http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html
The Essential Nature of the Base
al-Qaeda's Innovation and its Implications for US strategy in the War on
Terror
Fall 2004.
Al-Qaeda
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn1#_ftn
1> , Arabic for �The Base�, began in 1984, under the name Afghan Service
Bureau, or Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK), a small but strong
organizational alliance between Osama Bin Laden and Sheikh Abdullah Azzam,
Bin Laden�s mentor. Azzam, a Palestinian theologian and academic, lectured
in the late 1970�s at Abdul Aziz University, where Bin Laden was a student;
Bin Laden, who also studied under the brother of Said Qut�b in Jeddah, was
deeply moved by the teachings of his professors, and when he arrived in
Peshawar in 1984, he immediately began helping Azzam with MAK. The
organization was committed to bringing Arabs together to fight the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan. Upon driving the Soviets out, tension began to
rise between Azzam and Bin Laden about what to do next; Bin Laden wanted to
build upon the successes of their counter-Soviet efforts and apply them on
an international scale, whereas Azzam was more focused on building
Afghanistan into a model Islamic state. By the end of 1989, Azzam was dead
and Bin Laden, who had always envisioned MAK on a larger, more international
operational scale, was in charge. Gradually recruiting members, gathering
funds, and building alliances, Bin Laden widened the operation to reflect
his personal views. These views were also shared by Azzam�s �replacement�
Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor committed to and experienced in
Islamic revolution.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn2#_ftn
2> In 1998, the World Islamic Front Against the Jews and the Crusaders
(Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin), an
alliance among diverse regional jihadist movements, declared themselves to
the world, and with this declaration al-Qaeda was born. It has since become
the largest, most lethal, and only truly global terrorist organization in
history.
In the last three decades, the world has watched a significant rise and
spread of political Islamist groups throughout the Middle East. While
sharing many of the goals stated by these groups (such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and Jamaah Islamiyah),
al-Qaeda distinguishes itself from its predecessors in many critical areas.
It absorbed the ideology, methodology, legacy, and practical lessons of
established movements and harnessed them into a worldwide Islamic front, a
stateless umbrella network that any group or individual willing to
participate in jihad can join. It is this all-encompassing quality of
ideology and physical organization that fundamentally defines the movement
as a wholly new type of terrorism; indeed, it is an ideological clash of
civilizations that has been institutionalized.
Similarirites with Other Groups
Organization
Al-Qaeda�s structural characteristics are similar to the organization of
earlier terrorist and political Islamist groups, although in the case of
al-Qaeda, the organizational features can be divided into micro and macro
terms. At the micro level, al-Qaeda is structured around a majlis al-shura,
a consultative council which is comprised of the senior, most experienced
decision-making members. Many political Islamist groups work through such a
top down structure, such as Islamic Jihad, Jamaah Islamiyah, and Hizballah.
Below the majlis al-shura there are four different entities and various
subcommittees for planning, networking, financial, military, fatwa and
religious consultation, and media operations. Below each of these
subcommittees are task forces, regional heads, country heads, down to local
handlers and support and operations cells.
In regards to the macro structural organization, which mimics the micro
components of other groups, there are three essential layers: the �al-Qaeda
hardcore�
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn3#_ftn
3> , the echelon of executives in a small circle at the top; the al-Qaeda
associates, which would include the aforementioned groups and actors; and
the vast ocean of radical Islamist movements and individuals dispersed
throughout the global population. The macro characteristic of al-Qaeda,
while replicated in other organizations on a more regional scale, is however
unique simply because it transcends regional boundaries in favor of the
international sphere. Hezbollah, initially a small-scale umbrella network,
is perhaps one of the few groups to have strategic bases and perpetuate
attacks outside of their main region of operation, as witnessed in the 1992
and 1994 bombings of an Israeli embassy and a Jewish Community Center in
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn4#_ftn
4>
Goals
Al-Qaeda�s goals can be boiled down to the following six points: 1)
the end of US aid to Israel, and the eventual elimination of that state; 2)
the removal of Western and US forces from the Arabian peninsula; 3) the
removal of Western and US military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
Muslim lands; 4) the end of US support for the oppression of Muslims by
Russia, China, and India; 5) the end of US protection for repressive,
apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and others;
and 6) the conservation of the Muslim world's energy resources and their
sale at high prices.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn5#_ftn
5> Some experts would also add to this list of goals the re-establishment
of the caliphate as well as the creation of a greater Islamic state in the
Middle East. Throughout the history of Islamist groups, variations on each
of these themes have been the stated missions of organizations. Hamas,
Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have waged war against Israel in
the aims of eventually destroying it; regional groups in Chechnya, Kashmir,
and Southeast Asia attack the countries which oppress their people; some
focus on the creation of an Islamic state, such as Gama�a al-Islamiyya,
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Harakat al-Mujahideen, and Groupement Islamique Arme
(GIA). Other groups loosely combine these religious and nationalistic goals
tailored to their political situation; however, most of the ideas espoused
by al-Qaeda have appeared in earlier manifestations. Moreover, all of these
ideas and goals generally find wide sympathy and support, both ideologically
and financially, amongst the local population.
