http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/experts-stuxnet-game-changer

 


Stuxnet "a game changer"


Published 11 October 2010

EU cybersecurity agency warns that the Stuxnet malware is a game changer for
critical information infrastructure protection; PLC controllers of SCADA
systems infected with the worm might be programmed to establish destructive
over/under pressure conditions by running pumps at different frequencies;
Dr. Udo Helmbrecht, chief of EU's cybersecurity agency: "Stuxnet is a new
class and dimension of malware--- The fact that perpetrators activated such
an attack tool, can be considered as the 'first strike' against major
industrial resources. This has tremendous effect on how to protect national
[cyber and critical infrastructure] in the future'

The Stuxnet malware is a game changer for critical information
infrastructure protection, an EU security agency has warned
<http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/press-releases/stuxnet-analysis> .

ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) issued a technical
report titled "Stuxnet Analysis
<http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/press-releases/stuxnet-analysis> ," in
which it warns that a similar attack of malware capable of sabotaging
industrial control systems as Stuxnet may occur in future.

John Leyden writes
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/10/09/stuxnet_enisa_response/>  that the
worm, whose primary method of entry into systems is infected USBs,
essentially ignores vulnerable Windows boxes but aggressively attacks
industrial control (SCADA) systems from Siemens, establishing a rootkit as
well as a backdoor connection to two (now disconnected) command and control
servers in Malaysia and Denmark.

PLC controllers of SCADA systems infected with the worm might be programmed
to establish destructive over/under pressure conditions by running pumps at
different frequencies, for example. Leydent notes there is no evidence
either way as to whether this has actually happened, but what is clear is
that the malware has caused a great deal of concern and inconvenience.
India, Indonesia, and Iran have recorded the most incidents of the worm,
according to analysis of infected IP addresses by security firms.

Incidents of infection were first recorded in Malaysia, but the appearance
of the malware in Iran has been the focus of comment and attention. Plant
officials at the controversial Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran have admitted
that the malware has infected laptops. Government ministers, while blaming
the attack on nuclear spies, had downplayed the impact of the attack and
denied it has anything to do with a recently announced two-month delay in
bringing the reactor online.

Dr. Udo Helmbrecht, executive director of ENISA, commented:

Stuxnet is a new class and dimension of malware. Not only for its complexity
and sophistication (e.g., by the combination of exploiting four different
vulnerabilities in Windows, and by using two stolen certificates) and from
there attacking complex Siemens SCADA systems. The attackers have invested a
substantial amount of time and money to build such a complex attack tool.
The fact that perpetrators activated such an attack tool, can be considered
as the 'first strike' against major industrial resources. This has
tremendous effect on how to protect national (CIIP) in the future.

Ilias Chantzos, director of government relations at Symantec, told a meeting
at the Symantec Vision <http://www.symantec.com/vision/index.jsp>
conference in Barcelona last week that millions had been spent developing
the malware.

"Stuxnet would have involved a team of between 5-10 people, six months
research and access to SCADA systems. The motive behind the malware was to
spy and re-program industrial control systems."

Chantzos declined to enter into speculation about who created the malware or
its intended target beyond saying "only a well-funded criminal organisation
or nation state would have the resources to develop the malware."

Steve Purser of ENISA told journalists that Stuxnet has taught security
experts nothing they did not already know. "What is significant is its
target and impact. We have to prepare for a future Stuxnet."

Critical protection methodologies and best practices will have to be
reassessed in the wake of Stuxnet, according to ENISA.

Large scale attacks on critical infrastructure require a coordinated
international response. No Member State, hardware/software vendor, CERT or
law enforcement agency can successfully mitigate sophisticated attacks like
Stuxnet on their own. ENISA plans to support these efforts by helping to
devise revised best practices for securing SCADA systems.

Leyden writes that in addition, ENISA, in co-operation with all EU member
states and three EFTA countries, plan to mount the first pan-Europe
cyber-security exercise in early November. Cyber Europe 2010
<http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/2018cyber-europe-20102019-the-1
st-pan-european-ciip-exercise-phase-one>  will set out to test member
states' plans, policies and procedures for responding to potential critical
information infrastructure crises or incidents, such as those posed by
Stuxnet. The scheme is similar and smaller than the Cyber-Storm program in
the United States.

ENISA, which was established in 2004, was granted a 5-year extenuation to
its responsibilities last month.

 



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