http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/skullduggery-massive-scale

 


Skullduggery on a massive scale


Published 11 October 2010

Stuxnet, the malware which attacked more than 30,000 computers used in
industrial control systems in Iran, including that country's nuclear weapons
facilities, represents a new class and dimension of malware; it can reach
into the physical world, allowing attackers to run motors so fast they burn
out, to turn off alarms and safety cut-offs, open effluent valves and
activate pumps -- in the words of Paul Marks, it allows attackers to "carry
out industrial sabotage and skullduggery on a massive scale" 

In Monday's issue of the Homeland Security NewsWire we run two stories which
convey the same message: cyberwarfare is no longer a theoretical
possibility, but a reality.

*       Dr. Udo Helmbrecht, executive director of ENISA (European Network
and Information Security Agency), the main EU cybersecurity body, says that
"Stuxnet is a new class and dimension of malware.. The attackers have
invested a substantial amount of time and money to build such a complex
attack tool. The fact that perpetrators activated such an attack tool, can
be considered as the 'first strike' against major industrial resources. This
has tremendous effect on how to protect national [cyber and critical
infrastructure] in the future" (see "Experts: Stuxnet 'a game changer'," 11
October 2011 HSNW)
*       The U.S. National Security Agency, worried about Chineses spying,
earlier this year warned AT&T that if the company were to go ahead with its
decision to purchase equipment for a next-generation phone system from
China's Huawei Technologies, then AT&T would lose all of its U.S. government
business (see "NSA threatened AT&T over buying phone gear from China," 11
October 2011 HSNW)

Paul Marks, the New Scientist's chief technology correspondent, agrees
<http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827815.200-stuxnet-the-online-front
-line.html>  that we are on the threshold of a new phase in warfare:

Is cyberwarfare (a) one of the biggest threats of the 21st century or (b) an
elaborate hoax designed to extract money from gullible governments? Stuxnet,
the computer worm running rampant in Iran's nuclear facilities, tells us the
answer.

For Marks, Stuxnet proved a straightforward proposition: "a few lines of
malicious computer code can trip electricity grids, burn out power-station
generators, pollute water supplies, and sabotage gas pipelines. That
cyberattacks can become real-world attacks is no longer a matter of
conjecture."

Note that Stuxnet represents a paradigmatic shift in information warfare
(IW). Previous digital attacks by one party to a conflict on another were
aimed at the digital assets of the other side. Thus, in April 2007,
following measures by the Lithuanian government that many in Russia took to
be hostile to the interests and sensibilities of the Russians living in
Lithuania (the "near abroad"), the Web sites of several Lithuanian
government departments were taken down by sustained cyberattacks from
Russia. Similarly, in August 2008, Russian hackers took down Web sites of
the government of Georgia during the short war between the two countries.

Stuxnet was different - but it had a predecessor. On 6 September

2007 Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor days before it was to receive
a shipment of fissile material from North Korea. The new aspect of the
attack was not the precision of the Israeli bombing of the reactor buildings
in the high desert of northeast Syria. Rather, the new chapter in warfare
was opened by the Israel was able, digitally, to turn off power in Syria for
an hour and half, thus blinding Syria's air defenses. Israeli commandoes
approached the nuclear site, beamed it with IR beams to guide precision
bombs being dropped from bombers above, then were picked up be helicopters
that took them back to Israel.

The United States, too, shut down Iraqi power stations during the 1991 and
2003 attacks, but in both cases the means were crude in comparison: aluminum
foil strips were dropped on the station to short circuit the generators.

Whoever designed Stuxnet and sent it to attack Iran's nuclear weapons
facilities was building on - and extending and improving - Israel's IW
capabilities as demonstrated on 6 September 2007.

Marks is precise in identifying the qualitative differences - unique and
frightening differences - which set Stuxnet apart from previous IW efforts,
and which give us a taste of things to come:

Where regular worms merely infect computer systems, Stuxnet can reach out
into the physical world. It uses vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows to
give an attacker remote control of the specialized factory-floor computers
used to control industrial processes. These programmable logic controllers
(PLCs) do not run everyday computer languages: each type of machine has its
own customized language.

Stuxnet is the first worm designed to attack a PLC in its own language. Its
target is one of the most popular models, made by Siemens and used to run
oil pipelines, power grids, and nuclear plants. The worm can allow attackers
to run motors so fast they burn out, to turn off alarms and safety cut-offs,
open effluent valves and activate pumps - in other words, carry out
industrial sabotage and skullduggery on a massive scale.

Stuxnet's origin is unknown. Iran blames the Pentagon or Israel. Regardless
of who wrote it, "cyberwar just got real," Marks concludes.

We do not know for sure, but we may want to speculate about the origins of
Stuxnet. We said earlier that Israel, two years ago, already successfully
carried out a digital attack which crossed from the digital to the physical
realm.

We may have another indication. During the next six months, between
September 2010 and February 2011, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) will see a
major rotation of generals and major generals in top military positions.
Such a rotation always accompanies a changing of the guard at the very top:
those who competed for the top job and lost retire, at times accompanied by
commanders who were close to them personally and professionally, while those
close to commander who won the top position are promoted.

The replacement in February of the current chief of staff, General Gabbi
Ashkenazi, with General Yoav Galant (currently commander of Israel's
Southern Command, who was adamantly opposed by Ashkenazi) is no exception.

One of the top officers who is retiring is Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, who headed
Military Intelligence in the last five years (although, in his case, it has
less to do with changes at the top than with sheer length of service). Amir
Oren, Haaretz's military analyst, wrote over the weekend:

The technology unit of Military Intelligence, once dubbed the 432, last week
held a change of command ceremony. The unit's outgoing commander, identified
in the media only as Colonel P., is to head up computer warfare in MI's Unit
8200, which handles electronic intelligence gathering. The appointment is
another step in realizing MI director Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin's vision of
making 8200 responsible for all aspects of electronic and cybernetic
warfare: defense, offense and intelligence-gathering.

Yadlin will retire next month after a 40-year military career, from combat
pilot to three command terms in his present rank (Amir Oren, "On loyalty and
superiors," Haaretz
<http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/The%20technology%20unit%20of%20Mili
tary%20Intelligence,%20once%20dubbed%20the%20432,%20last%20week%20held%20a%2
0change%20of%20command%20ceremony.%20The%20unit%27s%20outgoing%20commander,>
, 10 October 2010)

The guess here is that Stuxnet was General Yadlin's - technically, Unit
8200's - farewell present to his successors. It is as if this indefatigable
advocate of heavy investment in IW capabilities was eager to demonstrate to
a new generation of military leaders how such capabilities allow a country
to fight a war against an enemy thousands of miles away, and do so without
firing a shot.

One day we will know for sure.

Ben Frankel is editor of the Homeland Security NewsWire

 



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