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Sword of the Shia
He can deal out death through his black-clad followers and roil the
government any time he chooses. Why Moqtada al-Sadr may end up deciding
America's fate in Iraq.
  [Underestimated No More: Educated Shiites once dismissed the young
cleric as a za'tut--an ignorant child. Now his followers are feared for
their attacks on Sunni civilians in Baghdad.]

Wathiq   Khuzaie / Getty Images for Newsweek

Underestimated   No More: Educated Shiites once dismissed the young
cleric as a za'tut--an   ignorant child. Now his followers are feared
for their attacks on Sunni   civilians in Baghdad.





Newsweek

Dec. 4, 2006 issue - One way to understand Moqtada al-Sadr is to think
of him as a young Mafia don. He aims for respectability, and is willing
to kill for it. Yet the extent of his power isn't obvious to the
untrained eye. He has no standing army or police force, and the Mahdi
Army gunmen he employs have no tanks or aircraft. You could mistake
him—at your peril—for a common thug or gang leader. And if he or
his people were to kill you for your ignorance, he wouldn't claim
credit. But the message would be clear to those who understand the
brutal language of the Iraqi Street.

American soldiers who patrol Sadr's turf in Baghdad understand. They can
spot his men. "They look like they're pulling security," says First Lt.
Robert Hartley, a 25-year-old who plays

cat and mouse with the Mahdi Army in the Iraqi capital. The Sadrists use
children and young men as lookouts. When GIs get out of their Humvees to
patrol on foot, one of the watchers will fly a kite, or release a flock
of pigeons. Some of Sadr's people have even infiltrated top ranks of the
Iraqi police. Capt. Tom Kapla, 29, says he knows who they are: "They
look at you, and you can tell they want to kill you."

Sadr is a unique force in Iraq: a leader from the majority Shiites who
has resisted American occupation from the start. He's a populist, a
nationalist and an Islamic radical rolled into one. Part of his power is
simply that he's powerful. Large numbers of impoverished Shiites view
Sadr as their guardian—the one leader who is willing not just to
stand up for them but to strike back on their behalf. "People count on
the militias," says Lieutenant Hartley, who deals with Sadr's thugs on a
regular basis. "It's like the mob—they keep people safe."

The longer Sadr has survived, the greater his prestige has grown. Iraqis
and foreigners who meet him are impressed by the transformation. He's
more diplomatic and commands more respect. He used to greet visitors at
his Najaf office sitting on pillows on the floor. Now he has a couch
set. His concerns are high-minded: he speaks of fuel shortages and
cabinet politics. In the past, Sadr was shrugged off as a rabble-rouser
and a nuisance. Now he is undeniably one of the most popular leaders in
the country. He is also its most dangerous, for he has the means to wage
political or actual war against any solution that is not precisely to
his liking. He is driven by forces America has long misread in Iraq:
religious sentiment, economic resentment and enduring sectarian
passions.

And he is now a primary target of Sunni insurgents bent on provoking
all-out civil war. Last Thursday, Sunni militants carried out their
deadliest attack since 2003. Multiple car bombs, accompanied by mortars,
killed more than 200 people in Sadr City, a Shiite slum of 2 million
people in Baghdad that is dominated by the Mahdi Army. Shiite forces
responded immediately by firing mortars at a revered Sunni mosque in
Baghdad, and by torching other holy places. Only the presence of U.S.
troops—and a wide curfew over the city—prevented far bloodier
revenge attacks.



More than anyone, Sadr personifies the dilemma Washington faces: If
American troops leave Iraq quickly, militia leaders like Sadr will be
unleashed as never before, and full-scale civil war could follow. But
the longer the American occupation lasts, the less popular America
gets—and the more popular Sadr and his ilk become.