Why al-Qaeda is unique
The nature of al-Qaeda is fundamentally different from previous
political Islamist groups precisely because it is not a specific group. It
is an international umbrella network of jihadist movements. Whereas previous
groups focused on nationalistic struggles, aimed at overthrowing specific
regimes, Al Qaeda is not a political party; it is not local; it does not
look for interim solutions to their demands and is unwilling to make
compromises. It is an ideological, stateless amalgamation of radical
Islamist cells with which any group can ally themselves. It is unique in
this regard; its organizational, financial, and training support for other
jihadist groups allows them to wage war on many different fronts all at
once.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn6#_ftn
6>
The international presence and reach of al-Qaeda underscores most
significantly its innovative dimension. Al-Qaeda has cells in roughly
seventy countries, and the extent of its affiliate network blankets the
globe. As J.T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director of the FBI�s
Counter-Terrorism Unit testified:
Although Al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations,
it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate
under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the
Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups
in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania,
Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the
Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also
maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its
activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the
United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together
against the perceived common enemies in the West - particularly the United
States."
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn7#_ftn
7>
Not only does al-Qaeda have an established global presence, but their
message is a call to all Muslims, throughout the ummah; and while there may
not be al-Qaeda fighters in every country, financial supporters and
sympathizers can be found everywhere. In pursuing their goals, Al-Qaeda is
also unique because it represents the first time that a terrorist
organization does not delineate between Sunni and Shia groups in their
financial or operational support of other regional Islamist groups. Indeed,
there is strong evidence of al-Qaeda fighters training in Hezbollah camps,
and as an extension of that connection, contact and limited cooperation
between al-Qaeda and Iran.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn8#_ftn
8>
Many have described al-Qaeda as a multinational terrorist corporation,
or an international venture capital firm for jihad, not only because of its
global reach, but also because of its organization, which is, in fact,
reminiscent of an efficient, modern corporate business model. The
sophistication of their network also highlights another critical distinction
between al-Qaeda and previous Islamist groups � its wholehearted embrace of
technology and the forces of globalization to achieve their goals.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn9#_ftn
9> Their use of cell phones, the internet, and satellite television,
coupled with their understanding of global economic market forces and
targeting of financial institutions and other financially significant
targets also reveals the extent to which they comprehend their enemies�
vulnerabilities.
Al-Qaeda represents an acknowledgement of established political
Islamist groups, ideologies, and tactics, but takes their lessons and widens
their focus to the greater �historical solution.� This broader range of
objectives allows al-Qaeda to distance itself from local interactions, which
would, based on the experiences of its predecessors, only embroil them in
national or local politics. After losing their base in Afghanistan, this
distance has become more acute. Much like Hamas� �historic solution�, or end
goal, al-Qaeda refuses to compromise or yield in an �interim solution.�
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn10#_ft
n10> It avoids direct recognition and eschews contact with local authority,
preferring to allow its affiliates and smaller partners to execute attacks
and claim responsibility. The �al-Qaeda hardcore� prefers secrecy; indeed,
Bin Laden did not even mention the name al-Qaeda until 2001, speaking
instead on behalf of the World Islamic Front, if not simply as an
independent. This mysterious, elusive quality, also reflected in the few
(albeit straightforward) communiqu�s published by the group, enables them to
stay out of the fray of day-to-day interaction with governments or military
forces, which inevitably allows them to avoid any means of compromising
their mission and objectives. As Abdullah Azzam stated, �Jihad and the rifle
alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues.�
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn11#_ft
n11> This lowest common denominator approach in their ideology also
significantly widens their potential base of recruitment, support, and pool
of resources.
Implications for the US
These combined factors constitute a staggering challenge to the United
States� interests and security; the magnitude and depth of this threat must
be wholly accepted and understood before any effective counter-measures can
be implemented, for al-Qaeda is a patient, thorough, innovative and
resourceful enemy. Indeed, there have been a number of different ideas in
recent years about what al-Qaeda is; each one, with the exception of those
which deny plain-hard facts, has some facet of truth to it. However, what
has been missing is the all-encompassing vision of all these characteristics
stitched together into a global, amorphous terrorist web. Various
commentators, members of the Intelligence Community, and scholars have tried
to confine al-Qaeda into traditional categories and labels, trying to
understand the group within an outdated framework, or only focusing on one
of the group�s goals, dividing them up from the larger ideology based on
reasonable projections and capabilities.
