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China's Military Comes Into Its Own


January 18, 2011 | 0953 GMT 

By Rodger Baker

Chinese President Hu Jintao is visiting the United States, perhaps his last
state visit as president before China begins its generational leadership
transition in 2012
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100910_looking_2012_china_next_generatio
n_leaders> . Hu's visit is being shaped by the ongoing China-U.S. economic
dialogue, by concerns surrounding stability on the Korean Peninsula
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101129_tactical_details_korean_artillery
_exchange>  and by rising attention to Chinese defense activity in recent
months. For example, China carried out the first reported test flight of its
fifth-generation combat fighter prototype
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110111-satellite-imagery-chinas-fifth-ge
neration-combat-aircraft> , dubbed the J-20, during U.S. Defense Secretary
Robert Gates' visit to China the previous week.

The development and test flight of China's J-20 is not insignificant, but it
is also by no means a game changer in the U.S.-China defense balance. More
intriguingly, the test highlights how China's military increasingly is
making its interests heard.


The J-20 Test Flight and China's Strategic Concerns


The J-20 test flight shone a light on China's strategic concerns and
reflected some of the developing capability that addresses those concerns.
The Chinese fear a potential U.S. blockade of their coast. While this may
not seem a likely scenario, the Chinese look at their strategic
vulnerability, at their rising power and at the U.S. history of thwarting
regional powers, and they see themselves as clearly at risk.

China
<http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20100729_south_china_sea_and_ame
rican_chinese_tensions> 's increased activity and rhetoric in and around the
South and East China seas also clearly reflect this concern. For Beijing, it
is critical to keep the U.S. Navy as far from Chinese waters as possible and
delay its approach by maximizing the threat environment in the event of a
conflict. Though the J-20 is still a work in progress, a more advanced
combat fighter - particularly one with stealth capabilities - could serve a
number of relevant roles toward this end.

The Chinese are still in the early stages of development, however. They are
experimenting with stealth shaping, characteristics and materials, meaning
the degree to which the J-20 can achieve low observability against modern
radar remains an open question. Significant changes to the design based on
handling characteristics and radar signature can be expected. And true
"stealth" is the product of more than just shaping. Special coatings and
radar-absorbing materials only top a lengthy list of areas in which Chinese
engineers must gain practical experience, even allowing for considerable
insight gained through espionage or foreign assistance. China still is
thought to be struggling with indigenously designed and manufactured
high-end jet engines, not to mention the integration of advanced sensors,
avionics and the complex systems that characterize fifth-generation
aircraft. It is too early to infer much from the single flight-tested
prototype, something the United States learned during the Cold War when
initial U.S. estimates of the Soviet MiG-25 attributed far more
sophistication and capability to the design than proved to be the case after
a Soviet pilot defected with his aircraft years later.

The Chinese role for the J-20 is based on a different set of realities than
those the Soviets and Americans faced during the Cold War, meaning the J-20
prototype should not be judged solely by the American standards for
fifth-generation aircraft. More than having the most advanced aircraft in
the sky, the Chinese value the ability to maintain high sortie rates from
many bases along the country's coast to overwhelm with numbers the superior
U.S. combat aircraft, which would be expected to be operated from aircraft
carriers or from more distant land bases. 


The J-20 Test's Timing


Perhaps more interesting than the test was its timing, with its associated
political implications. For weeks before the test flight, Chinese message
boards and blogs were filled with photographs of the new prototype on the
tarmac, conducting taxi tests in preparation for its first test flight.
Foreign military and defense observers closely monitor such sites, and their
"leaked" images renewed attention to China's fifth-generation development
program, about which there has been plenty of speculation but little hard
detail. Chinese defense and security officials also closely monitor such
boards, but the officials chose not to shut them down - clearly indicating
Beijing's intent to draw attention to the test.

Gates asked Hu about the test when the two met in Beijing. According to some
media reports citing American officials present at the meeting, Hu appeared
surprised by the question and somewhat perplexed by the details of the test
- the implication being that Hu was unaware of the test and that the Chinese
military may have acted out of turn. Gates told reporters that Hu had
assured him the timing was coincidental. After being asked for his own
thoughts regarding the relationship between the military and the political
leadership in China after his meetings with Chinese civilian and defense
leaders, Gates noted that he had become concerned about that relationship
over time. He added that ensuring civilian and military dialogue between the
two countries was important.

