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Russian and Chinese Support for Tehran 

 
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from George L. Simpson, Jr.    


Thursday, 22 July 2010 20:51 

        


Iranian Reform and Stagnation


Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2010, pp. 63-72

Recent years have witnessed the rise of irregular but frequently intensive
opposition to U.S. global preeminence by Russia and China. In their own
ways, and in pursuit of their own interests, each of these authoritarian
governments has established an informal alliance with the Islamic Republic
of Iran.

92For its part, the Khamenei regime in Tehran continues to view the United
States as the "Great Satan" and works against American interests by engaging
in international terrorism,[1] aiding in attacks on U.S. and coalition
personnel in Iraq[2] and Afghanistan,[3] working to derail any resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute,[4] and most of all by seeking to acquire
nuclear weapons. 

There is a long history of conflict between Russia and Iran, so why is
Moscow now warmly regarded by the Islamist regime, and why does Moscow, in
turn, court Tehran? Furthermore, what explains Iran's new alliance with
China? Has a new axis, opposed to the United States and Europe, formed, and
if so, what are its roots and ramifications?

 


A New Geostrategic Axis?


Russian commentator Andrei Volnov has called the de facto
Moscow-Beijing-Tehran alignment "a new geostrategic axis."[5] While such a
characterization is more metaphor than reality, a trilateral combination,
based on the common goals of promoting economic self-interest and reducing
U.S. influence, certainly has been built on the foundations of fairly recent
but significant bilateral ties between the two countries and Tehran. Thus,
Ariel Cohen, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, notes that
Moscow's ties with the Iranian regime "reflect a geopolitical agenda which
is at least twenty years old."[6] Russia is engaged in what might be called
"strategic opportunism" as it constantly fishes in troubled waters with the
goal of identifying vulnerabilities that its policy makers can exploit.[7]
Similarly, one can trace Beijing's increasing links with Tehran to the first
years of the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s.[8] For its part, Iran has
followed a consistent anti-America and anti-Israel path since its 1979
revolution.

Proponents of an informal alliance from the Russian Federation, China, and
Iran present it as a reaction to the unilateralism of the United States and
alleged U.S. aspirations for global hegemony. They consider the United
States a significant rival and a threat to their long-term security.
Consequently, Russia's goal, according to Cohen, is to engage in a
"balancing strategy" that will knock the United States down a notch and thus
revise the international status quo. While Cohen makes this point for
Moscow's policy, it is an equally apt characterization of Beijing's approach
as well.[9]


The View from Beijing


The leaders of China and Iran feel that they are the proud heirs to two
great and ancient civilizations that have been humiliated and made victims
of Western imperial aggression. They believe that Washington's "hegemonism"
represents the unjust continuation of long-standing Western efforts to keep
them weak and subordinate.[10] Hence, Sino-Iranian relations are bound by
what Asia and Middle East analyst John Calabrese calls a "kinship of
nationalisms."[11]

Perhaps more importantly, an understanding of economic issues further
explains China's lukewarm support for the United States in its disputes with
Iran. China, which has one of the world's fastest growing economies and
which has designs on becoming an economic superpower, is today the world's
second largest consumer of oil. Nearly 60 percent of its oil is imported
from the Middle East. Iran, which possesses about 10 percent of the world's
proven petroleum reserves, replaced Saudi Arabia as the leading supplier of
oil to China in May 2009. Indeed, since reaching an agreement in October
2004, Beijing and Tehran have penned energy deals that purportedly are worth
more than US$120 billion.[12]

Furthermore, Iran's oil producing facilities and equipment are in serious
need of modernization. Beijing's willingness to invest in this vital sector
of the Iranian economy (as much as 90 percent of Iran's export income comes
from oil) is crucial to the fiscal well-being of the present Islamist
regime, which, according to official estimates, faces an 11 percent
unemployment rate and inflation exceeding 13 percent.[13] Thus, the China
National Petroleum Corporation, China's largest oil producer and supplier,
signed a deal in January 2007 worth $3.6 billion to develop Iranian offshore
gas fields. As recently as June 2009, the same company put its name to a $2
billion contract for development of the northern section of Iran's Azadegan
oil field near Ahvaz.[14]

Despite U.S. pressure to keep Iran economically isolated, China has leaped
into the void created by U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic since
its 1979 revolution. In 2003, trade between the People's Republic and Iran
reached a record $4 billion, and that figure soared to $16 billion in 2006
and $29 billion in 2008.[15] Crude oil constitutes 80 percent of China's
imports from the Islamic Republic with mineral and chemical products making
up most of the remainder. Beijing's exports are more diversified, with
machinery, electrical appliances, textiles, vehicles, and aircraft
comprising the most important commodities in demand from Iran.[16]

Before 1997, Beijing had, for more than a decade, been Iran's most important
partner in helping the Islamist regime develop its nuclear capability. As
China expert John W. Garver writes, China's cooperation with Iran "was
extensive, sustained over a fairly long period, and of crucial importance to
Iran's nuclear effort."[17] The Chinese have apparently retreated from their
policy of direct cooperation with the mullahs on the nuclear front since
that time.


