Note: With the latest news that CNN Reporter Drew Griffin was coincidently placed on the TSA Terrorist Watch List soon after airing very critical reports of corruption within both the TSA and the Federal Air Marshal Service, could there also be a more logical explanation as to why TSA investigators have recently targeted former Federal Air Marshal Jeffrey Denning? The answer just might surprise you . . . then again . . . maybe not. Ticket to an American University? . . . or Ticket to Paradise? By Annie Jacobsen On October 15, 2006, a young Saudi Arabian male named Anwar Al--,* (His full name will not be used for legal reasons) claiming to be an engineering student at the <http://ualr.edu/www/> University of Arkansas in Little Rock, presented what must have been false documents to <http://www.customs.gov/> United States Customs and Immigration (CIS) at an east coast airport and managed to slip into the country illegally. This is something that is not easily done: for a citizen of Saudi Arabia to get into the United States to attend an institution of higher learning requires the scrutiny of multiple, Cabinet level federal agencies. Customs was the last line in a series of Homeland Security controls that began halfway around the world at the <http://riyadh.usembassy.gov/> US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Anyone who has picked up a newspaper since September 11, 2001 understands why this is the procedure: fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals. Those 15 Saudis were issued visas and allowed entrance by United States officials. In other words, technically, those 15 hijackers came here with US consent. For reasons that are tragically obvious, after those 15 Saudis and their four colleagues killed 3000 people, the question of how they got permission to come here so easily caused great alarm. US citizens demanded reform and they got it-sort of. A 100-year old agency was disbanded (INS), the visa-issuing facility in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (where most of the Saudi 9/11 hijackers received their visas) was shuttered and hundreds of millions of dollars flooded into the system to make sure no more murderous terrorists from Saudi Arabia would be coming our way. So how did this Saudi kid presenting himself as a student slip into the United States without being stopped? And what was his reason for doing so? And illegal entry is only one of the federal offenses Anwar Al-- appears to have committed. Others raise even more serious alarms; events just three days after being admitted to the US involving this young, Saudi male raise the national security stakes exponentially. What happened next is enough to make you ask, just who is Saudi Arabia sending our way anyway - and what exactly are we doing about it? Please Do Not Leave Your Bags Unattended On October 18, 2006, Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Jeffrey Denning was about to catch a mission flight out of <http://www.metwashairports.com/national/> Reagan National Airport in Washington D.C. when a piece of luggage left unattended in a crowded area caught his attention. FAM Denning asked the individuals in the area if the bag belonged to any of them. When no one claimed ownership, FAM Denning notified the <http://www.tsa.gov/> Transportation Security Administration (TSA) -the federal agency tasked with protecting the airport from the terrorist threat. An airport police officer arrived to assist Denning. Twenty minutes passed. That's when Denning noticed a young, Middle Eastern man standing nearby watching him; it was Anwar Al--. Denning asked Anwar Al-- if the bag belonged to him. Anwar Al-- said "yes." In a recent interview, Federal Air Marshal Jeffrey Denning explained to me what happened next: "I asked him why he left his bag unattended for so long. He said, 'I don't speak English' in what I call a California accent. I speak a little Arabic because I lived and worked in the Middle East. So I spoke to him in Arabic and he just clammed up. He was being deceptive. My experience said he was lying." Denning asked to see the man's passport and travel documents. At this point, FAM Denning noted several key facts in addition to his name (Anwar Al--), his passport number and date of birth. . That Anwar Al-- was from Saudi Arabia. . That his passport showed he'd cleared US Customs three days before. . That he carried with him a document, on letterhead, from the University of Arkansas, which stated he was a student. . That he carried with him airline tickets from Washington, DC to Little Rock, Arkansas via Atlanta, Georgia. Following protocol, FAM Denning phoned the information in to the MOC (Mission Operations Control) at the Federal Air Marshal Service Headquarters. An alarming message came back: "Officer Approach with Caution." The MOC informed FAM Denning that a man named Anwar Al-- was on the TSA terrorist watch list. Denning went back to the suspect. "I asked him to turn around-in English-so I could pat him down for an officer safety check. He turned around right away. He understood what I said." FAM Denning and the airport police officer spent the next few hours watching Al-- while FAM Denning communicated with the MOC. "Word was there were two men named Anwar Al--. Apparently, one was a terror suspect and the other one was not. [DHS was] working to establish which Anwar Al-- this was," Denning explained. "I asked him what he'd been doing for three days in Washington. He said 'visiting friends.'" The Federal Air Marshal Service notified the <http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf/> Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) about what was going on. JTTF is made up of Homeland Security Agents, FBI Agents, and local police officers, all of whom work together to deter and detect terror-related crimes. The theory behind JTTF is that by using the talents of multiple agencies-each coming