17.01.11
Tunisia: The Struggle for Legitimacy
by Dyab Abou Jahjah
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/jahjah170111.html

In Tunisia, a new government is being formed under the leadership of the RCD
(the party of the fallen dictator) and with the participation of some
legalized opposition parties. All parties that were illegal under the old
regimes are being excluded, however, and this is stirring up a lot of
controversy among parts of the Tunisian population who feel that the
Revolution is being driven away from its ideals.

The main view of the opposition is that the people who made the revolution
are not represented and that by keeping the RCD on board and even at the
steering wheel the former regime is perpetuating itself. On the other hand,
the pro-coalition voices stress that this is only a transition, necessary to
avoid plunging the country in chaos. Some argue that, now that the
revolution deposed the tyrant, the country must seek reconciliation, and
they also argue that the RCD has hundreds of thousands of members and
excluding them would exclude important segments of society. However, most of
these members were in the RCD not for an ideology or a vision, but because a
party card was synonymous with personal advancement under the old regime. I
wonder if the RCD will have more than a few thousand hardcore Ben Ali
loyalists if things are left to take their natural course. But even if the
RCD were a real party with a real base of supporters, it is now the duty of
these people -- if they want national reconciliation -- to distance
themselves from the past and its crimes by changing their party's name and
going to the opposition.

"Why should national reconciliation be the responsibility of the oppressed?"
many rightly ask. And they also believe that the best strategy to use now is
a transitional committee representing all currents of the people and its
trade unions and excluding the RCD as such while including some independents
who are not far from it and that this committee should lead the country into
transition towards a free and fair election where the chances of all the
parties are equal.

In my opinion, the Americans and the French have certainly played a role in
convincing parts of the mild opposition to support this government in order
to guarantee continuation of the old economic structure and its integration
as a service economy for France, plus the political and military alliance
with the U.S and NATO.

The risk is that this government will not be so transitory after all and
will only serve as an excuse to win more time and allow intelligent services
and regime loyalists to work on their strategy to take back control of the
country, albeit under another leader who will govern slightly differently
than Ben Ali but will be just as autocratic and corrupt and pro-Western.
This is a real risk and the people started protesting against this
government today and in Tunis the governmental police used tear gas against
the demonstrators.

On a side note: 6 Algerians, 1 Egyptian, and a Mauritanian burned themselves
in clear attempts to emulate the igniting act of the Tunisian revolution.

Dyab Abou Jahjah is founder and former president of the Arab European
League. This article was first published in his blog Abou Jahjah Comments on
17 January 2011;

....................................................................

Tunisia: the need for vigilance
http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2011/blog1101b.htm#tunisia_the_need_for_vigilance

Having got rid of Ben Ali and his family, the question now for Tunisians is
how to dismantle the system of control that he established over the last 23
years – and it's looking far from easy. Without continuous pressure from the
public, the Ben Ali loyalists are likely to retrench and continue running
the country much as before – minus Ben Ali of course, and perhaps in a
slightly less repressive way.

The "new" government announced yesterday is not a good start. Give or take a
few opposition figures, it looks suspiciously like the old one: same prime
minister, same people in all the key positions. And all the opposition
parties included in it are those that Ben Ali approved of – with none of the
parties that he banned.

This can be excused, to some extent, on the grounds of maintaining
legitimacy: that constitutional procedures have to be followed and that the
outlawed parties are – well – still technically illegal. It has be
remembered, though, that the legitimacy – such as it is – comes from a
constitution that was never designed to be genuinely democratic and is
derived from a regime that many would not regard as legitimate in any case.

The crucial issue is whether this new government is one to set the country
on a path to transition of whether it will merely try to consolidate
whatever can be salvaged from the old regime.

Either way, the new government may only last a couple of months. Under the
constitution, a presidential election must be held within 60 days of Ben
Ali's departure (no later than March 12 by my reckoning). The new president
is then empowered to form a new government and dissolve the existing
parliament.

Sixty days is a very short time to organise a presidential campaign from
scratch and this probably gives Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally
(RCD) party, with its structure still largely intact, a considerable
advantage – regardless of any other attempts to manipulate the result.

