Al-Qaeda Doctrine: Training the Individual Warrior

By  <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/analysts.php?authorid=251> Michael
Scheuer    http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369944


 <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/589training_camp.jpg>     
While Terrorism Focus previously examined al-Qaeda's strategic and tactical
doctrine (February 28, March 14), this article looks at the type and purpose
of the non-military training that is given to the individual al-Qaeda
fighter or mujahid. Based on al-Qaeda sources (see notes for complete
listing), this training appears to be common to both the organization's
insurgents and their special forces, and is intended to produce fighters who
are pious, disciplined and unity-minded, fatalistic, and cognizant of the
requirements and attitudes of those they are defending.

Piety

When training each mujahid, al-Qaeda's doctrine declares that the first
priority must be "spiritual preparation . because it is necessary to attain
victory." The key to this preparation is two-fold, al-Qaeda's Ma'adh
al-Mansur explained. First, each fighter must completely accept the fact
that God has promised victory to the Muslims if they obey His word. Second,
the fighter must recognize that victory has not yet come because most
Muslims love life and hate death, and thus have strayed from God's path,
most specifically from the path of jihad. As a result, al-Mansur directs
that each trainee be taught that "God has set the infidel nations against
them [the Muslims] to inflict on them humiliation and lowly status. This is
an inevitable and ordained punishment that befalls those who abandon jihad."
For this degraded status, each Muslim man should be deeply ashamed, and
should "die of grief if he does not ward off the calamities inflicted on his
fellow Muslims and Kinsmen." 

In other words, al-Qaeda doctrine does not argue that the current
predicament of Muslims is the fault of what Al-Faruq al-Amiri calls "the
campaign and reality of the crusader enemy." Rather, that predicament flows
from the refusal of Muslims to resist the infidels' attack. The commonly
held Western view that al-Qaeda and its followers blame the West for all of
Islam's woes-an understanding most stridently advocated by Bernard
Lewis-thus falls by the wayside. Al-Qaeda trainees are taught that the
humiliation God has inflicted on Muslims for their failure to obey Him can
only be lifted by Muslims accepting God's word and "returning to jihad." If
they do so, they will win victories like those the Prophet Muhammad and his
companions won in the battles of Badr and The Trench in Islam's first years
of existence. "Although the Muslims [with Muhammad] were few and had scanty
military means, and the infidels were many and well-equipped," al-Mansur
reminds today's mujahedin, victory was in the hands of God."

Discipline and Unity

If an al-Qaeda trainee is not thoroughly inculcated with the discipline of
the Shariah, Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin warned, "[he] will turn into an
outlaw." Abu Jandal, bin Laden's former bodyguard, noted that each trainee
must learn that his "mission in life is to protect the ummah," and that this
is the "cause" all fighters "carried in our hearts wherever we are able to
go." Reflecting on his own training, al-Muqrin recalled that he and his
colleagues, "the sons of the Arabian Peninsula," came to the Afghan training
camps with much to learn. We were "not used to military order and
discipline," al-Muqrin wrote, and found "many things full of restrictions
and difficult." After receiving what al-Amiri called intense training for
"faith, spirit and heart," however, al-Muqrin said that he and his comrades
became mentally "tough and arduous" and knew that they "must fear no one but
God and must be ready to sacrifice everything for upholding God's word." 

While Shariah instruction develops a disciplined, focused mindset, al-Qaeda
doctrine acknowledges that unity of belief does not automatically yield a
consistently united organization. Of the other factors impacting unity,
al-Qaeda doctrine focuses most on eliminating animosities between trainees,
or groups of trainees, that are based on national origins. Abu Jandal, for
example, said that in the late 1990s he was often called on by al-Qaeda
leaders to travel to camps in Afghanistan to settle disagreements between
different nationalities, most commonly Saudis and Egyptians. Al-Qaeda is
unique for a number of reasons, but most of all because it is the only
Islamist insurgent organization that has been able to remain cohesive and
effective despite a heterogeneous membership drawn from several dozen Muslim
and non-Muslim states. Abu Jandal has written that bin Laden has long
contended that to successfully confront the United States and its allies
al-Qaeda fighters "needed to entrench amity among ourselves and eliminate
regional rivalries." Part of the training regimen is to ensure, according to
Abu Jandal, that "the issue of nationalism was put out of our minds, and we
acquired a wider view than that, namely the issue of the ummah."