Although Gates did not say the Chinese military tested the J-20 without
political clearance from Hu, the idea was certainly suggested by the media
coverage and Gates' response. On the surface, this seems rather hard to
believe. Hu, as president of China and general secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, also serves as chairman of
China's parallel Central Military Commissions (one is under the government,
the other under the Party, though both have exactly the same makeup).

That the head of China's military would not know about a major new hardware
test coming a week before his trip to meet with the president of the United
States and coinciding with a visit of the U.S. defense secretary seems a
reach. Furthermore, given the amount of attention just beneath the surface
in China to the imminent test, and the subsequent attention in the foreign
media, it would be startling that the Chinese president was so poorly
briefed prior to meeting the U.S. defense secretary. If indeed the test
surprised Hu, then there is serious trouble in China's leadership structure.
But perhaps the issue isn't one of knowledge but one of capability: Could Hu
have stopped the test given the timing, and if so, would he have wanted to
stop it?


The Rising Influence of China's Military


Rumors and signs of the rising influence of the military establishment in
China have emerged over the past few years. Since the 1980s, China has
focused on and invested in a major reorientation of its military from a
massive land army focused on territorial defense to one that emphasizes
naval and air capabilities to protect China
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090323_part_1_china_s_new_need_maritime_
focus> 's interests in the East and South China seas and beyond into the
western Pacific. This has included expanding China's reach and a focus on
anti-access and area-denial capabilities, with accelerated development in
this arena in recent years. 

Some systems, like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091118_china_fielding_new_antiship_capab
ility> , are uniquely tailored to countering the U.S. Navy. Others, like an
expanding and more aggressive Ocean and Fisheries Administration, is
directed more at China's neighbors in the South and East China seas, and at
asserting China's claims to these waters. 

This change in focus is driven by three factors. First, China sees its land
borders as being fairly well locked down
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china> , with its buffer
territories largely under control, but the maritime border is a
vulnerability - a particular concern for a trade-based economy. Second, as
China's economy has rapidly expanded, so has Beijing
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090323_part_1_china_s_new_need_maritime_
focus> 's dependence on far-flung sources of natural resources and emerging
markets. This drives the government and military to look at protection of
sea-lanes, often far from China's shores. Third, the military leadership is
using these concerns to increase its own role in internal decision-making.
The more dependent China is on places far from its borders, the more the
military can make the case that it is the only entity with both the
intelligence and the understanding to provide the necessary strategic advice
and perspective to China's civilian leadership.

There is also the issue of a modernizing military looking out for itself,
battling for its share of China's budget and economic pie. A key part of
former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's fundamental military reforms was
stripping the military of much of its business empire. At the time, the
state - while funding the military - assumed that military-run industry
would supplement the defense budget. In short, the military ran industries,
and the profits were used to support local and regional defense needs. That
kept the official state military budget down and encouraged enterprising
commanders to contribute to China's economic growth.

But over time, it also led to corruption and a military where regional and
local military commanders were at risk of becoming more intent on their
business empires than on the country's national defense. Money that largely
had gone to support the living of the troops was sidelined and funneled to
the military officials. And the faster the Chinese economy grew, the more
profit there was for the taking. Regional military leaders and local
governments teamed up to operate, promote and protect their own business
interests regardless of the state's broader national economic or social
priorities. China's central leadership saw troubling parallels to older
Chinese history, when regional warlords emerged.

In response, Jiang ordered the military largely out of business. Military
leaders grudgingly complied for the most part, though there were plenty of
cases of military-run industries being stripped of all their machinery,
equipment and supplies, which were then sold on the black market and then
unloaded at bargain prices to the cronies of military officials. Other
companies were simply stripped and foisted on the government to deal with,
debts and all. Jiang placated the military by increasing its budget,
increasing the living standard of the average soldier and launching a
ramped-up program to rapidly increase the education of its soldiers and
technical sophistication of China's military. This appeased the military
officials and bought their loyalty - returning the military to financial
dependence on the government and Communist Party.

But the success of military reform, which also involved seeking greater
sophistication in doctrine, training, communications and technology, has
also given the military greater influence. Over time, the military has come
to expect more technologically, and China has begun experimenting with
technology-sharing between military and civilian industry to spur
development. The drive for dual-use technology, from the evolving aerospace
industry to nanotechnology, creates new opportunities for military officials
to promote new weapons-system development while at the same time profiting
from the development. As China's global economic power has grown, the
military has demanded more funding and greater capabilities to protect
national interests and its own prerogatives.

