On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 10:05:02AM -0500, Jonathan D. Proulx wrote: > On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 11:03:41PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: > :On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 06:19:03PM -0800, Theodore Bagwell wrote: > > :> I nominate this paper as a founding reason why Tor should permit users > :> to increase the number of relay nodes used in each circuit above the > :> current value of 3... > : > :No, that won't work. The key vulnerability is the first-last correlation > :attack, which doesn't care how many hops your path has (as long > :as it's at least two). > > perhaps a naive comment compounded by low caffienation, but wouldn't > longer chains reduce the likelihood (or raise the cost) getting the > first-last spots? Or maybe the performace loss to privacy gain ratio > for this isn't worth it?
No. It just increases unnecessary network overhead. If an adversary owns some given fraction of the network, the probability that he owns the first and last node does not change whether the path is longer or shorter. (If you mean that by having longer chains you decrease thereby the probability for a given circuit that an adversary occupying nodes in that circuit is occupying first and last positions, that is true. But that is like reducing the likelyhood of an attack by given adversary by using an algorithm that chooses ten nodes instead of Tor's usual three for a circuit and then using three as normal and telling the other seven of them to do nothing at all on the circuit. The only difference is the latter has less network overhead.) Better go have another espresso ;>) HTH, Paul *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
