The effort is not a "war"...it should be though.
 
B 

*       simply put- you cannot undermine their capabilities until you
eliminate their safe havens, training bases, recruitment and staging areas.
We are back to where we were in the 1970-80s where we could control the
primary battlefield, but would not take the battle directly to their
adversary's prime material and ideological support base (then, Russia,
China and Cuba; now Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran).  It is no wonder the
first generation of itnernational terrorism waned when the Soviet bloc was
dismantled.

Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted
Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War'


By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 30, 2008; A04

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/29/AR2008072902
041_pf.html



The Bush administration's terrorism-fighting strategy has not significantly
undermined al-Qaeda
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline> 's
capabilities, according to a major new study that argues the struggle
against terrorism is better waged by law enforcement agencies than by
armies.

The study by the nonpartisan Rand Corp.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/RAND+Corporation?tid=inform
line>  also contends that the administration committed a fundamental error
in portraying the conflict with al-Qaeda as a "war on terrorism." The phrase
falsely suggests that there can be a battlefield solution to terrorism, and
symbolically conveys warrior status on terrorists, it said.

"Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy
warriors," authors Seth Jones and Martin Libicki write in "How Terrorist
Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda," a 200-page volume released
yesterday.

But the authors contend that al-Qaeda has sabotaged itself by creating ever
greater numbers of enemies while not broadening its base of support.
"Al-Qaeda's probability of success in actually overthrowing any government
is close to zero," the report states.

The study was based in part on an analysis of more than 600 terrorist
movements tracked over decades by Rand and the Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism. Jones and Libicki sought to determine why such
movements ultimately die out, and how lessons from recent history can be
applied to the current struggle against al-Qaeda.

The researchers found that more than 40 percent of terrorist movements fade
away when their political objectives are met -- but that this outcome occurs
only when groups are secular and have narrow goals. By contrast, al-Qaeda's
religious and political agenda calls for nothing less than the overthrow of
secular Arab governments and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

A roughly equal number of terrorist groups die when their key leaders are
arrested or killed. In the vast majority of instances, this is accomplished
by local law enforcement, the study notes.

"In most cases, military force isn't the best instrument," said Jones, a
terrorism expert and the report's lead author.

Addressing the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda, the study noted successes in
disrupting terrorist financing, but said the group remains a formidable foe.
Al-Qaeda is "strong and competent," and has succeeded in carrying out more
violent attacks since Sept. 11, 2001, than in all of its previous history.
Moreover, its organizational structure has adapted and evolved over time,
"making it a more dangerous enemy," Jones and Libicki wrote.

The authors call for a strategy that includes a greater reliance on law
enforcement and intelligence agencies in disrupting the group's networks and
in arresting its leaders. They say that when military forces are needed, the
emphasis should be on local troops, which understand the terrain and culture
and tend to have greater legitimacy.

In Muslim countries in particular, there should be a "light U.S. military
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Armed+Forces?tid=infor
mline>  footprint or none at all," the report contends.

"The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous
capacity," it said, "but should generally resist being drawn into combat
operations in Muslim societies, since its presence is likely to increase
terrorist recruitment."

 
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