at the threat with expertise in different arenas-the greatest results can be achieved. JTTF tried getting an Arabic speaker to the scene but, according to Denning, "no fluet [Arabic] speaker was around." JTTF tried getting the bomb-sniffing dogs over to the scene to examine Al--'s bag but, according to Denning, the dogs were "tied up with something else." So Denning and the airport police officer searched the bag. JTTF was working to get an <http://www.ice.gov/> Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent to the scene -- and quickly. That's because The 9/11 Commission Report determined that examining a terror suspect's travel documents in a situation such as this one, is a key counterterrorism move. And ICE agents are the only Homeland Security agents trained to examine such documents. If there was anything suspicious about Anwar Al--'s entry into the US just three days earlier, one would assume the Homeland Security net would come down on him now. Surely, now that alarm bells has been sounded inside the upper-most echelons of six, US federal agencies-DHS, TSA, FAMS, ICE, JTTF, FBI-and with a match-hit on a terrorist watch list, Anwar Al-- would be under intense scrutiny and taken in for further questioning. At least in theory he would be. Denning explained what happened next: "They [i.e.: DHS/JTTF and the airport police] couldn't get an ICE agent to the scene so I was asked to examine [Al--'s] travel documents. This struck me as odd because I have no training in examining travel documents. None of the Federal Air Marshals have received training that I'm aware of. Finally word came back from the MOC. They said, 'we've been waiting on the FBI. We can't get them to verify. Let him go.'" FAM Denning followed orders. As he watched Anwar Al-- pick up his bag and disappear into the throngs of travelers at Reagan National Airport, Denning told me that he thought to himself, "I seriously hope this guy doesn't show up on the evening news." Oh, Brother Where For Art Thou? I first heard about this incident in February of 2007, approximately 100 days after it happened, from a Homeland Security agent who was peripherally involved. I had not yet interviewed FAM Denning nor was I convinced that Al-- had entered the country illegally, so my first task was to get Al--'s side of the story. I called the University of Arkansas and spoke with administrator James Felton. Felton agreed to pass a message along to Anwar Al-- on my behalf. A few days later, at 7:42 a.m. I received a call from Felton. He sounded panicked. "We have a serious problem," Felton told me. "Anwar Al-- never showed up for class." Felton told me he had Anwar's younger brother, Mohammed-an undergraduate student at the University- with him. Felton put Mohammed on the line. Mohammad asked me if I knew where his brother was; I said I was looking for him myself. I asked Mohammed if he knew where his brother was; Mohammed said he didn't. I asked Mohammed if he knew why his brother didn't show up for class. He said his brother "decided to continue [his studies] in Jordan or Egypt or Saudi Arabia." He also told me it was "too hard to get a <http://www.gmac.com/gmac/thegmat> GMAT in the United States." I asked Mohammed if he had spoken directly with his brother since he'd arrived in the United States on October 15, 2006. Mohammad said he had not. I asked Mohammed if he knew if the FBI was looking for his missing brother. "I know nothing about that," Mohammed said. University Administrator James Felton came back on the line. "Arkansas law prevents you from recording our conversation," he said. Then he hung up. I reviewed my facts up to that moment: a young man from Saudi Arabia-whose name is on the terrorist no-fly list-comes to America on a student visa, is involved in a suspicious incident in a Washington DC airport, gets questioned by Homeland Security agents, involves the FBI, is let go and then never shows up for class? That alone is a story. But there were far too many unanswered questions so I continued to investigate. Tight Lips No one wanted to discuss Anwar Al-- with me. Not DHS, not FAMS, not TSA, not ICE, not JTTF, not the FBI. Question after question I posed to these agencies came back to me with the likes of, "we don't comment on specific cases" et al. Through anonymous sources, I was given the name and number of the FBI Special Agent involved in the incident, the man who'd allegedly given the orders to release Anwar Al-- from DHS custody. So I called him. I reached Special Agent W. in his office and shared with him what I knew; he told me "never to call [him] again." For good measure, Special Agent W. added that he "was now required to report me to the FBI." I said that was fine. But who could answer my questions, I wanted to know? With Anwar Al-- at large, wasn't public safety a concern? Special Agent W. referred me to FBI Washington Spokesperson Debra Weierman, who in turn stated she had "no comment." I reminded Weierman that the FBI had been outspoken about missing foreign student cases in the past -the missing Egyptian students from Montana State came to mind. Why the tight lips about Anwar Al--? "No comment," Weierman said again. How It Works: What Happened When 11 Egyptian Students Went on the Lam In investigating this story I learned that at least two Universities continue to work in the spirit of transparency, democracy and public policy at a time in history when it seems like some agencies of the US government do not. To this end, I called Dr. Norman Peterson, the Vice Provost for <http://www.montana.edu/international/> International Education at Montana State University, looking for a lead. Dr. Peterson was involved in the missing-foreign-student manhunt that caught the nation's attention last summer when 11 Egyptian students failed to show up for class. It was Dr. Peterson, on behalf of the University, who reported them missing. None of those Egyptians