http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran 





Russian and Chinese Support for Tehran
Iranian Reform and Stagnation


by George L. Simpson, Jr.
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2010, pp. 63-72





Recent years have witnessed the rise of irregular but frequently intensive
opposition to U.S. global preeminence by Russia and China. In their own
ways, and in pursuit of their own interests, each of these authoritarian
governments has established an informal alliance with the Islamic Republic
of Iran. For its part, the Khamenei regime in Tehran continues to view the
United States as the "Great Satan" and works against American interests by
engaging in international terrorism,[1]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn1>  aiding
in attacks on U.S. and coalition personnel in Iraq[2]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn2>  and
Afghanistan,[3]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn3>
working to derail any resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute,[4]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn4>  and
most of all by seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.


  <http://www.meforum.org/pics/large/92.jpg> 

Iran tests a Shahab-3 missile in November 2006. Currently, the Iranian
military is trying to develop the Shahab-6 missile, which will have a range
of 3,500 miles, putting Europe within its sights. There is some speculation
that Moscow is helping Tehran with a missile that will have a 6,300-mile
range, enabling it to reach the eastern seaboard of the United States.

There is a long history of conflict between Russia and Iran, so why is
Moscow now warmly regarded by the Islamist regime, and why does Moscow, in
turn, court Tehran? Furthermore, what explains Iran's new alliance with
China? Has a new axis, opposed to the United States and Europe, formed, and
if so, what are its roots and ramifications? 


A New Geostrategic Axis?


Russian commentator Andrei Volnov has called the de facto
Moscow-Beijing-Tehran alignment "a new geostrategic axis."[5]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn5>  While
such a characterization is more metaphor than reality, a trilateral
combination, based on the common goals of promoting economic self-interest
and reducing U.S. influence, certainly has been built on the foundations of
fairly recent but significant bilateral ties between the two countries and
Tehran. Thus, Ariel Cohen, a senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, notes that Moscow's ties with the Iranian regime "reflect a
geopolitical agenda which is at least twenty years old."[6]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn6>  Russia
is engaged in what might be called "strategic opportunism" as it constantly
fishes in troubled waters with the goal of identifying vulnerabilities that
its policy makers can exploit.[7]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn7>
Similarly, one can trace Beijing's increasing links with Tehran to the first
years of the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s.[8]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn8>  For
its part, Iran has followed a consistent anti-America and anti-Israel path
since its 1979 revolution.

Proponents of an informal alliance from the Russian Federation, China, and
Iran present it as a reaction to the unilateralism of the United States and
alleged U.S. aspirations for global hegemony. They consider the United
States a significant rival and a threat to their long-term security.
Consequently, Russia's goal, according to Cohen, is to engage in a
"balancing strategy" that will knock the United States down a notch and thus
revise the international status quo. While Cohen makes this point for
Moscow's policy, it is an equally apt characterization of Beijing's approach
as well.[9]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn9> 


The View from Beijing


The leaders of China and Iran feel that they are the proud heirs to two
great and ancient civilizations that have been humiliated and made victims
of Western imperial aggression. They believe that Washington's "hegemonism"
represents the unjust continuation of long-standing Western efforts to keep
them weak and subordinate.[10]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn10>
Hence, Sino-Iranian relations are bound by what Asia and Middle East analyst
John Calabrese calls a "kinship of nationalisms."[11]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn11> 

Perhaps more importantly, an understanding of economic issues further
explains China's lukewarm support for the United States in its disputes with
Iran. China, which has one of the world's fastest growing economies and
which has designs on becoming an economic superpower, is today the world's
second largest consumer of oil. Nearly 60 percent of its oil is imported
from the Middle East. Iran, which possesses about 10 percent of the world's
proven petroleum reserves, replaced Saudi Arabia as the leading supplier of
oil to China in May 2009. Indeed, since reaching an agreement in October
2004, Beijing and Tehran have penned energy deals that purportedly are worth
more than US$120 billion.[12]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn12> 

