http://allafrica.com/stories/200702260971.html
What Collapse of Uganda Govt-LRA Peace Talks Could Mean to Regional Stability The New Times (Kigali) OPINION February 25, 2007 Posted to the web February 26, 2007 By Omar D. Kalinge-Nnyago Kigali News that Joseph Kony's LRA has pulled out of the Juba talks came as a bombshell onto Uganda's hopes of a peaceful end to one of Africa's longest running civil wars. For the suffering displaced persons of the North, another sad chapter just opened in their book of woes. Their hopes of returning to their homes have been dealt a heavy blow. Government also looks to be losing the opportunity of appearing to have done the right thing for Northern Uganda after 20 years in power, amidst accusations of colossal neglect of the region by Museveni's government. The LRA have given their conditions for a return to talks: a new chief negotiator to replace Dr. Machar, and a neutral venue, preferably Kenya or South Africa. Could history be repeating itself? It was in Nairobi where the 1985 peace talks, later dubbed peace jokes, between then rebel Museveni's NRA and Okello Lutwa's ruling junta were held. It is widely believed that the failure of those talks have a direct bearing on the emergence of the LRA two years later. Is Moi getting back into the picture to finish business he could not complete then? The Uganda government has called LRA's demands delaying tactics and diversionary. The LRA says its concerns are genuine and whoever does not appreciate them is not being serious at pursuing lasting peace. Beyond the nail biting suspense and a barrage of "I told you so" of skeptics that never believed a peace agreement was possible between the LRA and Museveni, there is the haunting question of: What next? A resumption of hostilities is a possibility unless common ground is reached very soon. Northern Uganda could slide back into civil war. The defence budget could shoot through the roof again, internally displaced persons would increase and a political fallout in the North, not a particularly pro-government area would be inevitable. Internal security would decline, not a desirable situation for a country that has months to host an important event as the Commonwealth Meeting. With a tied down military, Uganda's commitment to send troops to Somalia could face review. Uganda's standing as a stable country in the run up to the fast track of the East African political federation would be heavily compromised. President Museveni's personal ambitions of becoming East Africa's first ever president would be postponed. He has tied his retirement from Uganda's politics to the creation of the EA federation. He has once called the federation "his baby", a remark that did not go down well with other East African states, especially the more ideological Tanzania. President Museveni could nevertheless decide to turn to the Great Lakes security protocol that was signed in Nairobi last December and call for a Great Lakes intervention force, to flush out the LRA from Congo, where its leaders are now leading a fairly comfortable life. There are a few complications however. The LRA is not only in Congo but in Southern Sudan as well, and if recent reports can be believed, in Chad (where some are believed to be doing mercenary work) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It is not a coincidence than Kony once suggested the possibility of asylum in CAR. So, to tame Kony, you want to fight in several countries. Sudan could be the easier theatre. Both Bashir and Salva Kiir do not want to have much more to do with Kony. Congo could be less forthcoming. But there is another option. The United States state department lists the LRA as a terrorist organisation. Action against the LRA, therefore, would be legitimate in the US's war on terror campaign. Because targeted assassinations of terrorists is a preferred American method, President Museveni could persuade the US to launch one of those precision air strikes against Kony and his men in Congo and Sudan like it has just done in Somalia. Yet, to contemplate a precision air strike against Kony, Otti and a few other wanted terrorists would be to imagine that the LRA cannot survive without them, a rather simple assumption. In fact, any move that detaches Kony from the current peace process could take the process to back to square one. I see the government of Uganda deciding go along with Kony's demands, however diversionary, until CHOGM is off the table. As it is now, government has few options but to keep Kony alive and talking. As they say, 'better the devil you know.' Also, the discovery of oil in Bunyoro is also another factor that should make Kony better talking than fighting. No sane government would risk the escalation of a war that can be further fuelled by resource considerations. Bunyoro's proximity and historical ties to Acholi is too delicate a factor to ignore in dealing with Kony at this point. Resource wars attract a lot of interests, even form unlikely quarters. The entire Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region will need more attention from the international community than it is currently receiving in the coming days if stability is to be realised. There is something that is bringing a few places to the fore that is not right: Darfur, Juba, Mogadishu, Owiny Ki-Bul, Ndjamena, and Garamba. Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Congo, Chad also seem to have major problem to solve within its borders and beyond. Are we on track? +++ ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Check out the new improvements in Yahoo! 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