To many, Sadr's brand of Shiite politics—homegrown, populist and
ruthless—seems a natural outgrowth of the ruin left in Saddam
Hussein's wake, and a powerful part of what Iraq has become. The United
Nations calculates that an unprecedented 3,709 Iraqi civilians were
killed in October. Death squads connected to the Mahdi Army, as well as
to other Shia and Sunni groups, capture and execute civilians in cold
blood, sometimes dragging them out of hospitals or government
ministries. Corpses turn up on the street with acid burns on their
backs, or electric-drill holes in their knees, stomachs and heads. Among
ordinary Iraqis, the United States bears much of the blame for the
bloodshed—just for being there. As Sadr put it to NEWSWEEK earlier
this year, "The occupation is the decision maker ... any attack is
[America's] responsibility."

The story of the U.S. confrontation with Moqtada al-Sadr is, in many
ways, the story of American folly in Iraq. It's a story of ignorance and
poor planning, missteps and confusion. Key policymakers often disagreed
about the importance of Sadr and about how to deal with him. The result
was half-measures and hesitation. But the story isn't just about past
failures. It also contains lessons—and warnings—about the
future.



Little More Than 'Mullah Atari'

Moqtada al-sadr did not appearon anyone's radar screen ahead of the 2003
invasion. Even among Iraqis, although he came from an important clerical
family he was seen as a weak figure. Moqtada's father, Muhammad Sadiq
al-Sadr, had been a leading ayatollah, a rival to Grand Ayatollah Ali
Sistani and other top clerics. But gunmen—assumed to be working for
Saddam—murdered the elder Sadr along with two of his sons in 1999.
Moqtada was 25 at the time.



On the evening after his father's funeral, Moqtada presided over a
memorial service at the Safi al-Safa Mosque in Najaf. A storm was raging
outside. At about 8 p.m., three men wearing suits and ties swaggered
into the mosque. Their jackets bulged where handguns were holstered.
They were smirking, recalls Fatah al-Sheikh, a family friend who was
present. Everyone in the mosque knew they were Saddam's men. One of the
visitors offered Moqtada a package: a brick of bank notes wrapped in
crisp white paper. "It was a message from Saddam Hussein," Sheikh
recalls. "They wanted to tell Sayyid Moqtada, 'We killed your father.'
They wanted to see if Sayyid Moqtada could be bought."

Moqtada declined the money, refused to shake hands and told the men to
leave the mosque. A cleric followed the men out, apologized on Moqtada's
behalf and accepted the money—knowing that to refuse it would mean a
death sentence. Fearing immediate retribution anyway, Moqtada cut short
the memorial and canceled two days of official mourning.

Sheikh says that for the next four years, Saddam's secret police
followed Sadr wherever he went. One hot summer day, Sheikh recalls
seeing Sadr leave the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf. Sheikh walked up and
said hello. Sadr squeezed Sheikh's hand tight and opened his eyes wide.
"He was trying to give me a signal." Then Sheikh saw why: two men
dressed in dishdashas, standing behind Sadr and near a Toyota with
tinted windows, were watching.

Saddam kept a close eye on Sadr because the young man inherited a wide
network of mosques, schools and social centers built up by his father.
The network was focused on the impoverished masses of Iraqi
Shiites—the sort of people other religious and secular leaders
didn't have much time for. Even some educated Shiites dismissed Moqtada
as a zatut, or ignorant child. Some called him "Mullah Atari," because
he apparently enjoyed videogames as a kid. He certainly lacked his
father's stature: in his theological studies, Moqtada never reached
beyond the level of bahth al-kharij (pregraduation research), according
to a study by the International Crisis Group. But it's clear now that
most everybody underestimated him.



The Time Bomb Starts to Tick

Top american officials may have been misled, as in so many other things,
by depending heavily on well-heeled Iraqiexiles for advice. The
outsiders, who had lived for many years in London or Washington or
Tehran, disagreed vehemently with each other on what an invasion would
mean. But some told Americans what they wanted to hear: you will be
greeted as liberators, especially by the Shiites and Kurds long
oppressed by Saddam.

American officials listened to Ahmad Chalabi, the well-known scion of a
secular Shiite banking family. Another prominent exile was Abdul Majid
al-Khoei, who was supposed to be a key guide to the Shia religious
community. Both had been away from Iraq for many years, and were
strangers to the place they had left behind.

