http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/018752.php
 

"Pure Islam" and Michael van der Galiën


Michael van der Galiën is a 23-year-old American Studies student at the
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in the Netherlands, and correspondent in the
Netherlands for Pajamas Media. In a post entitled "
<http://mvdg.wordpress.com/2007/11/02/islamic-law-and-violence/> Islamic Law
and Violence," he commented over a week ago on
<http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/018655.php> a response written by a
student at Brown, Jebediah Koogler, to my Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week talk
there. Since van der Galiën articulates so many common responses to and
common misunderstandings of the work I am doing, I thought it might be
useful to respond.

Jeb Koogler explains the obvious: Islamic law isn’t static. It changes over
time. I also get a bit tired of people who say that the Koran preaches much
more violence than the Bible and Torah do. I’ve read the Koran and I
disagree; it doesn’t teach violence any more than the Bible or Torah.

I discuss this very common argument at length in my book
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1596985151/002-4986521-7864813?ie=UTF8&tag
=robertspencer-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=1596985151> Religion
of Peace?; suffice it to say here that van der Galiën's statement, that the
Qur'an doesn’t teach violence any more than the "Bible or Torah" is flatly
false. For while the Bible contains descriptions of violent acts committed
in the name of God, nowhere does it teach believers to imitate that
violence. Where people are commanded to commit acts of violence, these are
commands directed to specific individuals or groups in particular
situations; they are not universal commands. 

The Qur'an, on the other hand, quite clearly does teach believers to commit
acts of violence against unbelievers -- see 2:190-193, 9:5, 9:29, 47:4, etc.
There are no equivalents to such open-ended and universal commands,
addressed to all believers to fight unbelievers, in the Bible.

Of course, van der Galiën would respond that such passages have not been
understood as such by all Muslims throughout history, and that is no doubt
true. We'll discuss that in more detail in a moment. But it is not the point
here, for when he says that the Qur'an "doesn’t teach violence any more than
the Bible or Torah," he is not talking about interpretative traditions, but
the content of the text. 

In fact, I’d say, the only way for people to defend terrorism or violence by
the Koran is by quoting passages in it completely out of context and to
ignore the spirit of the Koran, which is peaceful. 

Unfortunately for van der Galiën, there is not a single traditional school
of Islamic jurisprudence that would agree with his assessment here, for all
of the schools that are considered orthodox teach, as part of the obligation
of the Muslim community, warfare against and the subjugation of unbelievers.

Shafi'i school: A Shafi'i manual of Islamic law that was certified in 1991
by the clerics at Al-Azhar University, one of the leading authorities in the
Islamic world, as a reliable guide to Sunni orthodoxy, stipulates that “the
caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians...until they become
Muslim or pay the non-Muslim poll tax.” It adds a comment by Sheikh Nuh ‘Ali
Salman, a Jordanian expert on Islamic jurisprudence: the caliph wages this
war only “provided that he has first invited [Jews, Christians, and
Zoroastrians] to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not,
then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the
non-Muslim poll tax (jizya)...while remaining in their ancestral religions.”
('Umdat al-Salik, o9.8). 

Of course, there is no caliph today, and hence the oft-repeated claim that
Osama et al are waging jihad illegitimately, as no state authority has
authorized their jihad. But they explain their actions in terms of defensive
jihad, which needs no state authority to call it, and becomes "obligatory
for everyone" ('Umdat al-Salik, o9.3) if a Muslim land is attacked. The end
of the defensive jihad, however, is not peaceful coexistence with
non-Muslims as equals: 'Umdat al-Salik specifies that the warfare against
non-Muslims must continue until "the final descent of Jesus." After that,
"nothing but Islam will be accepted from them, for taking the poll tax is
only effective until Jesus' descent" (o9.8).

Hanafi school: A Hanafi manual of Islamic law repeats the same injunctions.
It insists that people must be called to embrace Islam before being fought,
“because the Prophet so instructed his commanders, directing them to call
the infidels to the faith.” It emphasizes that jihad must not be waged for
economic gain, but solely for religious reasons: from the call to Islam “the
people will hence perceive that they are attacked for the sake of religion,
and not for the sake of taking their property, or making slaves of their
children, and on this consideration it is possible that they may be induced
to agree to the call, in order to save themselves from the troubles of war.”


However, “if the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it
nor agree to pay capitation tax [jizya], it is then incumbent on the Muslims
to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because God is
the assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, the
infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the
Prophet, moreover, commands us so to do.” (Al-Hidayah, II.140)

Maliki school: Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a pioneering historian and
philosopher, was also a Maliki legal theorist. In his renowned Muqaddimah,
the first work of historical theory, he notes that “in the Muslim community,
the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim
mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by
persuasion or by force.” In Islam, the person in charge of religious affairs
is concerned with “power politics,” because Islam is “under obligation to
gain power over other nations.” 

