A terrorist organisation rises again
Praveen Swami
[From: The Hindu (Chennai) 24 March 2006]

A MARCH 17 encounter in Ahmedabad shows that the Pakistan-based
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, until recently thought to be defunct, has been reborn
from the ashes and has joined the growing Islamist terror campaign against
India. A register in the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen's office in Islamabad lists
the names of those who gave their lives for its cause: 238 men who were
killed fighting, the forces of first the Soviet Union and then the United
States in Afghanistan, and another
433 in Jammu and Kashmir.

Earlier this month, a clerk at the Harkat office may have added a new entry
to the list of countries against which the terrorist organisation had gone
to war — and then written the names of the first men to die in this
campaign.

On March 17, police in Ahmedabad shot dead Sialkot resident Imran Shehzad
Bhatti, the commander of the first Harkat terror cell to attempt strikes
against India outside of Jammu and Kashmir. Bhatti, who had earlier served
for three years as a field commander in Jammu and Kashmir, died along with
his lieutenant Mohammad `Furkan' Iqbal, who hailed from Karachi, and two
long-standing ethnic-Kashmiri Harkat operatives, Mohammad Ayub Butt and
Mudassir Rather, both from the apple-growing region of Shopian.

Last summer, Bhatti had been given charge of building a new house for the
Harkat: a house from which it could wage war across India. Bhatti, Indian
counter-intelligence officials have found, travelled across much of India,
scouring towns for both recruits and base. He seems to have had more than a
little success in this enterprise. From Punjab, for example, the Harkat
commander even succeeded in purchasing for himself fake documents that
identified him as a policeman serving in the State's vigilance organisation.

Much of Bhatti's network was set up by Butt, a fruit trader from the village
of Laddi, near Shopian in southern Kashmir. Butt's brother, Yakub, had
served for several years with the Jaish-e-Mohammad, before being shot dead
in an encounter last year. Although he worked closely with Bhatti's south
Kashmir Harkat group, Butt's apparently unremarkable life helped him stay
off the radar of the Jammu and Kashmir police. His fruit business, however,
would be critical to Bhatti's plans to expand the Harkat's terror
capabilities.

Travelling with Butt on his visits to fruit markets across India, Bhatti was
introduced to some of the businessman's associates as a friend — and to an
inner circle by the nom de guerre `Azaan,' the term Muslims use for the call
to prayer at mosques. One of Butt's contacts in Punjab helped the Harkat
commander obtain his fake identification; others provided homes and
references to right-wing clerics in New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Ahmedabad,
Hyderabad, and at least half-a-dozen smaller cities.

By late last year, the basic elements of Bhatti's new network were falling
in place. Iqbal, who had long been one of the Harkat commander's most
trusted lieutenants, was able to make contact with newly recruited
associates in New Delhi, Goa, Gwalior, Agra, and Kota.
Like Bhatti himself, Iqbal travelled posing as a businessman linked to
Butt's fruit business, using fake identification — in this case, a driver's
licence obtained from the Yashwantpur Regional Transport Office in north
Bangalore, issued against a false address.

A house of war

For his part, Rather succeeded in obtaining admission to a madrassa near the
southern Gujarat town of Valsad, on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad route both Bhatti
and Butt were now regularly using. Investigators have found that at least
three seminaries in the State rejected the ethnic Kashmiri's application to
study there, unimpressed by his credentials. The fourth, however, proved
less suspicious of Rather's claims that he wished to become a cleric. Soon
afterwards, in January, Bhatti rented the Ahmedabad apartment.

Bhatt's Harkat cell now had a home, soon to be stocked with explosives and
weapons. Days after the house was rented, Butt told his parents he was going
to close a fruit deal. He never returned. His worried family filed a missing
persons report later that month, but the Jammu and Kashmir police had no
success in locating Butt — until, that is, the morning of March 18, when
photographs of the four terrorists killed in Ahmedabad reached the police
headquarters in Srinagar.

Jammu and Kashmir police officials had been increasingly concerned about the
Harkat's rebirth long before those photographs arrived. Late last year,
investigators had learned that a new commander, operating under the
code-name `Talha,' had been despatched across the Line of Control to rebuild
the group's apparatus. The commander, they discovered, had hidden out in the
Bandipora forests in northern Kashmir, before moving to a safe house in
Srinagar.