The View from Moscow


One might think that the long history of conflict between Russia and Persia
would preclude Iran from seeking Russian aid. As far back as Peter the Great
(r.1682-1725), tsars and tsarinas have nibbled at Iranian borders in the
Caucasus and the Caspian region. Over time, first the Romanovs, then the
communists intervened more and more in Persian affairs, with the latter
going so far as to establish short-lived "People's Republics" in Kurdish and
Azeri regions of Iran. Despite this, the courtship continues.

Russia also has economic reasons to back the Tehran regime. Russia's trade
with Iran is more modest than China's but nevertheless significant. Total
trade between the two countries equaled $3.2 billion in 2008 with analysts
predicting even higher numbers within a few years. As both countries are
major energy producers, they share a common interest in establishing pricing
policies for oil and natural gas as well as manipulating these markets to
their advantage.

More significant, however, is Moscow's role in the Islamic Republic's
nuclear program. The Russian government has assisted in Iran's construction
of the $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant and has helped the mullahs
obtain nuclear knowledge.[18] As a result, Moscow, as well as Beijing, is at
odds with Washington over how to deal with Tehran's efforts to gain a
nuclear capability. China and Russia, both of which wield veto power on the
United Nations Security Council, have consistently obstructed efforts in the
U.N. to halt Tehran's drive to obtain nuclear weapons. While it is true that
from time to time, both countries have called on Iran's regime (which is a
signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) to cooperate with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), neither has supported effective
sanctions or forceful measures to deal with the problem. Gennady Yevstafyev,
a senior adviser at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, has gone so far
as to contend that "Washington closed its eyes to the creation of nuclear
weapons by its strategic partner, Pakistan. But now it is threatening a war
on its ex-strategic partner Iran for the same crime."[19]

Moscow continues to talk out of both sides of its mouth. Sergei Kiryienko,
the director-general of Rosatom, Russia's federal atomic energy agency, has
stated the official Russian position that "broad access to civilian nuclear
power must be guaranteed while at the same time there must be a guarantee
that weapons of mass destruction will not proliferate under any
circumstances."[20] As recently as October 2007, then-president Vladimir
Putin described a nuclear armed Iran to be a "strategic threat" to Russia
when he met with leaders of the European Jewish Congress and with French
president Nicolas Sarkozy in Moscow. Yet the Russian leader went on to claim
that there was no "objective data" proving that Iran was seeking nuclear
weapons so that "we proceed from a position that Iran has no such
plans."[21] What lies behind the inscrutable strongman's thinking is
difficult to say for certain, but one can speculate that Putin's antipathy
towards the United States as well as his desire to conciliate cronies within
the Russian Federation's military-industrial complex goes a long way to
explain this gamble.


China, Russia, and Iranian Weaponry


Arms sales to Iran by China and Russia, which the three countries insist are
lawful, is another source of contention between the latter two and
Washington.[22] Russia is Iran's biggest weapons supplier by a wide margin,
though China is also an important source. Russia reportedly supports the
Islamic Republic's development of ballistic missiles, which former Secretary
of State Colin Powell warns have been redesigned to enable them to carry
nuclear warheads.[23] Currently, the Iranian military is trying to develop
the Shahab-6 missile, a variant of the North Korean Taep'o-dong-2C/3, which
will have a range of 3,500 miles, putting Europe within its sights. There
are unverified reports that the Russians have transferred rocket engine
technology for this program and even some speculation that Moscow is helping
Tehran with a missile that will have a 6,300-mile range, enabling it to
reach the eastern seaboard of the United States.[24]

For its part, although the Chinese government denies as "groundless
allegation[s]" reports about its role in supplying Iran with weaponry,[25]
<outbind://51-000000000217A9092DA2D946B02079870B522FB9C44F9000/#_ftn25>  it
is clear that it has transferred missile components and technology to Iran
since the 1980s.[26] For example, Tehran has obtained Chinese-made anti-ship
surface-to-surface C-801 and C-802 missiles, which pose a potential threat
to Persian Gulf shipping and U.S. naval vessels in the region.[27].