Hanbali school: The great medieval theorist of what is commonly known today
as radical or fundamentalist Islam, Ibn Taymiyya (Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn
Taymiyya, 1263-1328), was a Hanbali jurist. He directed that “since lawful
warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s
entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims,
those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought.” 

Of course, these are all extremely old authorities -- such that one might
reasonably assume that whatever they say couldn’t possibly still be the
consensus of the Islamic mainstream. The laws of the United States have
evolved considerably since the adoption of the Constitution, which itself
has been amended. So why shouldn’t this be true of Islamic law as well? Many
observers assume that it must be, and that contemporary jihadists' departure
from mainstream Islam must be located in its preference for the writings of
ancient jurists rather than modern ones. But in this, unfortunately, they
fail to reckon with the implications of the closing of the gates of ijtihad.

Ijtihad is the process of arriving at a decision on a point of Islamic law
through study of the Qur’an and Sunnah. From the beginning of Islam, the
authoritative study of such sources was reserved to a select number of
scholars who fulfilled certain qualifications, including a comprehensive
knowledge of the Qur’an and Sunnah, as well as knowledge of the principle of
analogical reasoning (qiyas) by which legal decisions are made; knowledge of
the consensus (ijma) on any given question of Muhammad, his closest
companions, and the scholars of the past; and more, including living a
blameless life. The founders of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence are
among the small number of scholars -- mujtahedin -- thus qualified to
perform ijithad. But they all lived very long ago; for many centuries,
independent study of the Qur’an and Sunnah has been discouraged among
Muslims, who are instead expected to adhere to the rulings of one of those
established schools. Since the death of Ahmed ibn Hanbal, from whom the
Hanbali school takes its name, in 855 A.D., no one has been recognized by
the Sunni Muslim community as a mujtahid of the first class -- that is,
someone who is qualified to originate legislation of his own, based on the
Qur’an and Sunnah but not upon the findings of earlier mujtahedin. 

Islamic scholar Cyril Glasse notes that “‘the door of ijtihad is closed’ as
of some nine hundred years, and since then the tendency of jurisprudence
(fiqh) has been to produce only commentaries upon commentaries and
marginalia.” 

Shi’ite Muslims have never accepted that ijtihad is a thing of the past.
Thus it is with a slight tone of disapproval that the Shi’ite scholar
Murtada Mutahhari notes of the Sunnis:

The right of ijtihad did not last for long among the Sunnis. Perhaps the
cause of this was the difficulty which occurred in practice: for if such a
right were to continue [for any great length of time], especially if
ta`awwul and the precedence of something over the texts were to be
permitted, and everyone were permitted to change or interpret according to
his own opinion, nothing would remain of the way of Islam (din al islam).
Perhaps it is for this reason that the right of independent ijtihad was
gradually withdrawn, and the view of the Sunni `ulama became that they
instructed people to practice taqlid of only the four mujtahids, the four
famous Imams - Abu Hanifa [d.150/767], al Shafi`i; [d.204/820], Malik b.
Anas [d.179/795] and Ahmad b. Hanbal [d.241/855] - and forbade people to
follow anyone apart from these four persons. This measure was first taken in
Egypt in the seventh hijri century, and then taken up in the rest of the
lands of Islam. 

The Imam Hassan Qazwini, director of the Islamic Center of America,
considers this closing off of new interpretations of Islamic law to be a
serious error. According to David Smock, director of the Religion and
Peacemaking Initiative of the United States Institute of Peace:

One of the gravest mistakes Muslims have committed, according to Qazwini, is
closing the doors of ijtihad. They have limited legal interpretation to only
four prominent scholars: Malik Ibn Anas, Abu Hanifa al-No‘man, Muhammad Ibn
Idris al-Shafi‘i, and Ahmad Ibn Hambal—the heads of the Maliki, Hanafi,
Shafi‘i, and Hambali [sic] schools of thought. The motivation for this was
political. During the Abbasid Dynasty (750–1258 CE), the Abbasids decided to
outlaw all other sects in order to strictly control religion and worship, as
well as political matters. 

Closing the doors of ijtihad has had extremely detrimental ramifications for
the Muslim world. According to Qazwini, this decision has resulted in
chronic intellectual stagnation, as thousands of potential mujtahids and
scholars have been prohibited from offering workable solutions to newly
emerging problems. Muslim thinkers have become captive to rules that were
made long ago, leaving little scope for liberal or innovative thought. 