But China's military officials are also growing more vocal in their opinions
beyond the issue of military procurement. Over the past year, Chinese
military officers have made their opinions known, quite openly in Chinese
and sometimes even foreign media. They have addressed not only military
issues but also Chinese foreign policy and international relations. This
step outside the norm has left the Chinese diplomatic community
uncomfortable (or at least left it expressing its unease with the rising
influence of the military to their foreign counterparts). This may be an
elaborate disinformation campaign or a slightly higher level of the griping
typical of bureaucrats, or it may in fact reflect a military that sees its
own role and significance rising and is stepping forward to try to grab the
influence and power it feels it deserves. 

One example of the ostensible struggle between the military and the civilian
bureaucrats over Chinese foreign policy played out over the past year.
Through nearly the first three-quarters of the year, when the United States
carried out defense exercises in the Asia-Pacific region - whether annual or
in response to regional events like the sinking of the ChonAn in South Korea
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100524_north_korea_managing_aftermath_ch
onan_incident>  - the Chinese would respond by holding their own series of
exercises, sometimes on a larger scale. It was a game of one-upmanship. But
the foreign ministry and bureaucracy purportedly argued against this policy
as counterproductive, and by the fourth quarter, China had shifted away from
military exercises as a response. Instead, it once again pushed a friendlier
and more diplomatic line even as U.S. exercises continued. By the November
2010 crisis over North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, China had
returned to its standard call for moderation and dialogue. 

If this narrative is accepted, the military response to being sidelined
again was to leak plans to launch an aircraft carrier in 2011, to
reinvigorate international attention to Chinese anti-ship ballistic
missiles, and to test the new Chinese fifth-generation aircraft while Gates
was in Beijing and just before Hu headed to Washington. A Chinese military
motivated by nationalism - and perhaps an even stronger interest in
preserving its power and influence within China - would find it better to be
in contention with the United States than in calm. This is because U.S.
pressure, whether real or rhetorical, drives China's defense development. 

But the case could as easily be made that the Chinese political leadership
has an equal interest in ensuring a mixed relationship with Washington, that
the government benefits from seemingly endless U.S. criticism of Chinese
defense development. This is because such criticism increases Chinese
nationalism, distracting the people from the economic troubles Beijing is
trying to manage
<http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20110106-beijing-tells-provinces
-slow-down> . And this is the heart of the issue: Just how well-coordinated
are the military and civilian leadership of China, and how stable is their
relationship?


An End to the Chinese Miracle


The Chinese miracle is nearing its natural conclusion
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100419_china_shaky_structure_economic_mi
racle> , as Beijing begins to face a reality like that seen by Japan, South
Korea and the other Asian Tigers that all followed the same growth pattern.
How that crisis plays out is fundamentally different depending upon the
country: Japan has accepted the shared long-term pain of two decades of
malaise; South Korea saw short, sharp, wrenching reforms; Indonesia saw its
government collapse. The reliability of the military, the capability of the
civilian leadership and the level of acceptance of the population all
combine to shape the outcome. 

A divide between the military and civilian leadership would mean that China,
already facing the social consequences of its economic policies, is facing
another significant issue at the same time: the balance of civilian-military
relations. However, a carefully coordinated drive to give the appearance of
a split may help China convince the United States to ease economic pressure
to avoid exacerbating this "split" while also appealing to nationalistic
unity at home. 

But even small signs of a split now are critical because of the stresses on
the system that China will experience when its economic miracle expires in
the not-so-distant future. Mao and Deng were both soldiers. Their successors
were not. Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao has military experience, and
incoming President Xi Jinping similarly lacks such training. The rumors from
China suggest that the military plans to take advantage of Xi's lack of
experience and use its influence to shape his policies. The leadership
transition may provide a chance for the military to gain more influence in
an institutional way, allowing it to drive a hard bargain and buy a bigger
share of the pie in the fifth generation set-up. 

For most of modern China's history, the military has been an internal force
without much appetite for more worldly affairs. That is now changing,
appropriately, due to China's growing global prominence and reliance on the
global economy. But that means that a new balance must be found, and China's
senior leadership must both accommodate and balance the military's
perspective and what the military advocates for. 

As Chinese leaders deal with a generational transition, expanding
international involvement and an increasingly difficult economic balance,
the military is coming into its own and making its interests heard more 

                

 

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<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110117-chinas-military-comes-its-own>  is
republished with permission of STRATFOR."



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