According to the CIA and experts in the field, Iran is also trying to
develop sophisticated biological and chemical weapons.[28] These efforts go
back to the Iran-Iraq war when the Iranians were on the receiving end of
Iraqi chemical attacks. Although Iran has ratified the Biological Weapons
Convention, specialists believe that with the help of Russian experts, it is
"in the advanced research and development phase" of weaponizing chemical
toxins and living organisms.[29] For its part, China has helped in Iran's
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by selling precursor and dual-use
chemicals, as well as the technology and equipment needed to use them. Thus
there is good reason to conclude that "the Iranian leadership intends to
maintain a robust CW [chemical weapons] capability."[30]

Washington is concerned not just with Iranian possession of sophisticated
weapons but with the prospect of Tehran transferring them to terrorist
proxies, such as Lebanese-based Hezbollah. In fact, the group launched an
Iranian C-802 missile during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, which hit the
Israeli missile frigate Hanit.[31] According to Israeli press reports, the
mullahs are currently supplying Iranian-made Zelzal and upgraded Fateh-110
surface-to-surface missiles to the radical Shi'i group.[32] In August 2009,
Israeli president Shimon Peres claimed that Hezbollah currently had 80,000
Iranian-supplied missiles.[33] While neither Moscow nor Beijing is directly
responsible for these developments, neither appears particularly concerned
when the weapons or technologies they transfer to Iran find their way into
the hands of terrorist organizations.

Finally, both Moscow and Beijing are aiding the Iranian military as it
develops advanced conventional weapons. Despite Washington's strong
objections, by late 2006, the Russia government had sold and begun delivery
to Tehran of twenty-nine of its Tor-M1 air defense systems. Moscow argues
that the $700 million sale is totally legal and asserts that these are
"defensive" weapons.[34] Iran's acquisition of such a sophisticated and
advanced system poses a threat to any potential U.S. or Israeli air attack
to take out Tehran's nuclear facilities.[35] Iran has also acquired at least
ten Russian-made Pantsyr-S1E self-propelled short-range gun and missile air
defense systems from Syria.[36] In March 2007, the Russian investigative
journalist Ivan Safronov died mysteriously after learning that Moscow's
military-industrial complex was planning to transfer S-300VB missiles to
Iran via Belarus.[37] These are Russia's equivalent to the U.S.'s Patriot
missiles: The S-300VB is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and has
a range of 150 kilometers.[38] As of this writing, it appears that Iran has
not received the weapons, but Iranian officials are eager to do so.[39]
There are numerous reports that Russia and China have also covertly sold
Iran an array of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), combat aircraft,
sophisticated radar systems, and fast-attack missile vessels.[40] Some of
the SAMs have apparently made their way to insurgents fighting coalition
forces in Iraq.[41] Sources also claim that either China or Kyrgyzstan has
sold the Iranians high-speed torpedoes originally produced by the
Russians.[42]


Mixed Signals?


Recent events demonstrate the complexities of the evolving relationship
between Tehran and its great-power allies. Over the summer of 2009, there
were mixed signals coming from Russia and Iran concerning bilateral ties. In
June, following the upheavals in Iran over that country's disputed
presidential elections, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev cancelled, because
of alleged scheduling conflicts, a planned meeting with Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), a mutual-security organization comprising China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[43] Iran has observer status
with the multinational group and aspires to become a full member, but the
Russians have not gone out of their way to make this happen. In August 2009,
Russia joined with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan in a four-party
regional summit to which Iran was not invited.[44] At that time, the
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a journal whose views sometimes reflect those of the
Kremlin, editorialized, "It appears that the idea that Iran is a regional
power, which Russia could use as a trump card in relations with the West,
has turned out to be mistaken."[45] It would appear that at least some in
the upper echelons of the Russian government doubted the wisdom of
continuing support to Tehran following the disputed election and the
international opprobrium directed against the mullahs as they suppressed
subsequent dissent.

For their part, at least some Iranians took note of this chilly behavior. An
editorial in the "moderate" Iranian newspaper E'temad, which serves as the
mouthpiece for Mehdi Karroubi's oppositional National Trust Party,
complained that Moscow had not helped Iran in the United Nations with its
"peaceful pursuit" of nuclear energy as much as it could, and that it was
dragging its feet in getting the Bushehr nuclear facility up and running.
The article concludes, "Russians cheat their allies if it is necessary, and
history shows that they have swindled us heavily."[46]