Furthermore, Iran's oil producing facilities and equipment are in serious
need of modernization. Beijing's willingness to invest in this vital sector
of the Iranian economy (as much as 90 percent of Iran's export income comes
from oil) is crucial to the fiscal well-being of the present Islamist
regime, which, according to official estimates, faces an 11 percent
unemployment rate and inflation exceeding 13 percent.[13]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn13>  Thus,
the China National Petroleum Corporation, China's largest oil producer and
supplier, signed a deal in January 2007 worth $3.6 billion to develop
Iranian offshore gas fields. As recently as June 2009, the same company put
its name to a $2 billion contract for development of the northern section of
Iran's Azadegan oil field near Ahvaz.[14]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn14> 

Despite U.S. pressure to keep Iran economically isolated, China has leaped
into the void created by U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic since
its 1979 revolution. In 2003, trade between the People's Republic and Iran
reached a record $4 billion, and that figure soared to $16 billion in 2006
and $29 billion in 2008.[15]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn15>  Crude
oil constitutes 80 percent of China's imports from the Islamic Republic with
mineral and chemical products making up most of the remainder. Beijing's
exports are more diversified, with machinery, electrical appliances,
textiles, vehicles, and aircraft comprising the most important commodities
in demand from Iran.[16]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn16> 

Before 1997, Beijing had, for more than a decade, been Iran's most important
partner in helping the Islamist regime develop its nuclear capability. As
China expert John W. Garver writes, China's cooperation with Iran "was
extensive, sustained over a fairly long period, and of crucial importance to
Iran's nuclear effort."[17]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn17>  The
Chinese have apparently retreated from their policy of direct cooperation
with the mullahs on the nuclear front since that time.


The View from Moscow


One might think that the long history of conflict between Russia and Persia
would preclude Iran from seeking Russian aid. As far back as Peter the Great
(r.1682-1725), tsars and tsarinas have nibbled at Iranian borders in the
Caucasus and the Caspian region. Over time, first the Romanovs, then the
communists intervened more and more in Persian affairs, with the latter
going so far as to establish short-lived "People's Republics" in Kurdish and
Azeri regions of Iran. Despite this, the courtship continues.

Russia also has economic reasons to back the Tehran regime. Russia's trade
with Iran is more modest than China's but nevertheless significant. Total
trade between the two countries equaled $3.2 billion in 2008 with analysts
predicting even higher numbers within a few years. As both countries are
major energy producers, they share a common interest in establishing pricing
policies for oil and natural gas as well as manipulating these markets to
their advantage.

More significant, however, is Moscow's role in the Islamic Republic's
nuclear program. The Russian government has assisted in Iran's construction
of the $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant and has helped the mullahs
obtain nuclear knowledge.[18]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn18>  As a
result, Moscow, as well as Beijing, is at odds with Washington over how to
deal with Tehran's efforts to gain a nuclear capability. China and Russia,
both of which wield veto power on the United Nations Security Council, have
consistently obstructed efforts in the U.N. to halt Tehran's drive to obtain
nuclear weapons. While it is true that from time to time, both countries
have called on Iran's regime (which is a signatory to the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty) to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), neither has supported effective sanctions or forceful
measures to deal with the problem. Gennady Yevstafyev, a senior adviser at
the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, has gone so far as to contend that
"Washington closed its eyes to the creation of nuclear weapons by its
strategic partner, Pakistan. But now it is threatening a war on its
ex-strategic partner Iran for the same crime."[19]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn19> 

Moscow continues to talk out of both sides of its mouth. Sergei Kiryienko,
the director-general of Rosatom, Russia's federal atomic energy agency, has
stated the official Russian position that "broad access to civilian nuclear
power must be guaranteed while at the same time there must be a guarantee
that weapons of mass destruction will not proliferate under any
circumstances."[20]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn20>  As
recently as October 2007, then-president Vladimir Putin described a nuclear
armed Iran to be a "strategic threat" to Russia when he met with leaders of
the European Jewish Congress and with French president Nicolas Sarkozy in
Moscow. Yet the Russian leader went on to claim that there was no "objective
data" proving that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons so that "we proceed from
a position that Iran has no such plans."[21]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn21>  What
lies behind the inscrutable strongman's thinking is difficult to say for
certain, but one can speculate that Putin's antipathy towards the United
States as well as his desire to conciliate cronies within the Russian
Federation's military-industrial complex goes a long way to explain this
gamble.