were on the no-fly list. None of them had run-ins with federal agents from DHS. They didn't enter the US illegally; they simply failed to show up for class. And yet, after it was established that the Egyptian students were missing, the FBI issued a nationwide-alert (including photographs) calling for their apprehension. Dr. Peterson explained why. "There is a mandatory reporting system for foreign students called SEVIS [ <http://www.ice.gov/sevis/> Student and Exchange Visitors Information System] which tracks and monitors students while they are in the United States. When foreign students arrive in the US, we expect delays. In the course of being questioned at Customs, they often miss their connecting flights. So a delay by a day is normal. But after three days of not showing up, we got seriously concerned about these [11 Egyptian] students. We contacted Mansoura [University] their home University in Egypt. We did everything we could to locate them. We even got messages back to their parents. We made it clear that things could get very bad very quickly if they didn't let us know where they were. On the fourth or fifth day, we didn't have a choice. We reported to the SEVIS reporting system that the students never showed up for class. This was obligatory on our part. It is required by US federal law." I asked Dr. Peterson if he thought the SEVIS system was a good one. "Regardless of how I feel, it's the law. There was no way this University was going to circumvent that," Dr. Peterson said. Given the FBI's reaction to the missing Egyptian students, why then, I wondered, didn't the FBI issue a manhunt for Anwar Al--, now that it was determined he never showed up for class? The only explanation I could come up with was that the University of Arkansas had failed to report him as missing. How It Doesn't Work At first, high-ranking officials at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock (UALR) refused to answer further questions about Anwar Al--. "We're not going to discuss any of this with you. It's a privacy issue," I was told by Dr. Susan Hoffpauir, <http://ualr.edu/academics/index.php/home/provost/staff/> Assistant Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs. Felton had since left the University and Dr. Hoffpauir said she said she was unaware of my conversation with him or Mohammed. "We complied with the SEVIS system," she said and that was about all she would say. I asked further questions about ICE's response and the FBI's reaction to the missing student but Dr. Hoffpauir would not answer them. And then, in a surprise move, Dr. Hoffpauir offered to recheck University records for me. In our next conversation, she said this: "He was due to start classes on January 16, 2007. We reported him missing in February; the law gives you thirty days. We complied." So what was he doing at Reagan National Airport on October 18, 2006? I asked. "We don't know," Hoffpauir said. "But we weren't expecting him until January so he wasn't missing in October. We don't have an October start date. It doesn't make any sense." Essentially what Dr. Hoffpauir was saying to me was that as far as the University of Arkansas knew, Al -- should have flown into the US in January. So, why did he fly here in October? The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia To find out more about Saudi student visas, I called Nail Al-Jubeir, the friendly, knowledgeable spokesman for the <http://www.saudiembassy.net/> Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia located in Washington D.C. "Is it possible for a Saudi student scheduled to start classes in January to arrive in America approximately three months before that January start date?" I asked Al-Jubeir. "Not according to US Immigration law it isn't," Al-Jubeir explained. "There is a [pre-start date] limit of 30 days." "Could mistakes happen?" I asked? "Very unlikely," Al-Jubeir said. A Saudi student visa is a coveted visa indeed. Of the 7,500 Saudi students coming to the United States on student visas for the academic year 2006/2007, the majority of those students have all expenses paid by the Saudi Royal family. There is an approximate five-month wait-time to get an appointment to at the US consulate in Riyadh. According to Al-Jubeir, the visa application itself can take six months. Any "mistake" with a visa could seriously jeopardize a student's good standing. "It [a mistake] could happen, but it would be very rare," Al-Jubeir explained. The Envelope Please To make sure "mistakes" don't happen, Al-Jubeir explained the US Embassy's sealed envelope procedure. "A student gets an I-20 form from the school [in the United States]. It's signed by the school, along with a letter of admission from the school. The student takes that I-20 form to the US Embassy and based on that information the visa is issued." But there are considerably heightened controls involved in Saudi Arabia; Al Jubeir explained. "You have to understand how much information is on that piece of paper [i.e.: the I-20]: name, date of birth, degree, tuition, room and board, school cost per year, proof of [payment] and other things. And you see -- and this is important -- the embassy official gives the student that I-20 form back in an envelope that is sealed [his emphasis]. When the student arrives in the United States, they must present that sealed envelope to US immigration. The information on the I-20 form must match the information on the visa." In other words, there was only one way for Anwar Al-- to have entered the US on October 15th "by mistake." If the University of Arkansas issued him an I-20 with an October 15-November 15 date written on it. I called back Susan Hoffpauier and told her what I'd learned. In the spirit of transparency, Hoffpauir agreed to a conference call with the University officials in charge of the SEVIS reporting system, as well as General Council for the University of Arkansas System, Mark