A New Doctrine for New Wars
By James Webb. Mr. Webb was a combat marine in Vietnam and later
secretary of the Navy.
For more than a decade, our military has been conducting its
world-wide activities without a clearly articulated doctrine that would
dictate the size and makeup of its forces and the acceptable uses to which
they would be put. So long as the Soviet Union remained a threat, this
glaring omission could be overlooked, since the military was sized and
positioned in a way that could allow it to adapt to lesser contingencies.
The buildup in the Gulf War was a direct product of this Cold War
positioning, as many of the units deployed to Saudi Arabia were shifted from
Europe.
Post-Cold War policies dramatically reduced the size of the military,
even as debates continued regarding its missions. Lacking a traditional
"threat" around which to build military forces, defense officials had great
difficulty justifying the size and functions of the military to Congress and
the media.
The recent focus on international terrorism raises the prospect that
traditional deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, could be minimized in
the public's eye. In order to ensure that this does not happen, our
leadership needs to articulate a clear national strategy that addresses all
our responsibilities.
As a starting point, it should be remembered that an operational
paradigm is not a strategic doctrine. The most egregious misuse of this term
in recent years has been its application to the so-called Powell Doctrine,
which called for the use of massive, overwhelming force whenever the U.S.
military was put into play. The Powell Doctrine was little more than a
"best-case scenario" for situations where the U.S. could respond at its own
discretion, using a schedule of its choosing, against an enemy whose
military makeup allowed such a response. But sometimes a nation must fight
even when it cannot muster up an overwhelming advantage, as in the early
days of World War II. And sometimes massive force is irrelevant, as in the
anti-terrorist campaigns we are waging today.
The most useful strategic doctrine in recent decades was that
announced by Richard Nixon in 1969. The Nixon Doctrine was based on three
broad principles -- that we would provide a nuclear deterrent to hostile
powers, that we would actively defend allies under external attack, and that
we would provide military equipment and other assistance to friendly nations
battling insurgents within their borders. The great strength of the
doctrine, which has not been fully superseded, was that it allowed
discretion regarding whether to enter direct combat, while assuring friendly
nations that we would not abandon them. Its principle weakness today is that
it did not take into account the evolution of asymmetrical warfare, or the
ability of terrorist movements to avoid direct affiliation with any specific
state sponsor.
As we look at shaping a comprehensive new doctrine, two historic
models come to mind. Both instruct us as to how we can meet the
responsibilities of maintaining global stability while addressing the
long-term need to directly combat asymmetrical movements such as al Qaeda.
And just as importantly, both also offer a clear warning regarding the
dangers of over-stretch if we ask too much of a military with only 1.4
million active-duty members.
Americans tend to recoil from the word "empire," but the grand
strategy of the British in the decades leading up to World War I is a
relevant precedent. Britain's diplomacy and strategy were based on a desire
to maintain world-wide stability and to protect its commercial interests.
Similarly, Britain was a dominant maritime power that made minimum use of
its own ground forces. In Asia, it counterbalanced the maritime interests of
other nations in part by developing an alliance with Japan. Despite an
empire that required a military presence in hot spots that spanned the
globe, at the start of World War I the British Army had only six active
divisions. The U.S. has 13 today, including the Marine Corps, with a far
wider spectrum of responsibilities than had the British a century ago.
In terms of how our military should operate with nations and movements
that share our ideology, we should remember the successes of the Soviet
Union throughout the Cold War period. Until their invasion of Afghanistan,
the Soviets relied on a strategy of "cooperative forces," assisting
insurgent armies around the world in their bid to destabilize and demoralize
the West. This involved supply and training, but the Soviets themselves
never found it necessary to field an army against the Western powers. This
surrogate approach was highly effective. It was a major reason that the U.S.
found itself involved in lengthy wars in Korea and Vietnam, at a cost of
more than 100,000 combat deaths, while the Soviets themselves enjoyed a
period of relative calm.
Both of these strategies met their demise in wars that required
sizable commitments of ground forces. The British commitment in World War I
eventually bled a generation dry, with a loss of nearly a million soldiers,
and empire died with them. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sucked up a
large percentage of its army, and in the end demoralized the nation. Indeed,
the war in Afghanistan may have contributed to the demise of the USSR every
bit as much as the U.S. approach of outspending the Soviets on defense until
they could no longer afford to compete.
The key elements of a new doctrine seem obvious. We must retain our
position as the dominant guarantor of world-wide stability through strategic
and conventional forces that deter potentially aggressive nations. We must
be willing to retaliate fiercely against nations that participate in or
condone aggressive acts, as well as non-national purveyors of asymmetric
warfare. But we should take great care when it comes to committing large
numbers of ground forces to open-ended combat, and we should especially
avoid using them as long-term occupation troops.
The approach to our commitment in Afghanistan fits the above criteria,
and should serve as a clear warning to other states that have condoned or
supported terrorism. The Taliban were warned, and were offered the chance to
rid their country of Osama bin Laden's forces. Our military campaign has
been conducted with lethality, relying on mobile naval and air assets and
special forces units. The ground campaign has been carried out principally
through local forces. Marine Corps infantry units were inserted at a time
when the campaign's objectives had been clearly focused, in order to perform
specific tasks. And around the world, the U.S. military is still carrying
out its functions of maintaining global stability.
This formula works, and as the campaign stretches, we should not be
tempted by its very successes to change it. If we remain focused on the twin
goals of deterring cross-border aggression and eliminating international
terrorism we will prevail. If we move beyond these clear objectives, we risk
running out of people, equipment, and the kind of clarity that maintains the
national spirit.
Basil Liddell Hart, who was gassed as a British infantry captain in
the trenches of World War I and became perhaps the greatest strategist of
the 20th century, put it best. "A conservative state may defeat its own
purpose by exhausting itself so much that it is unable to resist other
enemies, or the internal effects of overstrain. . . . Economy of force and
deterrent effect are best combined in the defensive-offensive method, based
on high mobility that carries the power of quick riposte."
http://interactive.wsj.com/fr/emailthis/retrieve.cgi?id=SB100708664375324712
0.djm
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
DonorsChoose. A simple way to provide underprivileged children resources
often lacking in public schools. Fund a student project in NYC/NC today!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/EHLuJD/.WnJAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~->
--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL
PROTECTED]
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.intellnet.org
Post message: [email protected]
Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods,
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,'
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml
Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