China, Russia, and Iranian Weaponry


Arms sales to Iran by China and Russia, which the three countries insist are
lawful, is another source of contention between the latter two and
Washington.[22]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn22>
Russia is Iran's biggest weapons supplier by a wide margin, though China is
also an important source. Russia reportedly supports the Islamic Republic's
development of ballistic missiles, which former Secretary of State Colin
Powell warns have been redesigned to enable them to carry nuclear
warheads.[23]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn23>
Currently, the Iranian military is trying to develop the Shahab-6 missile, a
variant of the North Korean Taep'o-dong-2C/3, which will have a range of
3,500 miles, putting Europe within its sights. There are unverified reports
that the Russians have transferred rocket engine technology for this program
and even some speculation that Moscow is helping Tehran with a missile that
will have a 6,300-mile range, enabling it to reach the eastern seaboard of
the United States.[24]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn24> 

For its part, although the Chinese government denies as "groundless
allegation[s]" reports about its role in supplying Iran with weaponry,[25]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn25>  it is
clear that it has transferred missile components and technology to Iran
since the 1980s.[26]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn26>  For
example, Tehran has obtained Chinese-made anti-ship surface-to-surface C-801
and C-802 missiles, which pose a potential threat to Persian Gulf shipping
and U.S. naval vessels in the region.[27]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn27> .

According to the CIA and experts in the field, Iran is also trying to
develop sophisticated biological and chemical weapons.[28]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn28>  These
efforts go back to the Iran-Iraq war when the Iranians were on the receiving
end of Iraqi chemical attacks. Although Iran has ratified the Biological
Weapons Convention, specialists believe that with the help of Russian
experts, it is "in the advanced research and development phase" of
weaponizing chemical toxins and living organisms.[29]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn29>  For
its part, China has helped in Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction by selling precursor and dual-use chemicals, as well as the
technology and equipment needed to use them. Thus there is good reason to
conclude that "the Iranian leadership intends to maintain a robust CW
[chemical weapons] capability."[30]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn30> 

Washington is concerned not just with Iranian possession of sophisticated
weapons but with the prospect of Tehran transferring them to terrorist
proxies, such as Lebanese-based Hezbollah. In fact, the group launched an
Iranian C-802 missile during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, which hit the
Israeli missile frigate Hanit.[31]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn31>
According to Israeli press reports, the mullahs are currently supplying
Iranian-made Zelzal and upgraded Fateh-110 surface-to-surface missiles to
the radical Shi'i group.[32]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn32>  In
August 2009, Israeli president Shimon Peres claimed that Hezbollah currently
had 80,000 Iranian-supplied missiles.[33]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn33>  While
neither Moscow nor Beijing is directly responsible for these developments,
neither appears particularly concerned when the weapons or technologies they
transfer to Iran find their way into the hands of terrorist organizations.

Finally, both Moscow and Beijing are aiding the Iranian military as it
develops advanced conventional weapons. Despite Washington's strong
objections, by late 2006, the Russia government had sold and begun delivery
to Tehran of twenty-nine of its Tor-M1 air defense systems. Moscow argues
that the $700 million sale is totally legal and asserts that these are
"defensive" weapons.[34]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn34>
Iran's acquisition of such a sophisticated and advanced system poses a
threat to any potential U.S. or Israeli air attack to take out Tehran's
nuclear facilities.[35]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn35>  Iran
has also acquired at least ten Russian-made Pantsyr-S1E self-propelled
short-range gun and missile air defense systems from Syria.[36]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn36>  In
March 2007, the Russian investigative journalist Ivan Safronov died
mysteriously after learning that Moscow's military-industrial complex was
planning to transfer S-300VB missiles to Iran via Belarus.[37]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn37>  These
are Russia's equivalent to the U.S.'s Patriot missiles: The S-300VB is
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and has a range of 150
kilometers.[38]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn38>  As of
this writing, it appears that Iran has not received the weapons, but Iranian
officials are eager to do so.[39]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn39>  There
are numerous reports that Russia and China have also covertly sold Iran an
array of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), combat aircraft, sophisticated
radar systems, and fast-attack missile vessels.[40]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn40>  Some
of the SAMs have apparently made their way to insurgents fighting coalition
forces in Iraq.[41]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn41>
Sources also claim that either China or Kyrgyzstan has sold the Iranians
high-speed torpedoes originally produced by the Russians.[42]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn42> 