Hagemeier. There were a total of six of us on the call. During that call, I found the answers I was looking for. Based on those facts, University Officials issued these conclusive statements on the case: . "We [The University] issued Anwar Al-- three I-20 forms." . "The first one was for May [2006]; he deferred." . "The second one was for August 28 [2006]; he deferred again." . "And the third one was for January 16 [2007]. We never got a message from Riyadh [that he deferred]." . "If the student had used an I-20 issued by University of Arkansas, [the dates of which would be either May 2006, August 2006 or January 2007] it would have been impossible for him to enter the country legally on October 15 [2006]. He should have been stopped at the border." . "He never showed up for class." . "We have never heard from him again." What We Know Apparently Anwar Al-- applied for a US visa with doctored paperwork from the University of Arkansas. Despite the required face-to-face interview with US Embassy officials (a fact confirmed with me by the State Department), no one caught this. Instead, an embassy worker issued Al-- a visa to come to a University in the middle of a University semester, a highly irregular time. Al-- got on a plane and flew into the United States, despite his name being on a terrorist watch list. Al-- passed, undetected, through Customs and Immigration despite the fact that he presented what must have been fraudulent travel documents, and despite the fact that his name was on terrorist watch list. Three days after his illegal entry, he was involved in a suspicious incident at an airport that involved six US Federal Agencies. . Not one of them detained him for further questioning; . ICE agents never examined his travel documents; . An Arabic speaker never questioned him in his native tongue; . Bomb-sniffing dogs never examined his bags. . FBI couldn't "verify" that this particular young man was the terrorist on the watch list, so Al-- was let go. . Al-- never showed up for class. Four months after he arrived, in February 2007, University officials reported him missing. ICE agents never contacted the University for a follow-up to his absence, nor did agents from FBI. Anwar Al-- had successfully slipped past every, single federal control system put in place to catch someone like him in a post-9/11 world. He remains at large. What We Don't Know What we don't know is why Anwar Al-- decided to commit fraud, break multiple US federal laws and toss a coveted United States education to the wind. The University confirmed with me that Anwar Al--'s prospective tuition would have been paid for by the government of Saudi Arabia had he shown up. (He was on a full scholarship) This begs the question, what possibly could have been worth more to Anwar Al-- than a free ticket to an American University? One wonders if a ticket to Paradise promised Anwar Al-- a greater reward. Answers Anyone? Someone must have an answer; I tried getting it. There's tragic joke among my federal agent sources that getting an answer from DHS about a national security failure is as easy as building a snowman in Saudi Arabia. If Anwar Al-- got into the US with doctored papers, that means a cascading series of mistakes was made by various Homeland Security agencies. They say to err is human. But there is one element of egregious negligence in this scenario that is impossible to ignore: Why didn't ICE send an agent to Reagan National Airport to examine Anwar Al--'s travel documents? He was involved in a suspicious incident and his name appeared on the terrorist watch list? What more of a necessary threshold for serious investigation could there be? I emailed this question to Jamie Zuieback, Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs for ICE. Every day, for two weeks, I worked with agency spokesperson, Ernestine Fobbs, while Zuieback promised to "release to me information on the case." This Herculean feat took no less than 17 office and cell-phone calls between Fobbs and me. Day after day, phone call after phone call, the tireless Fobbs kept promising me that information about what had happened at Reagan National Airport with Anwar Al-- was right around the bend. Eventually, here's what Zuieback had to say: "The University of Arkansas acted appropriately in compliance to the regulations governing schools certified by ICE to accept foreign students. ICE has over 5,600 agents nationwide whose broad schedule of specific responsibilities includes supporting operations at airports throughout the country. However, we are not able to discuss specific cases." So, after 17 calls requesting an answer to a specific question, I received a 50-word non-answer. It's enough to make you ask, just who was sent here from Saudi Arabia - and what exactly are we doing about it? ***************** Annie Jacobsen, author of Terror in the Skies: Why 9/11 Could Happen Again, writes about business, finance and terrorism for a variety of national and international magazines and webzines. She also blogs for <http://www.theaviationnation.com/> The Aviation Nation and WomensWallStreet.com. A graduate of Princeton University, she lives in Los Angeles, California, with her husband and two sons. Jeffrey J. Denning has spent more than ten years in military and law enforcement special operations environments. Co-founder of Liberty Protective Solutions --a private security consulting company-- he is considered a leading authority in terrorist tactics and countermeasures, suicide bombings, and high-risk police incidents. After leaving the Federal Air Marshal Service, Denning was called to active duty and served as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army Reserves in Iraq. Denning is currently an Aviation Security blogger for <http://www.washingtontimes.com/communities/aviation-security/> The Washington Times. = _____ [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
