No real debate.Russia has been emasculated and should stay that way.
Bruce STRATFOR'S GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT Debating Russia's Fate May 09, 2005 23 13 GMT It has been 60 years since the defeat of Nazi Germany. The leaders of the nations that participated in that victory, along with those that didn't, have gathered in Moscow to commemorate the anniversary. The gathering has a meaning that transcends the historical. The question on the table is the future of Russia's relationship with the West. The issue is simple: From Moscow's point of view, it is whether the Russians squandered, over the past 15 years, the victory that was won at the cost of more than 20 million killed. From its erstwhile allies' point of view, it is whether to take Russia seriously, not only as a global power, but even as a regional power. How these questions are answered will determine the shape of Eurasia for a generation. >From the Soviet point of view, World War II was simultaneously a catastrophe and a triumph. The catastrophe consisted of Josef Stalin's massive diplomatic and military miscalculations, which led to the occupation of vast parts of the Soviet Union by the Germans. The triumph was the fact that the Soviet Union not only won the war (along with its allies), it also emerged from the war as the dominant Eurasian power -- its borders effectively pushing into central Germany -- as well as a global power. It became the only challenger to the other great victor in World War II, the United States. Now the fruits of the victories of 1945 are gone. Moscow's sphere of influence no longer extends to central Germany. In fact, it doesn't extend even through the former Soviet Union. The Baltics, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia are all slipping from its hands. It is not even certain that the Kremlin can hold all of the Russian Federation. From Moscow's point of view, the current generation has squandered the victory and betrayed the sacrifices of its greatest generation. The leadership of the Soviet and Russian recessional did not undertake this course out of indifference or confusion. Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Russian President Vladimir Putin all pursued a calculated policy, dictated in their minds by irresistible reality. Following the analysis of Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB in the 1960s and 1970s, they recognized that the Soviet Union was -- imperceptibly to many in the West -- slipping into economic and social catastrophe, caused by two things. First, the Soviet economy was inherently inefficient; geography and ideology combined to create a fundamentally flawed system. Second, the decision by the United States in the 1980s to directly attack this weakness by accelerating the arms race created a crisis of unsustainable proportions. The Soviet Union was poor, but geopolitically and strategically powerful. In order to retain that strategic power, it had to devote an enormous amount of economic energy to sustaining its military forces and the economic sectors that underpinned them. The cost of strategic parity with the United States rose and threatened the rest of the economy with collapse. Very quickly, the Soviet Union would be both poorer and weaker. Moscow made a fundamental strategic decision to preserve the Soviet Union by rebalancing the relationship between geopolitics and economics. Gorbachev attempted to implement this policy by effectively ending the Cold War in return for technology transfers and investments from the West. He lost control of the situation for two reasons. First, regardless of the level of Western investment and aid, the economic sclerosis of the Soviet Union was so extensive that Moscow could not effectively utilize the Western funds in any politically meaningful timeframe. Second, the United States was not going to allow the Soviets to recover from their weakness. Washington pressed home its advantage. First, it made alliances, covert and overt, in Eastern Europe that essentially pried the region out of the weakening Soviet grip. Second, the loss of its Eastern European empire created a dynamic that led to Gorbachev's fall and the rise of Yeltsin -- and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Retreat fed on itself, until Moscow lost not only what it won in World War II, but also much more. Yeltsin essentially extended Gorbachev's policies and deepened them. He assumed that the economic benefits that Andropov had been searching for would materialize more quickly if Russia were not also responsible for economic conditions in Soviet republics that lagged generations behind Russia itself. In effect, Yeltsin continued to trade geopolitics for economic relations with the West -- having abandoned the drag imposed by, for example, Central Asia. Russians hoped for a massive improvement in their lives. While there was substantial economic activity, wealth was not dispersed. The lives of Russians outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as the elderly and others who were not among the Westernized elites, went from difficult to extraordinarily harsh. The reasons are complex, but they boil down to this: Capitalism is extremely rewarding, but it demands huge social sacrifices up front -- and Russia, having already paid the price of communism, had nothing more to offer. By this, we don't simply mean money; we mean the social dynamism that capitalism requires. Russia was exhausted by communism. Its social, political and legal structure could not change to accommodate the requirements of capitalism. Theft replaced production as a means of becoming wealthy. Yeltsin could not have done anything about this had he wanted to. It was hardwired into the system. As a result, there was no economic payoff in return for Russia's geopolitical decline. Before the collapse of communism, Russia had been poor but enormously powerful. Afterward, Russia was even poorer and pathetically weak. Moscow had to struggle to hold on to Russia itself. Geopolitics is not a sentimental game, and the United States is not a sentimental country. It did precisely what the Russians had done in the past and would have done had the situation been reversed: It pressed its advantage. Using a variety of mechanisms, such as NATO expansion, the United States first spread its influence into Eastern Europe, then into the former Soviet Union itself, in the Baltics. Washington has increased its influence in the Caucasus via its