Mixed Signals?


Recent events demonstrate the complexities of the evolving relationship
between Tehran and its great-power allies. Over the summer of 2009, there
were mixed signals coming from Russia and Iran concerning bilateral ties. In
June, following the upheavals in Iran over that country's disputed
presidential elections, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev cancelled, because
of alleged scheduling conflicts, a planned meeting with Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), a mutual-security organization comprising China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[43]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn43>  Iran
has observer status with the multinational group and aspires to become a
full member, but the Russians have not gone out of their way to make this
happen. In August 2009, Russia joined with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Tajikistan in a four-party regional summit to which Iran was not
invited.[44]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn44>  At
that time, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a journal whose views sometimes reflect
those of the Kremlin, editorialized, "It appears that the idea that Iran is
a regional power, which Russia could use as a trump card in relations with
the West, has turned out to be mistaken."[45]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn45>  It
would appear that at least some in the upper echelons of the Russian
government doubted the wisdom of continuing support to Tehran following the
disputed election and the international opprobrium directed against the
mullahs as they suppressed subsequent dissent.

For their part, at least some Iranians took note of this chilly behavior. An
editorial in the "moderate" Iranian newspaper E'temad, which serves as the
mouthpiece for Mehdi Karroubi's oppositional National Trust Party,
complained that Moscow had not helped Iran in the United Nations with its
"peaceful pursuit" of nuclear energy as much as it could, and that it was
dragging its feet in getting the Bushehr nuclear facility up and running.
The article concludes, "Russians cheat their allies if it is necessary, and
history shows that they have swindled us heavily."[46]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn46> 

At the same time, other Russian officials have acted as if it were business
as usual between Moscow and Tehran. Moreover, supporters of this approach
seem to have had the final say in the Kremlin. Two days after what was
viewed by most outside observers as a fraudulent vote, newly "reelected"
Iranian president Ahmadinejad made his first foreign trip to Russia. Russian
deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov called the visit "symbolic" and
added, "This is a signal of successful mutual relations in the future."[47]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn47>
Shortly thereafter, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov referred to the
Iranian elections as "an exercise in democracy."[48]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn48> 

In early September 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov opined, "The most important
thing is Iran is ready for a comprehensive discussion of the situation, what
positive role it can play in Iraq, Afghanistan and the region."[49]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn49>  In
fact, he all but ruled out imposing sanctions on Tehran in order to get the
regime to come clean on its nuclear program. In light of this, it is
doubtful that the Obama administration's recent lobbying efforts have
fundamentally altered Russia's position on Iran. Two weeks after Lavrov's
statement, following the revelation that Iran had been covering up the
existence of a nuclear facility, CNN reported an unidentified senior U.S.
official's claims that Washington's efforts to bring Russia (and China) on
board with new sanctions against Tehran had "already begun to bear
fruit."[50]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn50>  Yet
even after the existence of the secret Iranian nuclear site near Qom became
public knowledge,[51]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn51>
Medvedev told the press, following the Group of Twenty summit in Pittsburgh:

I do not believe sanctions are the best way to achieve results. Sanctions
were used on a number of occasions against Iran, but we have doubts about
the results. Nevertheless, when all instruments have been used and failed,
one can use international legal sanctions. … I think we should continue to
promote positive incentives for Iran and at the same time push it to make
all its programs transparent and open. Should we fail in that case, we'll
consider other options.[52]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn52> 

