On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 11:03:41PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: :On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 06:19:03PM -0800, Theodore Bagwell wrote:
:> I nominate this paper as a founding reason why Tor should permit users :> to increase the number of relay nodes used in each circuit above the :> current value of 3... : :No, that won't work. The key vulnerability is the first-last correlation :attack, which doesn't care how many hops your path has (as long :as it's at least two). perhaps a naive comment compounded by low caffienation, but wouldn't longer chains reduce the likelihood (or raise the cost) getting the first-last spots? Or maybe the performace loss to privacy gain ratio for this isn't worth it? -Jon *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