Another question here concerns the presidential candidates. As Ibn Kafka
points out in his blog, in order to contest the election they need 30
signatures from members of parliament or presidents of city councils.

It's not clear at present how much of an obstacle that might become, but the
RCD currently holds 161 of the 214 parliamentary seats. In order to muster
30 parliamentary signatures without RCD support, candidates will need
backing from at least three of the smaller opposition parties. However, if
the RCD wants to avoid generating more hostility among the public it would
be well-advised not to use this power to block any serious opposition
candidates.

I have been trying to find out how the voting is supposed to work in
Tunisian presidential elections but so far I don't have an answer. If there
are more than two candidates, does the winner need more than 50% of the
votes, or is it a first-past-the-post system? The question was irrelevant
before, because Ben Ali always won with majorities that were never less than
89%, but it's relevant now.
If it's a first-past-the-post system, there's a risk of splitting the
opposition vote among multiple candidates and letting the RCD candidate slip
through by default.

A new president is empowered by the constitution (article 57) to dissolve
parliament and hold elections within 30 days. However, he (or she??) is not
obliged to do so and in theory the existing parliament could remain in place
until its term ends in October 2014.

I'm not suggesting this is necessarily what will happen but it's worth
keeping in mind that without extreme vigilance on the part of the Tunisian
public, the country might find itself, a few months from now, with another
RCD president and a parliament still dominated by Ben Ali's party. Tunisians
are going to have to remain very watchful, and keep up the pressure for
change.

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 18 Jan 2011. Comment. 

...................................................................

Tunisia's tide of defiance
As revolutionary zeal engulfs the region, the people must be on their guard
against the forces seeking to smother it.
Mohammed Khan Last Modified: 18 Jan 2011 08:29 GMT
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/20111178151948130.html

Eastern European nations, for decades shackled under the weight of
Communism, were the last geographical bloc to break the chains of oppression
en masse, and in the process shed a history of subservience to a far off
and, to many, an alien political culture. How that landscape has now
changed.

While Eastern Europe is now free, the plight of the majority of the Arab
world is reminiscent of the worst excesses of Soviet rule: Political
repression is the norm, civil society is suffocated while a political elite
operates in a parallel existence intoxicated by the stench of absolute
power.

Lest anyone think oppression breeds indifference, however, the people of
Tunisia have just turned history on its head and unleashed a defiance that
is bound to resonate with the people of neighbouring nations and to shake
the thrones of Arab despots.

Do not underestimate the psychological impact of what Tunisians have just
achieved. Arab regimes have had a free hand at imposing their will on
reluctant populations through the use of a single instrument: Fear. In the
space of just a few weeks, masses of Tunisians have demonstrated to the Arab
region the limits of dictatorial rule.

The death of one young Tunisian who set fire to himself in an act of
desperation lit the fuse of popular protests against mounting economic
turmoil, blistering corruption and a massive breach of trust with the ruling
class.

Where perhaps just a month ago such anger would have been momentary and the
rage dowsed by pure state brutality, the strength of feeling that has
propelled Tunisians to fight the state has proven overwhelming and
irreversible.

It is such sentiment which has resonated so profoundly across the region.
The rage is not specific to Tunisia: almost identical conditions fester
right across the Middle East. Tunisia in this instance could just as well be
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan or Syria. (This is to momentarily
ignore the political situation in the Gulf region.)

What is not lost on most of the protest voices in the region is the sheer
complicity of Western nations which have long waved an abstract, need one
say meaningless, flag of freedom. The violent protests that greeted the
result of the Iranian election were utilised to maximum effect by
governments in the US and Europe. Iranian leaders, rightly so, were at the
end of some heavy political vitriol from Western powers.

The popular revolution that many had thought - wished - would materialise in
Iran has forced itself on Tunisia. No words of praise for Tunisians,
however, from Western quarters for toppling their dictator, unsurprisingly.

Beware the French

As the former colonial overlord in Tunisia, France has a history of deceit,
mendacity and, to boot, hypocrisy in relation to North Africa. How often are
the French wont to proclaim liberté, égalité, fraternité as their most
fundamental values? As far as French policy in North Africa is concerned, we
may add another: Fallacy.