Medvedev's statement offers no clear sense of what might prompt the Russians
to wield a stick against the mullahs. Moreover, one must still wonder
whether former president Putin, the real power behind the throne, would
agree to such a policy. Notwithstanding Moscow's concurrence with an October
2009 IAEA compromise for Iran to send most of its enriched uranium abroad to
be processed into reactor fuel, there seems to have been no Russian reaction
to Tehran's failure to respond to President Obama's December 31, 2009
deadline regarding the offer. It is hard to imagine that Moscow will support
any but modest penalties to be imposed against Tehran. Indeed, as recently
as January 2010, Russian foreign minister Lavrov said that "acting with a
logic of punishing Iran … is not a sober approach."[53]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn53> 

On the surface, the Kremlin has apparently joined with the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Germany in pursuing the so-called "two track"
policy of threatening Iran with sanctions while still dangling the carrot of
dialogue. On February 5, 2010, Lavrov met with his German counterpart Guido
Westerwelle in Berlin and afterwards told reporters that "if we do not see a
constructive answer from Iran, we will have to discuss this in the U.N.
Security Council." Yet, the Russian foreign minister went on to say that he
was still hopeful of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.[54]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn54>  The
question remains, however, whether Moscow will let go of the carrot and,
even if it does, whether it would ever support more than a slap on Tehran's
wrist.

Basing one's appraisal of Russian intentions on experience rather than hope,
one is inclined to agree with the conclusion of Ray Takeyh, senior fellow
for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Nicholas
Gvosdev, adjunct senior fellow at the Nixon Center: "Russia is not
interested in playing an active role in resolving the Iran crisis on terms
America will find acceptable."[55]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn55> 

Tehran's ties with Beijing appear even stronger than those it has with
Moscow. Chinese president Hu Jintao had even fewer scruples than his Russian
counterpart in the wake of the fraudulent Iranian election. Days after the
disputed vote, he shook hands with Ahmadinejad as Xinhua, China's state-run
news agency, reported on the "sound momentum" of bilateral relations.[56]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn56>  When
the Chinese media actually did report on the post-election disturbances in
the streets of Tehran, they were attributed to "vandals" and "terrorists,"
and Chinese television viewers were shown no images of Iranian security
forces brutalizing protesters.[57]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn57>
Still, Wu Sike, China's special envoy to the Middle East, maintains that
Beijing opposes Iran's production and possession of nuclear weapons. The
problem is that while he avers that China's policies have not changed on
this issue, he and his superiors appear to see no urgency in acting to stop
it.[58]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn58> 

China does not, however, offer a strictly one-sided backing for all of
Iran's aspirations. In 2008, China's Hu Jintao officially "welcomed Iran's
interest to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), saying an
expert committee will be formed to consider the proposal."[59]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn59>  Yet
little progress has been evident thus far; Iran sent a representative to the
SCO secretariat in Beijing in January 2010 to discuss how it might further
its interaction with the organization but remains an observer state.[60]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn60> 

On the nuclear issue, Beijing also appears intent on opposing sanctions.
Thus, in early September 2009, China's Foreign Ministry declared that "under
current circumstances, we must increase diplomatic efforts and renew talks
with Iran."[61]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn61>
Although there was some hope that Vice President Joseph Biden's September
11, 2009 meeting with Wu Bangguo, China's second most powerful leader, would
have changed this response, such has not been the result. Indeed, shortly
thereafter, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson gave Beijing's response
to the revelation about Iran's covert nuclear facility: "We believe that
sanctions and exerting pressure are not the way to solve problems and are
not conducive for the current diplomatic efforts on the Iran nuclear
issue."[62]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn62> 

While French prime minister Francois Fillon has since asserted that his
country and China "share identical views on how to lead Iran away from its
threatening stance and isolation on the nuclear issue,"[63]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn63>  no
such declaration has been forthcoming from Beijing. In fact, the opposite is
true.