Al-Khoei paid with his life. The London-based exile returned to the holy
city of Najaf, where he was born and raised, under U.S. military
protection. He quickly organized a local council to get electricity and
water flowing again, apparently with CIA money. (The CIA declined to
comment.) But al-Khoei's father had been Iraq's top ayatollah—and a
bitter rival of Sadr's father—during Saddam's rule. Now the sons
were competing for power and influence. Sadr castigated al-Khoei as a
U.S. agent, and demanded that he turn over the keys to the tomb of Imam
Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law. A gilded cage surrounding the
tomb contains a box for pilgrims' donations, a huge and vital source of
income for religious leaders.

As al-Khoei and a colleague visited the shrine on the morning of April 
10, 2003, an angry mob attacked them with grenades, guns and swords.
"Long live Moqtada al-Sadr!" the mob cried out. Al-Khoei was stabbed
repeatedly, then tied up and dragged to the doorstep of Sadr's
headquarters in Najaf, where he was still alive. A subsequent
investigation by an Iraqi judge found that Sadr himself gave the order
to finish him off: "Take him away and kill him in your own special way."





Yet it wasn't clear at the time of the killing what Sadr's personal role
was, and "we didn't want one of our first acts in country to be taking
out one of the most popular leaders," says a U.S. military officer
familiar with Army intelligence on Sadr. The officer, who did not want
to be named discussing intelligence matters, says the Army was worried
about provoking riots. When Sadr's father was killed in 1999, Saddam
violently crushed protests by angry Shia mobs. "We thought that tens of
thousands would take to the streets in Nasiriya, Karbala and Baghdad. It
always comes back to that—not enough guys on the ground."

One courageous Iraqi judge, Raid Juhi, doggedly investigated the case.
He exhumed the bodies of al-Khoei and his colleague, and wrote up a
confidential arrest warrant for Sadr in August 2003. "From that moment
through April 2004, the issue was whether we were going to enforce the
arrest warrant," says Dan Senor, a senior official in the Coalition
Provisional Authority at the time.

The CPA, the Pentagon and the military on the ground were in
disagree-ment. The Marines in southern Iraq were particularly wary of
stirring up trouble. As it was, the United States was preparing to hand
off the area around Najaf to a multinational force with troops from
Spain and Central America. Still, the Coalition had a secret arrest
plan, and momentum toward nabbing Sadr was building. "The pivotal moment
was Aug. 19, 2003," says Senor. "We were down to figuring out the
mechanisms of ensuring that the operation was seen as Iraqi, executed on
an Iraqi arrest warrant. I remember it was late afternoon and we had
just received a snowflake from [U.S. Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld
... with nine different questions, rehashing how we were going to do
this, to make sure it was not seen as an American operation." (A
"snowflake" was a Rumsfeld memo.)





Suddenly word came that insurgents had detonated a massive truck bomb at
the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. Senor recalls rushing to the
scene with Hume Horan, a top U.S. diplomat and Arabist. Horan leaned
over to Senor and said, "We should take down Sadr now, when no one's
looking." But there was enough chaos to deal with already. The U.N.
bombing was "a huge distraction," says Senor, "and the Sadr operation
was forgotten."



Taking On Iraq's New Taliban

The u.s. invasion had destroyed an economy already crippled by years of
international sanctions. Countless young men were unemployed,
invigorated by the atmosphere of violent change but also poor and
fearful. They wanted to be part of the new order—whatever it would
be. The country was also awash in guns and other weapons, including
those looted from Saddam's vast and unsecured arms depots. The Sadrist
network was perfectly positioned to capitalize on the situation. Sadr
himself wasdetermined to lead a national movement—using a potent
mixture of anti-occupation militancy and millennial preaching about the
coming of the mysterious 12th imam, who Shiites believe will save
mankind. "Moqtada is absolutely hooked on the concept of the
reappearance of the Mahdi," says Amatzia Baram, the director of the Ezri
Center at Haifa University.