Other Muslims, however, disagree. Seyyed Hossein Nasr of George Washington
University, in his consideration of Islam and modernity, Ideals and
Realities of Islam, says: “Certain modernists over the past century have
tried to change the Shari‘ah, to reopen the gate of ijtihad, with the aim of
incorporating modern practices into the Law and limiting the function of
Shari‘ah to personal life. All of these activities emanate from a particular
attitude of spiritual weakness vis-à-vis the world and surrender to the
world. Those who are conquered by such a mentality want to make the Shari‘ah
‘conform to the times,’ which means to the whims and fancies of men and the
ever changing human nature which has made ‘the times.’ They do not realize
that it is the Shari‘ah according to which society should be modeled not
vice versa.” 

In any case, whether it is a manifestation of “chronic intellectual
stagnation” or fidelity to the Sharia, along with the stasis in other areas
there has been a lack of development in the doctrines of jihad. Even Islamic
apologist Karen Armstrong admits that “Muslim jurists...taught that, because
there was only one God, the whole world should be united in one polity and
it was the duty of all Muslims to engage in a continued struggle to make the
world accept the divine principles and create a just society.” Non-Muslims
“should be made to surrender to God’s rule. Until this had been achieved,
Islam must engage in a perpetual warlike effort.” But, she says, “this
martial theology was laid aside in practice and became a dead letter once it
was clear that the Islamic empire had reached the limits of its expansion
about a hundred years after Muhammad’s death.” 

The problem is that however much of a dead letter it became in practice
during times of weakness in the Islamic world, this doctrine of Islamic
supremacism was never reformed or rejected. No one seems to have told the
warriors of jihad who besieged Europe through the seventeenth century that
the Islamic empire had already reached the limits of its expansion centuries
before. No one seems to have told the modern-day warriors of Islam from
Bosnia to the Philippines that jihad is a dead letter, and that Islam isn’t
doing any more expanding. The Saudi Sheikh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajid
(1962-), whose lectures and Islamic rulings (fatawa) circulate widely
throughout the Islamic world, demonstrates this in a discussion of whether
Muslims should force others to accept Islam. In considering Qur’an 2:256
(“There is no compulsion in religion,”) the Sheikh quotes Qur’an 9:29, as
well as 8:39 (“And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and
polytheism, i.e. worshipping others besides Allaah), and the religion
(worship) will all be for Allaah Alone [in the whole of the world]”), and
the Verse of the Sword. Of the latter, Sheikh Muhammad says simply: “This
verse is known as Ayat al-Sayf (the verse of the sword). These and similar
verses abrogate the verses which say that there is no compulsion to become
Muslim.” 

Other modern writers agree. The Pakistani Brigadier S. K. Malik’s 1979 book
The Qur’anic Concept of War (a book that made its way to the American
mujahedin Jeffrey Leon Battle and October Martinique Lewis, and which
carried a glowing endorsement from Pakistan’s then-future President Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq, who said that it explained “the ONLY pattern of war” that a
Muslim country could legitimately wage) delineates the same stages in the
Qur’anic teaching about jihad: “The Muslim migration to Medina brought in
its wake events and decisions of far-reaching significance and consequence
for them. While in Mecca, they had neither been proclaimed an Ummah
[community] nor were they granted the permission to take up arms against
their oppressors. In Medina, a divine revelation proclaimed them an ‘Ummah’
and granted them the permission to take up arms against their oppressors.
The permission was soon afterwards converted into a divine command making
war a religious obligation for the faithful.” 

Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti, a theology professor at Damascus University,
echoes the classic Islamic legal tenet that Muslims can legitimately wage
war against those who resist the proclamation of Islam in his book Jihad in
Islam: How to Understand and Practice It. Al-Buti considers at great length
the question of whether this armed struggle can be undertaken “to avert
belligerency” or “to put an end to infidelity.” In other words, is jihad
purely defensive, or can it be offensive? (Al-Buti, however, carefully
defines “to avert belligerency” to allow for a pre-emptive strike against a
perceived imminent attack.) 

Al-Buti bases his discussion of this question on the Qur’an and Islamic
traditions. After a thorough discussion of these hadiths and other elements
of Muslim tradition, al-Buti concludes that Muslim forces shouldn’t attack
unbelievers. They should fight when attacked, or when an attack seems
imminent, but that’s all. In this conclusion he notes that he is siding with
three of the four major Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanafi,
Maliki, and Hanbali: all agree, by his account, that military jihad should
only be undertaken to ward off an attack or potential attack. Of course,
such restrictions can be and have been interpreted with great elasticity,
but the fourth Sunni school school of jurisprudence (madhhab) goes even
farther: the Shafi’is, as well as the minor Zahiri school, favor offensive
jihad. The Shafi’is and Zahiris, according to al-Buti, “proclaimed that the
fundamental cause of Jihad is to terminate Paganism.” 

Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Assistant Professor on the Faculty of Shari’ah and
Law of the International Islamic University in Islamabad, in a 1994 book on
Islamic law quotes the twelfth century Maliki jurist Abu al-Walid Muhammad
ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd. Ibn Rushd reports on a consensus (ijma) among Muslim
scholars on jihad warfare – and in traditional Islamic legal terms a
consensus among scholars, once reached, cannot be modified. “Why wage war?”
asks Ibn Rushd, and then he answers his own question: “Muslim jurists agreed
that the purpose of fighting with the People of the Book…is one of two
things: it is either their conversion to Islam or the payment of jizyah.”
Nyazee concludes: “This leaves no doubt that the primary goal of the Muslim
community, in the eyes of its jurists, is to spread the word of Allah
through jihad, and the option of poll-tax [jizya] is to be exercised only
after subjugation” of non-Muslims. 

But if this is so, why hasn’t the worldwide Islamic community been waging
jihad on a large scale up until relatively recently? Nyazee says it is only
because they have not been able to do so: “the Muslim community may be
considered to be passing through a period of truce. In its present state of
weakness, there is nothing much it can do about it.” 

In this view, then, the jihad must continue as long as there are
unbelievers, and only falls into abeyance when Muslims do not have the
military strength to press forward with it. Making war on unbelievers is one
of the responsibilities of the Muslim umma. That the three stages of jihad,
culminating in offensive warfare to establish the hegemony of Islamic law –
which stage is normative for all time -- can be found not only in the
writings of contemporary Islamic jihadists, but also in ancient Muslim
scholars, underscores the traditionalist character of contemporary Islamic
jihad activity. Modern mujahedin are, in their own view, not “hijacking”
Islam; they are restoring its proper interpretation – and they are
successfully convincing peaceful Muslims around the world that they are
correct in this. 

For this to end, peaceful Muslims around the world would have to confront
the fact that bin Laden and other jihad terrorists are regularly justifying
their violence by reference to passages of the Qur’an and the words and
deeds of Muhammad. If they don’t acknowledge this and formulate new and
non-literalist ways of understanding this material, it will continue to be
used to incite violence. In other words, the use that jihadists make of
elements of the Qur’an and Muhammad’s teaching makes it incumbent upon
peaceful Muslims to perform a searching reevaluation of how they understand
those elements, so as to neutralize their capacity to set Muslims against
non-Muslims.

People will do evil in all kinds of circumstances, and use all manner of
justification for it; but the violent passages in the Bible are not
equivalent to those in the Qur’an in content, in mainstream interpretation,
or in the effect they have had on believers through the ages. The fact that
in Islam violence against unbelievers has divine sanction in a way that it
does not in Christianity makes religious violence more prevalent and harder
to eradicate in Islam than it has ever been in Christianity. To equate it to
a jumble of passages from the Bible to which no one would otherwise be
paying any attention at all, at least as direct marching orders for
twenty-first century warriors, is specious and dangerously misleading.

Back to van der Galiën:

As regards to Islamic law: Jeb’s completely right. Throughout the history of
Islam there have been debates about what Islam means, what Islamic law
should look like, etc. To Robert Spencer I would like to say one thing, one
word: Mevlana.

Certainly there has been and is diversity of Islamic law, but as I have
shown above, there has been consensus on the necessity to wage war against
and subjugate unbelievers. I would ask van der Galiën or Koogler to produce
one orthodox school of Islamic jurisprudence, or one scholar recognized as
orthodox, who explicitly rejected this necessity. Mevlana? That's Rumi,
folks, the Persian poet and mystic. Rumi was a terrific poet, and a great
mystic, but does Islamic mysticism in general preclude a proclivity for
jihad warfare? Unfortunately, no. Here is a quote from the pioneering Sufi
mystic Al-Ghazali:

[O]ne must go on jihad (i.e., warlike razzias or raids) at least once a
year...one may use a catapult against them [non-Muslims] when they are in a
fortress, even if among them are women and children. One may set fire to
them and/or drown them...If a person of the Ahl al-Kitab [People of The Book
– primarily Jews and Christians] is enslaved, his marriage is
[automatically] revoked…One may cut down their trees...One must destroy
their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever they decide...they
may steal as much food as they need... 