In January 2010, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the
United States gathered in New York to focus on the issue of Iran's nuclear
program. Beijing, however, sent a low-level diplomat to the meeting in what
observers considered a snub to the others.[64]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn64>  The
Chinese representative explained that his country was only prepared to begin
discussing the possibility of imposing sanctions.[65]
<http://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran#_ftn65>  At
this point, it would seem that optimism regarding China's coming around to
support effective sanctions is reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's estimation of
second marriages as "the triumph of hope over experience."


Conclusions


The most imminent threat to the global order comes from the radical Islamic
regime in Iran bent on developing nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China
have consistently supported Tehran by their aggressive, opportunist—and
shortsighted—policies, and both are in large measure responsible for the
threat that the Iranian government poses to the world today.

Should the radicals in Tehran obtain the ability to launch ballistic
missiles with warheads on them, there is no guarantee that one day they
might not target Russian cities or other objectives. China, too, might
ultimately find itself in the sights of an unfriendly regime in Iran. Should
a military conflagration occur in the Persian Gulf and curtail the flow of
oil from the region, it would surely spell disaster for the Chinese economy.
With its vast supplies of oil and natural gas, Moscow might reap windfall
profits, but there is no guarantee of where the chain reaction of a Middle
East war might stop. A radical Shi'i Iranian regime armed with nuclear
weapons would likely lead to proliferation among other states in the area
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The stakes are high and getting
higher. Indeed, those who have decided to back Tehran should consider how a
nuclear Iran will promote their security interests.

The opaqueness of decision-making in the Kremlin makes it difficult to
explain fully Moscow's behavior in abetting the Iranian regime, but it would
seem that the temptation of making a fast ruble and undermining Washington
in the bargain is just too much for those in power to resist. Likewise, both
China's economic imperatives and its desire to become the next great
superpower on the world stage likely play a decisive role in its behavior.

Russian and Chinese posturing that they have sought peace and stability in
the region through constructive dialogue has been a façade. The occasional
snubs from Russia following the 2009 sham election or expressions of
discomfort from both countries over Iran's covert nuclear program seem
little more than public relations stunts.

The two authoritarian regimes have consistently undermined the United States
in its efforts to contain Iran and have profited by doing so. Indeed, if the
leaderships in Moscow and Beijing continue to sabotage diplomatic efforts to
halt the clerical regime's drive for nuclear weapons, they should be held
accountable by Washington and the international community for obstructing
nonviolent remedies to the Iranian problem. U.S. officials could launch a
concerted public relations campaign to demonstrate to the world the depth of
the Russian and Chinese culpability in creating a problem that threatens the
stability of a vital geopolitical part of the world. Washington might press
the restart button on its plan to provide missile defense systems in central
Europe or increase its military cooperation with Taiwan. Additionally, as
trade is a two-way proposition, the Russians and Chinese could encounter a
host of difficulties in this sphere as well.

Unless they change their course immediately, it is they who will carry the
onus for a U.S. or Israeli recourse to military intervention in order to
prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. It may seem hard to imagine the present
administration in Washington taking such action, but it is also unclear what
Jerusalem will do. An Israeli strike against Iran would likely result in a
serious setback to Tehran's nuclear program, but its certainty of success is
by no means guaranteed. Moreover, Israel would pay a heavy diplomatic price
for what would no doubt be termed its "reckless adventurism." Thus, it
hesitates, and if it does so for too long, one should not be at all
surprised if Israel or some other country ends up being the innocent victim
of a nuclear power that the Russians and Chinese will have helped to create.

While there may not be a new axis in a formal sense, the combination of
Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran on a range of issues has undermined the security
of the Persian Gulf region and worked against the interests of the United
States and its allies. Its potential continuation represents a broader and
more fundamental threat to global stability, would likely destroy decades of
diplomacy, and sound the death knell of the nonproliferation regime.

George L. Simpson, Jr., is professor and chair of the history department at
High Point University.

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Related Topics:  China <http://www.meforum.org/topics/51/china> , Iran
<http://www.meforum.org/topics/10/iran> , Russia/Soviet Union
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