Weeks of work finally led the Jammu and Kashmir police's crack Special
Operations Group to a small shop in Srinagar's Soura area. Local residents
thought the shop, which specialised in embroidering woollen shawls and
cloaks, was owned by an Urdu-speaking migrant from Uttar Pradesh. Officers
of the Special Operations Group, however, had learned he was a long-standing
Harkat operative named Mohammad Shehzad, a resident of Sialkot in Pakistan —
the man who called himself `Talha.'

On December 21, a brief fire fight outside the shop led to Shehzad's death —
and to the uncovering of a sophisticated communications centre equipped with
satellite phones. Before the week was out, however, the Harkat appointed a
successor. Abdul Qadir Mughal, a resident of Rawlakot in
Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, was given charge of the networks
Shehzad had begun to build. Mughal's term in office proved remarkably short,
though: before dawn on January 1, he was shot dead.

Several second-rung Harkat commanders were eliminated as a consequence of
these strikes targeting the terrorist organisation's top leadership.
Mohammad Iqbal Khan, the Pakistani national who was ordered to succeed
Mughal, was shot dead by police in Baramulla. So too was Azad Ahmad Bhatti,
a Harkat commander from the Pakistani city of Multan who had served as the
terrorist group's division commander in southern Kashmir for over five
years.

As investigators interrogated suspects detained during these operations, the
scale of the Harkat's plans became clear. Between January 14 and February
18, at least nine Jammu and Kashmir residents were arrested on charges of
helping the Harkat. Each member of the network had been assigned a specific
task aimed at providing key operatives cover identities. Pulwama resident
Mohammad Yunus Mir, for example, had applied for Indian passports for the
Harkat's key commanders, using fake names and photographs.

But why should the Harkat's revival be of particular concern? Answers lie in
the special place the outfit has in the history of Islamist terrorism. Until
1984, the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami was the largest clerical organisation
engaged in the U.S.-funded jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
After the death of its founder, Maulana Mohammad Irshad, the HuJI began to
disintegrate. Maulana Qari Saifullah's succession as the HuJI's supreme
leader led his opponents to form the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

Under Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil, the Harkat dramatically increased its
presence in both Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir. Factional disputes with
the HuJI, however, continued to be a serious concern. In June 1993, a
committee of clerics arranged for both organisations to merge into a new
group, the Harkat-ul-Ansar. Maulana Azhar Masood Alvi, the terrorist
released from jail in return for the lives of the hostages on Indian
Airlines flight 814 in 1999, was one of the key figures in this new group.

The HuA gained international attention when it kidnapped European and
American hostages in 1994 and 1995, in murderous efforts to secure Azhar
Masood's release. In 1997, the U.S. declared the HuA a terrorist
organisation, which led the group to resume calling itself the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. A year later, the U.S. fired missiles at two
Harkat-run camps in Afghanistan. The hijacking of IC 814, however,
demonstrated that its capabilities had not been diminished.

Ironically, however, Azhar Masood's first action on his return to Pakistan
was to found a new organisation, the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Much of the Harkat's
cadre defected to the new group, which also took over its offices and
financial assets. Matters came to a head in 2001, when the Harkat provided
support to the Taliban in Afghanistan against the U.S. By 2003, both the
Harkat and the Jaish had lost their primacy to the Lashkar, which did not
challenge Pakistan's new pro-U.S. stance in Afghanistan.

Now, though, it seems clear that the Harkat is being reborn from the ashes
it was reduced to by the events of September 11, 2001, and the U.S.' war in
Afghanistan. Indian intelligence officials estimate that of the 240-odd
terrorists who have crossed the LoC since the Kashmir earthquake in October
2005, upwards of 80 belong to the Harkat. If these figures are accurate, it
would suggest that the group is rivalled, in terms of cadre recently pumped
into Jammu and Kashmir, only by the Lashkar.

Does this rebirth have state patronage? It has become clear in recent weeks
that Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf finds himself in increasing
conflict with some of his one-time allies, notably Islamist hardliners in
the Lashkar. As such, Pakistan's covert services could be throwing their
weight behind the Harkat as a counter-weight. On the other hand, the Harkat
revival could be part of a generalised Islamist offensive leading into the
2007 elections in Pakistan, in which pro-jihad clerical parties hope to
acquire power. What is clear, though, is this: Pakistan's Islamist armies
have no intention of joining in a détente with India that promises them only
their obliteration.

http://www.hindu.com/2006/03/24/stories/2006032405381200.htm





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