Fatalism

"What does a mujahid seek from jihad?" Shaykh Yusaf al-Alyiri answers his
own question: "He seeks one of two happy endings, either victory or
martyrdom. He will be victorious when he achieves either of them." Of all
the non-weapons training an al-Qaeda trainee receives, this seems the most
simple and straightforward. The mujahid, al-Muqrin concludes, "must be eager
to enrage God's enemies and he must believe that God's victory is certain,
as promised." He must not worry about the future. "Whatever is going to
happen to you," al-Muqrin instructed would-be insurgents, "will not miss
you, and whatever is going to miss you will not happen to you; if it were
your fate to be killed, taken prisoner, or wounded , then this would be your
fate, and caution will not save you from fate."

Area Awareness

Al-Qaeda's training in piety, discipline, unity and fatalism is designed to
produce a mujahid who is part of an elite vanguard organization that is
deployed in multiple areas of the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda doctrine tells each
mujahid that he is "fighting for the whole [Islamic] nation to preserve its
religion, sanctities, the blood, honor, and property of the [Muslim] people,
and to repulse injustice and aggression." That said, the doctrine notes that
al-Qaeda fighters may not encounter a fully supportive population when they
first arrive in the theater of fighting. This is because the mujahedin
themselves are outsiders as far as the locals are concerned, and they have
not yet proved they can protect the local population. In many instances,
therefore, the most the mujahedin can expect is passive assistance. "The
mujahedin," al-Muqrin explained, "must pay attention to the fact that most
people are busy with life and pursuing their own livelihood. If the
mujahedin keep this in mind they will realize that in many circumstances
they will not get great support unless God wishes otherwise."

Since this situation will be common across the Muslim world, the mujahedin
must be disciplined and behave according to the tenets of their training. To
turn passive support into active support, al-Muqrin claims, each mujahid
must "be known for his nobility of character, ethics, and loyalty to the
believers." He continues:

"The troops must be marked by their good manners and conduct. A mujahid must
serve as a beacon to lighten the road for the people and a model for other
colleagues to follow. He must be careful not to be like those whom God
referred to as: 'Do ye enjoin right conduct on the people, and forget [to
practice it] yourselves?'"

Conclusion

For national militaries and insurgent groups military doctrine is a set of
ideals that cannot be perfectly applied during the unpredictable course of a
war. Clear, demanding and repetitive doctrinal training probably is the best
means of ensuring the fullest possible application of doctrine in war
situations. The fact that al-Qaeda has remained a united and disciplined
fighting force in a war against the world's greatest military power, and
continues to be welcomed in multiple Muslim countries in which insurgencies
are underway or being kindled, suggests the inculcation of its training
doctrine for individual fighters has been largely successful. 

Notes:
1. Ma'adh al-Mansur, "The Importance of Military Preparation According to
the Shariah," al-Mu-askar al-Battar, January 3, 2004.
2. Yusaf al-Alyiri, "The Illumination on the Path of Jihad. The Road to
Battle," Sawt al-Jihad, November 1, 2004.
3. Al-Faruq al-Amiri, "What is our duty toward our ummah?" al-Mu-askar
al-Battar, August 17, 2004.
Ibid.,"God is your refuge, Al-Fallujah," al-Mu-askar al-Battar, November 10,
2004.
5. "Interview with Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin," Movement for Islamic Reform,
October 13, 2003.
6. Abu Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, "The Second Stage: The Relative
Strategic Balance," Mu-askar al-Battar, January 15, 2004.
7. "Interview of Bin Ladin's Former Body Guard, Abu Jandal," Al-Quds
al-Arabi, August 3, 2004 and March 15, 22, 24, and 25, 2005. 

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