At the same time, other Russian officials have acted as if it were business
as usual between Moscow and Tehran. Moreover, supporters of this approach
seem to have had the final say in the Kremlin. Two days after what was
viewed by most outside observers as a fraudulent vote, newly "reelected"
Iranian president Ahmadinejad made his first foreign trip to Russia. Russian
deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov called the visit "symbolic" and
added, "This is a signal of successful mutual relations in the future."[47]
Shortly thereafter, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov referred to the
Iranian elections as "an exercise in democracy."[48]

In early September 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov opined, "The most important
thing is Iran is ready for a comprehensive discussion of the situation, what
positive role it can play in Iraq, Afghanistan and the region."[49]
<outbind://51-000000000217A9092DA2D946B02079870B522FB9C44F9000/#_ftn49>  In
fact, he all but ruled out imposing sanctions on Tehran in order to get the
regime to come clean on its nuclear program. In light of this, it is
doubtful that the Obama administration's recent lobbying efforts have
fundamentally altered Russia's position on Iran. Two weeks after Lavrov's
statement, following the revelation that Iran had been covering up the
existence of a nuclear facility, CNN reported an unidentified senior U.S.
official's claims that Washington's efforts to bring Russia (and China) on
board with new sanctions against Tehran had "already begun to bear
fruit."[50] Yet even after the existence of the secret Iranian nuclear site
near Qom became public knowledge,[51] Medvedev told the press, following the
Group of Twenty summit in Pittsburgh:

I do not believe sanctions are the best way to achieve results. Sanctions
were used on a number of occasions against Iran, but we have doubts about
the results. Nevertheless, when all instruments have been used and failed,
one can use international legal sanctions. ... I think we should continue to
promote positive incentives for Iran and at the same time push it to make
all its programs transparent and open. Should we fail in that case, we'll
consider other options.[52]

Medvedev's statement offers no clear sense of what might prompt the Russians
to wield a stick against the mullahs. Moreover, one must still wonder
whether former president Putin, the real power behind the throne, would
agree to such a policy. Notwithstanding Moscow's concurrence with an October
2009 IAEA compromise for Iran to send most of its enriched uranium abroad to
be processed into reactor fuel, there seems to have been no Russian reaction
to Tehran's failure to respond to President Obama's December 31, 2009
deadline regarding the offer. It is hard to imagine that Moscow will support
any but modest penalties to be imposed against Tehran. Indeed, as recently
as January 2010, Russian foreign minister Lavrov said that "acting with a
logic of punishing Iran ... is not a sober approach."[53]

On the surface, the Kremlin has apparently joined with the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Germany in pursuing the so-called "two track"
policy of threatening Iran with sanctions while still dangling the carrot of
dialogue. On February 5, 2010, Lavrov met with his German counterpart Guido
Westerwelle in Berlin and afterwards told reporters that "if we do not see a
constructive answer from Iran, we will have to discuss this in the U.N.
Security Council." Yet, the Russian foreign minister went on to say that he
was still hopeful of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.[54] The
question remains, however, whether Moscow will let go of the carrot and,
even if it does, whether it would ever support more than a slap on Tehran's
wrist.

Basing one's appraisal of Russian intentions on experience rather than hope,
one is inclined to agree with the conclusion of Ray Takeyh, senior fellow
for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Nicholas
Gvosdev, adjunct senior fellow at the Nixon Center: "Russia is not
interested in playing an active role in resolving the Iran crisis on terms
America will find acceptable."[55]

Tehran's ties with Beijing appear even stronger than those it has with
Moscow. Chinese president Hu Jintao had even fewer scruples than his Russian
counterpart in the wake of the fraudulent Iranian election. Days after the
disputed vote, he shook hands with Ahmadinejad as Xinhua, China's state-run
news agency, reported on the "sound momentum" of bilateral relations.[56]
When the Chinese media actually did report on the post-election disturbances
in the streets of Tehran, they were attributed to "vandals" and
"terrorists," and Chinese television viewers were shown no images of Iranian
security forces brutalizing protesters.[57] Still, Wu Sike, China's special
envoy to the Middle East, maintains that Beijing opposes Iran's production
and possession of nuclear weapons. The problem is that while he avers that
China's policies have not changed on this issue, he and his superiors appear
to see no urgency in acting to stop it.[58]

China does not, however, offer a strictly one-sided backing for all of
Iran's aspirations. In 2008, China's Hu Jintao officially "welcomed Iran's
interest to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), saying an
expert committee will be formed to consider the proposal."[59] Yet little
progress has been evident thus far; Iran sent a representative to the SCO
secretariat in Beijing in January 2010 to discuss how it might further its
interaction with the organization but remains an observer state.[60]