Viewing al-Qaeda in such a limited capacity is inherently flawed and
dangerous. America�s approach, if it wants to defeat the threat posed by
al-Qaeda, must be different from its stances towards other terrorist groups
fundamentally because the end game � for both al-Qaeda and the United States
� is drastically different from all previous terrorist threats and
organizations; the lowest common denominator approach espoused by al-Qaeda�s
mission and operational capacity means the United States should expect the
worst case scenario. What needs to be understood that there is one face of
the WOT, and it is a global face; its face is al-Qaeda, because their
ideology supports anyone who will accomplish any of their aims. Moreover,
as many scholars have correctly noted, this �war on terror� is, in
al-Qaeda�s point of view, a war of attrition; as such, the United States
should view it that way. It will not suffice to simply capture or kill the
majlis al-shura and other lower-level members; it will not suffice to merely
cut off their funding networks
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn12#_ft
n12> ; it will not suffice to destroy their internet and media
capabilities. Because it is an ideology that has organizational components
to it, the US and al-Qaeda�s other targets must offensively attack the
reasons which cause their viral ideology to spread while at the same time
pursuing the structural-elimination goals previously mentioned. The failure
of the US to address the problems of inequality, oppression, tyranny, and
poverty, coupled with the widespread perception of America as an imperialist
force and the continued military campaigns in the Middle East, only spreads
the allure of al-Qaeda and the support for their actions.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftn13#_ft
n13> It is impossible to kill an idea; the only way to defeat it is to
lessen its resonance. Until the US understands that al-Qaeda is an idea � an
uncompromising one which has apocalyptic strings of attrition attached � it
is doomed to fail.
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Endnotes
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref1#_
ftnref1> The name �al-Qaeda� was actually given to the group by the State
Department/CIA/FBI in 1998 when they were investigating the East Africa
Embassy bombings, although the name, which had been used, most likely in a
different context, was taken from statements and writings of various
individuals affiliated with the group. This, Jason Burke notes, �was partly
due to institutional conservatism and partly because the FBI had to apply
conventional antiterrorism laws to an adversary that was in no sense a
traditional terrorist or criminal organization.� (Burke, Al-Qaeda 1-15, and
�Think Again: Al-Qaeda�.) Indeed, Israeli intelligence services now prefer
the term �jihadi international� to describe the group, and various other
terms have been added onto the name, such as Jihad al-Qaeda, to denote its
merge with Islamic Jihad. For an insightful and thorough semantic
deconstruction, see Burke.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref2#_
ftnref2> See Lawrence Wright, �The Man Behind Bin Laden� The New Yorker, 16
September 2002 for a full and detailed account of Zawahiri.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref3#_
ftnref3> Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, 8.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref4#_
ftnref4> See Blanca Madani, �Hezbollah�s Global Finance Network: The Triple
Frontier.�
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref5#_
ftnref5> Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, xviii.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref6#_
ftnref6> Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, page 13.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref7#_
ftnref7> Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and
Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December
18, 2001"Al-Qaeda International".
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref8#_
ftnref8> Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, 76, 220.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref9#_
ftnref9> The term �netwar�, which first appeared in 2001, is defined as an
emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of
traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms or
organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to
the information age. See Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime,
and Militancy John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, eds. Rand Corporation, 2001.
Al-Qaeda has used cutting-edge technology, such as cellular and satellite
phones, the internet, email, etc. in planning and executing their attacks.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref10#
_ftnref10> Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. 69.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref11#
_ftnref11> Lawrence Wright, �The Man Behind Bin Laden�. The New Yorker. 16
September 2002.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref12#
_ftnref12> Note, for example, Hezbollah�s ability to survive financially
despite Israeli attempts at interception.
<http://homepage.mac.com/kmcspadden/EssentialNatureoftheBase.html#_ftnref13#
_ftnref13> For example, while it has been found that the majority of people
in Saudi Arabia would not want Bin Laden to lead their country, most of the
Saudi population fervently believes in what he does; one can imagine, given
the declining popularity of the US and Bin Laden�s growing pool of admirers
in the Middle East, that one would see similar conclusions in other
countries. This phenomenon is similar to one found with Hamas � after Israel
attacks a Palestinian site or person, the public support for Hamas goes up
dramatically; whereas in times of relative calm, their core base hovers
around only 10 to 12 percent of the Palestinian population.
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