The first sighting of black-clad militiamen identifying themselves as
part of Mahdi Army seems to have come in September 2003 in the southern
town of Kufah. "I do not care what the Americans have to say about this,
and I never did," said Sadr when asked about the new militia by
reporters later that month. "Only the Iraqi people can choose who they
want to protect their country." The U.S. military, fighting an
ever-growing insurgency by the minority Sunnis, who had lost power with
Saddam's downfall, didn't want to instigate a two-front war. But that
left the United States without a strategy. If American forces weren't
going to fight Sadr, it made sense to try to entice him into a political
process. But other Iraqi leaders, including prominent Shiites, may have
opposed that idea.

n the winter of 2004, a senior adviser to Ambassador Paul Bremer, the
American proconsul in Iraq, was traveling in the south, meeting with
friendly clerics and community leaders. "I could see how frightened they
were of [Sadr] and his Mahdi Army," recalls the aide, Larry Diamond. "I
was driven past an area, a kind of compound where his black-clad army
was training for the upcoming revolution to seize power and take over.
It just dawned on me that these people were going to make this place an
authoritarian hell of a new sort, Taliban style, and would murder a lot
of our allies in the process."



Diamond went to Bremer and gave him his assessment: the United States
urgently needed to act against Sadr. Bremer responded that he was
waiting for a new plan from Coalition forces. "I first wanted to go
after him when he had probably fewer than 200 followers," Bremer
recalled in an interview with NEWSWEEK last week. "I couldn't make it
happen ... the Marines were resisting doing anything." But in the
meantime, on March 28, 2004, Bremer suspended publication of Sadr's
newspaper after it ran an editorial praising the 9/11 attacks on America
as a "blessing from God."

The response was swift: mass demonstrations, which led to the first of
two Sadr uprisings in 2004. In a final meeting between Diamond and
Bremer on April 1, Diamond pressed the point that the United States
needed more troops in Iraq. It was around 8 p.m., and Bremer's dinner
was sitting on a tray un- eaten. He looked exhausted. "And he just
didn't want to hear it," says Diamond. "In retrospect, I think he had
gone to the well on this issue of more troops during 2003, had gotten
nowhere ... and had just resigned himself to the fact that these troops
just weren't going to come. I think the tragedy is that everyone just
gave up."



When fighting did break out, American forces hammered the Mahdi Army in
Baghdad and Najaf—first in the spring and then again, after a broken
ceasefire, in the late summer. Some of the worst fighting came in
August, as Sadr's militiamen made their stand around the Imam Ali Shrine
in Najaf. They turned the area into a no-go zone, sniping at any sign of
movement. U.S. forces retaliated by laying waste to large swaths of
central Najaf. In the end, Ayatollah Sistani brought his influence to
bear on the renegade cleric and encouraged a ceasefire. Attempts to
enforce the arrest warrant against Sadr and several aides were dropped,
and Sadr's forces disarmed in Najaf or headed out of town. They were
badly bloodied, and some militants were shellshocked. Others bragged
about how they had fought back tanks with AK-47s, or disabled Humvees
with a single grenade. Scores of militiamen were dead, but Sadr's
prestige was, if anything, enhanced: he had fought the mighty United
States to a stalemate.



Getting Sadr Inside The Tent

Sadr needed a new strategy, how- ever. He wasn't strong enough to defeat
the occupier head-on, nor could he eliminate his Iraqi rivals. So he
took up what he calls "political resistance"—working from within the
system. Chalabi played an important role here. Washington's favorite
Iraqi had found that he had little popularity in his homeland, so he was
seeking alliances. Chalabi also felt, as did many other Iraqis and
Americans, that it was better to bring Sadr inside the process than to
have him trying to destroy it. "Sadr is respected because of his lineage
and because he speaks for the disenfranchised, the scared and the
angry," says a Chalabi aide, who did not want to be named because of the
sensitivity of the subject. "In that sort of situation, it makes
absolute sense to try to get him inside the system."

Sadr made the most of the opening. Politicians in his Sadr bloc won 23
of 275 seats in the January 2005 elections and, after fresh voting
nearly a year later, now hold 30 seats. In both cases, because of
divisions between other large Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni parties, Sadr
was able to play kingmaker. Two prime ministers since 2005—Ibrahim
Jaafari and the current Iraqi leader, Nuri al-Maliki—have depended
on his swing votes for their majority. But Sadr himself stayed out of
government, and kept his distance. That way he could pursue a dual
strategy—rebuilding his militia even as he capitalized on his
control of key ministries, like Health and Transportation, to provide
services to the poor and jobs to his followers.