relationship with Georgia and others.The Americans moved into Central Asia -- first, through the development of energy resources there; then, as a side effect of Sept. 11, through the deployment of U.S. troops and intelligence services throughout the region. Russian weakness had created a vacuum. The United States inexorably moved into it. Putin came to power in the wake of the Kosovo conflict, in which the United States had treated Russian interests with indifference and even contempt. He did not wish to reverse the Andropov doctrine, but intended only to refine it. He expected there never to be a repeat of Kosovo, in which the United States attacked Serbia -- a nation regarded by the Russians as friendly -- without ever taking Russian interests into account. Putin also intended to reverse the consequences of the economic chaos of the 1990s. But he did not intend to create any fundamental change. In other words, Putin wanted to have his cake and eat it too. He did not want to change the foundation of U.S.-Russian relations; he simply wanted to rebalance it. The two goals contradicted each other. The relationship could not be rebalanced: It was built around the reality that Russian leaders had been dealing with for a generation with declining success. Russia didn't have the weight to rebalance the relationship. Economically, it remained crippled. Militarily, it was impotent. The geopolitical consequence -- decline -- could not be stopped. For the past six years, Putin has been searching for the Holy Grail: a no-cost, no-risk solution to Russia's problems. The United States has followed a consistent policy from Ronald Reagan, through the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and now George W. Bush as well. It has sought to prevent, under any circumstances, the re-emergence of Russia as a regional hegemon and potential global challenger. This has been a truly bipartisan policy. Clinton and George W. Bush have sought to systematically increase American influence in what the Russians call their "near abroad" while at the same time allowing the natural process of economic dysfunction to continue. More precisely, they have allowed Russia's weaknesses to create vacuums into which American power could move. The breakpoint came in Ukraine. Washington took advantage of pro-Western forces there to create a situation in which it, rather than Moscow, was the most influential foreign force in Kiev -- including raising pointed discussions about whether to include Ukraine in NATO. Ukraine lies on Russia's southern frontier; if it becomes a NATO country, Russia becomes indefensible. This, coupled with growing U.S. power in Central Asia, threatens Russia's position in the Caucasus. The situation quickly becomes hopeless for Moscow. This explains why Putin recently referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in the 21st century. Western leaders expressed shock at the statement, but Putin was simply expressing the obvious. President Bush's travel itinerary surrounding Russia's V-E Day celebrations -- making his first stop in the Baltics and leaving by way of Georgia -- is intended to drive the point home. Discussion of internal Russian affairs -- the status of democracy there -- similarly drives home the inequality of the relationship. So, too, does the attempt to equate the Soviet occupation of the Baltics with the Nazi occupation, with Bush administration leaders saying that the fall of Adolf Hitler did not end oppression. All of this is designed rhetorically to put Russia on the defensive, just as it has been put on the defensive geopolitically. The Russian decline and the U.S. exploitation of the situation have taken us to the breakpoint. If Ukraine is lost to Moscow, if Georgia becomes the dominant power in the Caucasus, if events in Kyrgyzstan are extended to the rest of Central Asia -- all of which are very easy to imagine -- it will be difficult to imagine the survival of the Russian Federation. We will see a second devolution in which parts of the Federation peel off. Russia, as we know it today, will be finished. It is not clear that the Russians have the will to recover. Putin seems to be struggling with internal and external demons, and his heir is not apparent. However, if Russia is going to make an attempt to recover, now is the time when it will have to happen. Another year and there might not be any chance. It might already be too late, but the Russians have little to lose. It is really a case of now or never. Russia will never have a vibrant economy. In the long run, centralized command economies don't work. But neither does capitalism in Russia. A centralized economy can do remarkable things in the short run, however. Russia is particularly noted for short-term, unbalanced spurts -- sometimes with the government using terror as a tool, sometimes not. It must always be remembered how quickly military power can be recovered. Germany went from a collapsed military in 1932 to Great Power status in five or six years. Economic authoritarianism, coupled with a pre-existing skilled officer class, transformed Germany's strategic position. It is not wise, therefore, to assume that Russia cannot recover significant military force if it has the will to do so. It might not become a superpower, but Great Power status -- even with an impoverished population -- is not beyond its capabilities. We have seen Russia achieve this in the past. It therefore makes sense that the United States has been consolidating and extending its position in the former Soviet Union during the past few months. Russia can recover, but only if given time. The United States, having no desire to see Russia recover, doesn't intend to give it time. Washington intends to present Moscow with a reality that is so unfavorable that it cannot be reversed. Russia is close to that situation right now, but in our opinion, not yet there. A window is open that will close shortly. The question is simple: Will the Russians grab what might be a last chance, or are they just too tired to care? (c) 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved. <http://www.stratfor.com/> http://www.stratfor.com [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> DonorsChoose. A simple way to provide underprivileged children resources often lacking in public schools. Fund a student project in NYC/NC today! http://us.click.yahoo.com/EHLuJD/.WnJAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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