On the nuclear issue, Beijing also appears intent on opposing sanctions.
Thus, in early September 2009, China's Foreign Ministry declared that "under
current circumstances, we must increase diplomatic efforts and renew talks
with Iran."[61] Although there was some hope that Vice President Joseph
Biden's September 11, 2009 meeting with Wu Bangguo, China's second most
powerful leader, would have changed this response, such has not been the
result. Indeed, shortly thereafter, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
gave Beijing's response to the revelation about Iran's covert nuclear
facility: "We believe that sanctions and exerting pressure are not the way
to solve problems and are not conducive for the current diplomatic efforts
on the Iran nuclear issue."[62]

While French prime minister Francois Fillon has since asserted that his
country and China "share identical views on how to lead Iran away from its
threatening stance and isolation on the nuclear issue,"[63] no such
declaration has been forthcoming from Beijing. In fact, the opposite is
true.

In January 2010, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the
United States gathered in New York to focus on the issue of Iran's nuclear
program. Beijing, however, sent a low-level diplomat to the meeting in what
observers considered a snub to the others.[64] The Chinese representative
explained that his country was only prepared to begin discussing the
possibility of imposing sanctions.[65] At this point, it would seem that
optimism regarding China's coming around to support effective sanctions is
reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's estimation of second marriages as "the
triumph of hope over experience."


Conclusions


The most imminent threat to the global order comes from the radical Islamic
regime in Iran bent on developing nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China
have consistently supported Tehran by their aggressive, opportunist-and
shortsighted-policies, and both are in large measure responsible for the
threat that the Iranian government poses to the world today.

Should the radicals in Tehran obtain the ability to launch ballistic
missiles with warheads on them, there is no guarantee that one day they
might not target Russian cities or other objectives. China, too, might
ultimately find itself in the sights of an unfriendly regime in Iran. Should
a military conflagration occur in the Persian Gulf and curtail the flow of
oil from the region, it would surely spell disaster for the Chinese economy.
With its vast supplies of oil and natural gas, Moscow might reap windfall
profits, but there is no guarantee of where the chain reaction of a Middle
East war might stop. A radical Shi'i Iranian regime armed with nuclear
weapons would likely lead to proliferation among other states in the area
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The stakes are high and getting
higher. Indeed, those who have decided to back Tehran should consider how a
nuclear Iran will promote their security interests.

The opaqueness of decision-making in the Kremlin makes it difficult to
explain fully Moscow's behavior in abetting the Iranian regime, but it would
seem that the temptation of making a fast ruble and undermining Washington
in the bargain is just too much for those in power to resist. Likewise, both
China's economic imperatives and its desire to become the next great
superpower on the world stage likely play a decisive role in its behavior.

Russian and Chinese posturing that they have sought peace and stability in
the region through constructive dialogue has been a façade. The occasional
snubs from Russia following the 2009 sham election or expressions of
discomfort from both countries over Iran's covert nuclear program seem
little more than public relations stunts.

The two authoritarian regimes have consistently undermined the United States
in its efforts to contain Iran and have profited by doing so. Indeed, if the
leaderships in Moscow and Beijing continue to sabotage diplomatic efforts to
halt the clerical regime's drive for nuclear weapons, they should be held
accountable by Washington and the international community for obstructing
nonviolent remedies to the Iranian problem. U.S. officials could launch a
concerted public relations campaign to demonstrate to the world the depth of
the Russian and Chinese culpability in creating a problem that threatens the
stability of a vital geopolitical part of the world. Washington might press
the restart button on its plan to provide missile defense systems in central
Europe or increase its military cooperation with Taiwan. Additionally, as
trade is a two-way proposition, the Russians and Chinese could encounter a
host of difficulties in this sphere as well.

Unless they change their course immediately, it is they who will carry the
onus for a U.S. or Israeli recourse to military intervention in order to
prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. It may seem hard to imagine the present
administration in Washington taking such action, but it is also unclear what
Jerusalem will do. An Israeli strike against Iran would likely result in a
serious setback to Tehran's nuclear program, but its certainty of success is
by no means guaranteed. Moreover, Israel would pay a heavy diplomatic price
for what would no doubt be termed its "reckless adventurism." Thus, it
hesitates, and if it does so for too long, one should not be at all
surprised if Israel or some other country ends up being the innocent victim
of a nuclear power that the Russians and Chinese will have helped to create.

While there may not be a new axis in a formal sense, the combination of
Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran on a range of issues has undermined the security
of the Persian Gulf region and worked against the interests of the United
States and its allies. Its potential continuation represents a broader and
more fundamental threat to global stability, would likely destroy decades of
diplomacy, and sound the death knell of the nonproliferation regime.

 <http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran> REFERENCES
AND FOOTNOTES, AND MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY RESOURCES.

 



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