was set.  The actual value
   of TAC_PLUS_UNENCRYPTED_FLAG flag in the TACACS+ header MUST be
   ignored."

But what if the flag isn’t set and obfuscation is used?  That’s an error, and 
MUST result in the termination of the Session (at least that’s what I would 
think).  This should be clarified, and I would suggest stronger language to 
indicate that no obfuscation can be done when TLS is used.

===

Overall, I think this document warrants an Operators Considerations section to 
describe interoperability with legacy T+.  That is, thoughts around configuring 
a fallback legacy T+ server along side a tacacss server (or servers); thoughts 
on migrating from a shared key to certificate-based validation; etc.

You address some of this in different parts of the document where you talk 
about PSKs, mixing legacy and tacacss on a single server, and the need to 
provide some port flexibility, but I think a centralized section might help 
bring focus to those migrating to this.

Additionally, if there are working or PoC implementations of this, some lessons 
learned (perhaps in an appendix) could be useful.

Thanks.

Joe

On 6/3/22 00:36, heasley wrote:

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.

        Title           : TACACS+ TLS 1.3
        Authors         : Thorsten Dahm
                          Douglas Gash
                          Andrej Ota
                          John Heasley
        Filename        : draft-dahm-tacacs-tls13-00.txt
        Pages           : 11
        Date            : 2022-06-02

Abstract:
   The TACACS+ Protocol [RFC8907] provides device administration for
   routers, network access servers and other networked computing devices
   via one or more centralized servers.  This document, a companion to
   the TACACS+ protocol [RFC8907], adds Transport Layer Security
   (currently defined by TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]) support and deprecates
   former inferior security mechanisms.



The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dahm-tacacs-tls13/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-dahm-tacacs-tls13-00.html




This draft represents the TLS support portion of the original draft.

The separation was requested by the Chairs and Alan DeKok.

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