The Tunisian despot's closeness to France was legendary. Despite achieving
independence from France, Tunisia remained subject to its puppet master's
whims under its dictatorial regime.

Something of a similar revolution spread across Algeria some two decades
ago. Back then, with the avowed backing of the French state, Algerian
security forces trampled over Algerian democracy precipitating a brutal
civil war.

For Tunisia's revolution not to be short-lived, the population will need to
be alert to the behind-the-scenes machinations and manoeuvrings of the
French.

That France refused refuge to the deposed despot was not a sign of the
former's solidarity with the Tunisian people. Rather a play at real politik
by the French and a little forward thinking in how best to influence future
events in Tunisia.

If a new system beckons in Tunisia, the people would do well to distance
themselves from France.

The Arab world has had little cause for celebration of late. At the mercy of
long-standing kingdoms and hereditary life-time autocrats, political
suffocation has been the order of the day. Defeatism had taken hold over
civil society. But the momentous events in Tunisia show how no amount of
bloodletting will kill peoples' spirit.

Platitudes from foreign powers are unnecessary now. The people of the Middle
East are capable of building their own futures as they see fit.

Despite such optimism, however, do not be surprised if the new revolutionary
zeal is buried prematurely given what it may mean for Western policy.

The tide of defiance will not easily be pushed back. That is not to say
there will not be many forces out there employing all means necessary to
smother it. Tunisians and Arabs are only at the very early stages of their
struggle for freedom and must be on their guard against the difficult
obstacles ahead.

Mohammed Khan is a political analyst based in the UAE.

..................................................................

18 January 2011 Last updated at 11:40 GMT
Tunisia: Key players
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12214649

It is less than a week since the ousting of Tunisia's long-time president,
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, in a popular uprising that has shaken up the North
African country. Already, a transition government is taking shape, and fresh
elections have been promised within six to seven months.

Here are some of the key players inside the new administration, and some
other important figures to watch outside the country.

Old guard

Ministers: The country is being led by interim President Fouad Mebazaa, the
former parliamentary speaker. Six ministers from ousted President Ben Ali's
old administration have reappeared in the new unity government of Prime
Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, himself an ally of the former president who
has served as premier since 1999. Foreign Minister Kamal Morjane, Interior
Minister Ahmed Friaa, Defence Minister Ridha Grira and Finance Minister
Mohamed Ridha Chelghoum are among those who held on to key posts.

Army: It is widely believed that the Tunisian army's chief of staff played a
key role in undermining Mr Ben Ali in the days before he fled Tunisia. Gen
Rachid Ammar is believed to have resigned, refusing to order the army to
fire on unarmed protesters and effectively withdrawing the military's
support from the former president. Analysts say that the chief of staff is
now the power behind the scenes in Tunisia and may have political ambitions
of this own.

Political parties: Under President Ben Ali, Tunisia was effectively under
one-party rule. But several other parties exist. They include the Movement
of Socialist Democrats, Party of People's Unity, Unionist Democratic Union,
Renewal Movement (Ettajdid), Democratic Initiative Movement, Social Liberal
Party and the Green Party for Progress.

New faces

Nejib Chebbi Najib Chebbi has been one of the most outspoken critics of the
Tunisian government

In a first for Tunisia, Prime Minister Ghannouchi has included three
opposition politicians in the interim government. Ahmed Ibrahim, leader of
the Ettajdid party, becomes minister of higher education. Mustafa Ben
Jaafar, of the Union of Freedom and Labour (FDTL), is to serve as health
minister. And Najib Chebbi, founder of the Progressive Democratic Party, was
named Tunisia's new development minister.

Slim Amamou, a dissident blogger who was arrested during the protests, was
named Tunisia's new secretary of state for youth and sport.

Exiled opposition

The main Tunisian parties in exile include the al-Nahda party (Renaissance),
based in Britain, and the Congress for the Republic in France. It is not
known if they have a support base inside the country.