[T]he dhimmi is obliged not to mention Allah or His Apostle…Jews,
Christians, and Majians must pay the jizya [poll tax on non-Muslims]…on
offering up the jizya, the dhimmi must hang his head while the official
takes hold of his beard and hits [the dhimmi] on the protruberant bone
beneath his ear [i.e., the mandible]… They are not permitted to
ostentatiously display their wine or church bells…their houses may not be
higher than the Muslim’s, no matter how low that is. The dhimmi may not ride
an elegant horse or mule; he may ride a donkey only if the saddle[-work] is
of wood. He may not walk on the good part of the road. They [the dhimmis]
have to wear [an identifying] patch [on their clothing], even women, and
even in the [public] baths…[dhimmis] must hold their tongue…. [2] (From the
Wagjiz, written in 1101 A.D.)

There are  <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/004940.php> other Sufi
authorities who speak in the same vein.

In his response to Jeb Robert Spencer (whom Jeb criticized) writes: “I spoke
of the oppression of their fellow Muslims by Salafists, and discussed at
some length the fact that ‘the overwhelming majority of Muslims don’t
actually follow the passages that [I] cited’.” This, of course, sounds
better, but it still ignores the larger point, namely that these Muslims
don’t ‘ignore’ the passages in the Koran that speak about using violence
against unbelievers, but that they interprete them in their context. In
other words, they don’t just look at such a passage and say “ah yes, kiell
the infidel!,” they look at the entire Koran and understand that they
shouldn’t use violence but should preach and practice peace and tolerance.

Actually, I have never denied that alternative interpretations of the Qur'an
exist. And I am all for them -- in fact, we need more. But what we really
need are ones that are effective enough to begin to seize the intellectual
vanguard away from the jihadists, who make recruits among peaceful Muslims
by presenting their perspective as "pure Islam." Until this is effectively
countered by peaceful Muslims, that recruitment will continue successfully.

This means that Spencer et al. should stop arguing that ‘pure Islam’ is such
and so. That’s not up to them to say. Pure Islam is whatever you want it to
be. Rumi’s supporters thought and think that they are living true “Islamic”
(or Muslim) lives. Bin Laden disagrees and would kill them if he could.
Ahmadinejad thinks that what he preaches is the ‘pure’ Islam, Ali Eteraz
disagrees and offers ‘his’ ‘pure’ version of Islam.

Here van der Galiën gets me flatly wrong, as I have never said that the
jihadist version of Islam is "pure Islam." I have said that the jihadists
say it is, and that they appeal to broad support within the Qur'an and
Sunnah and Islamic jurisprudence, as I've shown above. But does all that
support mean that they're correct in saying that theirs is the "pure Islam"?
No, and I have never said otherwise. If someone, even Ali Eteraz, could
construct a version of Islam that could convince Muslims that the jihadists
did not represent "pure Islam," no one would be happier than I. But I don't
think they will succeed in doing that by denying the scope of the problem
and playing fast and loose with the facts,
<http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/015565.php> like Eteraz. Reform doesn't
occur by denying the need for reform. It occurs by confronting what needs
reforming, and opposing it.

Muslims should decide what ‘pure’ or ‘true’ Islam is and what’s not. 

Quite so. That's exactly what I've been calling upon peaceful Muslims to do
for years now.

And with regards to all religions, those who argue that it’s not about the
letter but about the spirit usually have a stronger case than those who
argue the opposite. We would do well to remember that. 

For instance when Spencer talks about how Islamic law has condoned the
stoning of women. Or how Islamic law has grown to oppress women, etc. All
true. From a modern Western perspective that is. If you look at what life
was like before Mohammed came to power and before he established the new
religion, you’ll see that Islam actually meant progress for Arabic women.
You will also see that Mohammed treated his wives with kindness and depended
on them (for advise, etc.). That’s the spirit of the Koran and of Mohammed’s
life. If you copy the spirit you’ll get an entirely different result today,
then when you only copy the letter.

All true only from a modern Western perspective? So would van der Galiën
deny that there are women awaiting death by stoning in Iran today? I suppose
I, with my modern Western perspective, put them there? It may be wonderfully
true that Muhammad liberated women in his day, but the application of the
letter of his law is oppressing and killing women today. Van der Galiën can
speak loftily about the spirit of that law all he wants, but that isn't
preventing those women in Iran from being stoned to death. 

And I am not going to stop speaking out on their behalf, and for the human
rights of women and religious minorities in the Islamic world, because
Muhammad was ahead of his time in the treatment of women. It's time for all
those who believe in the human dignity of all people, whether they are
Muslim or non-Muslim, to stand up against this oppression. I hope that
ultimately van der Galiën will join us in this stand, rather than making
excuses for the oppressors.

Posted by Robert 

 



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