The Sunni insurgents were pursuing a new strategy, too. In early 2004,
U.S. forces had intercepted a worried letter from the Qaeda leader in
Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, to Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi fretted that
his fight against American forces was going poorly. But he had a plan:
"If we succeed in dragging [the Shiites] into the arena of sectarian
war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they
feel imminent danger," he wrote.



Throughout 2005, Sunni insurgents launched increasingly vicious attacks
on Shiite civilians and holy places. Sistani regularly called on his
followers to exercise restraint, which they did with remarkable
forbearance. But Sadr, who had long positioned himself as an Iraqi
nationalist—and who had cooperated with Sunni fighters in the early
stages of the insurgency—now publicly called for Sunnis to disavow
Zarqawi. New battle lines were being drawn.

The turning point came on Feb. 22, 2006, when assailants bombed the
golden-domed Askariya Shrine in Samarra. This was the burial place of
the 10th and 11th imams, and one of the holiest sites of the Shia faith.
After the Samarra bombing, many Shiites felt compelled to lash back.
Caught in a vicious street fight against Sunnis, they decided that
they'd rather have a dirty brawler in their corner (like Sadr) than a
gray-bearded holy man (like Sistani). "We have courage, large amounts of
ammunition, good leaders, and it is a religious duty," says Ali Mijbil,
a 26-year-old mechanic who serves in the Mahdi Army. "So why don't we
fight them? We've been kept under Sunni rule for more than 14 centuries.
It is the proper time to rule ourselves now."

Sadr still insists his main fight is with foreign invaders. He's the one
Shia leader who has opposed the U.S. occupation from the beginning, and
who has continued to call for a strict timetable for American
withdrawal. An overwhelming majority of Iraqis now agree with him. A
September poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org found that 63 percent of 501
Iraqi Shiites surveyed supported attacks against Americans. Even in
Baghdad, where ethnic tensions are worst, Shiites agree with Sunnis on
one thing: the poll found that 80 percent of the capital's Shiites
wanted U.S. forces to leave within a year. That number has changed
dramatically in a matter of months. A January poll found that most
Shiites wanted U.S.-led troops to be reduced only "as the security
situation improves."

In Washington, some politicians still talk about "victory," while others
aim only to stabilize the country and leave with some semblance of
dignity. Many in the U.S. capital are dusting off yesterday's proposals
for tomorrow's problems—more training, more troops, disarming the
militias, more stability in Baghdad. The GOP presidential front runner
for 2008, John McCain, would prefer to increase the number of U.S.
troops in Iraq by 20,000, at least temporarily. He has also called for
Sadr to be "taken out." But it may be too late.



The movement may now be more important than the man. Sadr "is faced with
a common problem," says Toby Dodge of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London. "He can't control the use of his brand
name, the use of his legitimacy." Some elder followers of Sadr's father
have broken away, disillusioned with the son. And some young toughs seem
to be freelancing where they can. Renegade factions could eventually
threaten Sadr's power. If he were to fall, "you'll end up with 30
different movements," says Vali Nasr, a scholar and author who has
briefed the Bush administration on Iraq. "There are 30 chieftains who
have a tremendous amount of local power. If you remove him, there will
be a scramble for who will inherit this movement ... It's a great danger
doing that. You may actually make your life much more difficult."

How the Mahdi Army Works

For now, sadr and his mahdi army have the initiative. They can stir up
trouble without much fear of retribution. A case in point: When
kidnappers grabbed an Iraqi-American translator in Baghdad last month,
U.S. soldiers sealed off the Sadr City neighborhood where they believed
he was being held. But Prime Minister Maliki—who depends on Sadr for
political support—quickly ordered the Americans to remove their
roadblocks. Maliki has also forced the U.S. military to release men
picked up during raids in Sadr City on suspicion of belonging to Shiite
death squads.



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