JI's Two-Pronged Strategy in Indonesia
By Zachary Abuza
[From: Terrorism Focus (The Jamestown Foundation, USA) Volume 3, Issue 16
(April 25, 2006)]

Jemaah Islamiya was responsible for the Bali attack in 2002, which killed
over 200 people.
Two recent reports based on Indonesian police and intelligence sources
regarding Jemaah Islamiya's (JI) changing strategies suggest that the
organization continues to have a two-pronged strategy of both targeting
Western interests and fomenting sectarian conflicts. While some analysts
have suggested that these strategies reflect deep-seeded factionalism within
the organization, these reports suggest that the differing strategies and
targeting reflect limited resources and capabilities in the current period.

The first report contends that last year Noordin Mohammed Top, one of JI's
leaders, instructed his subordinates to conduct reconnaissance on Paiton
Energy's coal-fired thermal power plant, some 150 kilometers southeast of
Surabaya. The power plant, which is owned and operated by a consortium of
Japanese, British and U.S. companies, provides much of the electricity for
Surabaya, Indonesia's second largest city and the province of East Java. Two
men, arrested for their roles in harboring the JI fugitive, revealed that
the plot was abandoned simply because JI did not have the material resources
to mount an attack on such a large target (Yomiuri Shimbun, April 17).

Those same sources also suggest that Noordin ordered operatives to find
Japanese-related targets in Indonesia. Japan has never been directly
targeted by JI, although there were a number of Japanese victims in the Bali
bombing. This could be seen as an attempt to implement the al-Qaeda line,
espoused in several al-Qaeda statements that identified Japan as an enemy
(Japan was mentioned in Osama bin Laden's October 7, 2001 statement that
aired on al-Jazeera, in a 2004 statement by Abu Hafs al-Masri and in an
audiotape by Ayman al-Zawahiri that aired on al-Jazeera on October 1, 2004).

Lacking the resources, and arguably avoiding the dragnet across central
Java, the second report cites police intelligence that Noordin was planning
a suicide bombing in mid-April in the capital of the strife-torn province of
Central Sulawesi (Detik.com, April 12). This report is interesting for two
reasons. First, it stated that a man carrying a backpack would likely carry
out the operation. Noordin and his compatriot Dr. Azahari bin Husin, who was
killed in October 2005, were unhappy with JI's rate of attacks. Major truck
bomb operations were conducted on roughly an annual basis (for instance,
Bali in October 2002, the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, and
the Australian Embassy in September 2004). Beginning with last October's
triple bombings in Bali, perpetrated by three suicide bombers with
backpacks, Azahari and Noordin began a wave of smaller bombings in a faster
tempo. When police raided Azahari's East Java safe-house, they found some 30
bombs being prepared.

Second, Central Sulawesi, like the Malukus, has been the site of an
intensified push by JI and affiliated groups to foment a new wave of
sectarian bloodletting. In the immediate post-Suharto period, JI members
established two paramilitary organizations to engage in sectarian conflicts.
Not only did these lashkars, or militias, give JI an important pool of
indoctrinated militants, but they served to discredit the state that did not
come to the defense of the Muslim community.

In 2002, the government brokered a fragile peace in these provinces, but
since then there has been a concerted effort to undermine the fragile peace
process and renew the bloodletting. Since October 2004, incidents in Central
Sulawesi have included the seizure of two caches of more than 125 IEDs, the
bombing of a church, arson attacks in a Christian community that killed six,
the beheading of three Hindu schoolgirls, the targeted assassinations of two
witnesses in criminal trials of Muslim perpetrators of sectarian conflicts,
a bomb that ripped through a crowded marketplace in Palu, killing six and
wounding 45, some three other bombings, and a number of machete attacks.
Very clearly, militants hope to renew the fighting as JI's leaders set about
regrouping and recruiting a new generation of militants (Jakarta Post, May
21, 2005, October 30, 2005, October 29, 2005, November 29, 2005; Tempo,
August 5, 2005). A large percentage of apprehended JI militants come from
these conflict areas.

Additionally, recent press reports suggest that Noordin Mohammad Top has
broken away from JI and formed his own jihadi organization, called Tanzim
Qaidatul Jihad (TQJ). TQJ, according to some analysts, reflects the fact
that most JI members eschew JI's past strategy of focusing on the far enemy,
rather than the near enemy. Yet, the recent reports of Noordin's activities
cast further doubt on the intensity of those factional schisms. The main
determinant in targeting remains available human and material resources,
capabilities, and a desire to hit where Indonesian security forces least
expect it.

Clearly, JI is a much more horizontal organization, loosely organized around
increasingly autonomous cells. Command and control is weaker than in the
past. More than 300 JI members have been arrested throughout Southeast Asia,
more than 200 of which have been in Indonesia-roughly one-tenth of the
estimated size of JI in Indonesia.
Members of JI are encouraged to establish their own organizations (Kompak in
Ambon, for example) with varying degrees of covertness that simply have a
more local geographical range of operations and activities. That does not
mean, however, that they are completely autonomous or that they are working
at odds against JI's goals.

Moreover, the two strategies-targeting Western interests and engaging in
sectarian conflict-are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually
reinforcing. What is interesting is that on May 2, 2005, Indonesian police
arrested three suspects wanted in conjunction with the August
2003 bombing of the JW Marriott in Jakarta in a small village outside of
Poso, Sulawesi. All three, as well as a fourth who escaped, were involved in
not only the sectarian bloodletting in Ambon in 1999-2000, but also the
April 24 attacks in Mamasa, Sulawesi.

Therefore, there is a clear connection between the same people engaged in
both "international jihad" and sectarian conflict. They are simply different
tactics employed at different times. JI has demonstrated an ability to learn
and react to changing security environments.
Sectarian violence attracts less attention from the security
forces-especially from the United States and Australia. Refocusing on
sectarian violence by Noordin's cells, however, taps into a broader strategy
of fomenting sectarian conflict that JI has long used to recruit and
indoctrinate a new generation of jihadis.
 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369973









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