Al-Nahda is a banned Islamist party led by Rachid Ghannouchi, who was
sentenced to life in prison under the old regime for plotting against the
state. Prime Minister Ghannouchi (no relation) has banned him from returning
until an amnesty law is approved. The party, based in London, says it
advocates democracy, recognises political pluralism, and backs dialogue with
the West. It seeks an Islamic constitution for the country.

The Congress for the Republic is a banned secular party led by Moncef
Marzouki from Paris. Mr Marzouki has denounced political parties in Tunisia
for co-operating with the Ben Ali regime and says he plans to return to the
country to contest elections. The party has campaigned for human rights, an
independent judiciary and free elections.

..................................................................

Tunisia: the first Arab revolution
Mona Eltahawy
http://www.hindu.com/2011/01/18/stories/2011011855871300.htm

Every July 23 for the past 58 years Egypt, my country of birth, has
celebrated its “July revolution” that overthrew King Farouk and ended the
monarchy and British occupation once and for all. It was no revolution: it
was a coup staged by young Army officers.

And so it has been with a series of “revolutions” around the Arab world in
which a succession of military men went on to lead us in civilian clothes —
some kept the olive drabs on — and rob generations of the real meaning of
revolution. For years I looked at the Iranians with envy — not at the
outcome of their 1979 revolution, but because it was a popular uprising, not
a euphemism for a coup.

So you'll understand why, along with millions of other Arabs, I'll forever
cherish January 14, 2011 — the day Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia, his
23-year rule toppled by 29 days of a popular uprising. A real revolution for
a change.

It's the first time Arabs have toppled one of their dictators, so you'll
understand why, despite the reports of chaos, looting and a musical chairs
of caretaker leaders, I'm still celebrating. Let's have no whining about how
those pesky Tunisians who risked their lives in their thousands to face down
a despot ruined the idyllic package-holiday-in-a-police-state for so many
European tourists.

The equations circling Tunisia right now are very clear: we have no idea who
or what kind of coalition of leaders will emerge but there is no doubt who's
rooting for the failure of this revolution: every Arab leader who has spent
the past month watching Tunisia in fear. You can be sure the region's
dictators are on their knees right now praying for chaos and collapse for
Tunisia.

Some Arab countries have simply ignored what happened: no official statement
from Algeria or Morocco. Others said they respect the wish of Tunisians but
filled their state-owned media with reminders that they weren't anything
like Tunisia: Egypt.

Leave it to Muammar Gaddafi, the world's longest-serving dictator, to best
portray that panic.

Addressing a nation where thousands had faced down the bullets of Mr. Ben
Ali's security to protest at unemployment, police brutality and the
corruption of the regime, Mr. Gaddafi told Tunisians they were now suffering
bloodshed and lawlessness because they were too hasty in getting rid of Mr.
Ben Ali.

If every Arab leader has watched Tunisia in fear, then every Arab citizen
has watched in hope because it was neither Islamists — long used by our
leaders to scare many into acquiescence — nor foreign troops that toppled
the dictator: it was ordinary and very fed up people.

Tunisians must remember that during these days of chaos. We're hearing
reports that neighbourhood watch committees have sprung up to protect
against looting and violence, which many blame on Mr. Ben Ali's loyalists.

Interestingly, both Western observers and Mr. Gaddafi have been crediting
WikiLeaks, but for different reasons. By buying into the idea that leaked
U.S. embassy cables about corruption “fuelled” the revolution, commentators
smear Tunisians with ignorance of facts and perpetuate the myth that Arabs
are incapable of rising up against dictators. Mr. Gaddafi railed against
WikiLeaks because he, too, wants to blame something other than the power of
the people — and cables from Tripoli portray him as a Botox-using neurotic
inseparable from a “voluptuous” Ukrainian nurse.

Mr. Gaddafi's Libya has had its own protests over the past few days. Nothing
on the scale of Tunisia, but enough that his speech to Tunisians could be
summarised thus: I am scared witless by what happened in your country.

That's why I insist we stop and appreciate Tunisia: relish the revolution
that is no longer a euphemism for a coup. — © Guardian Newspapers Limited,
2011

(Mona Eltahawy is a writer and lecturer on Arab issues.)

....................................................................

Monde 18/01/2011 à 00h00
«Nous n’avons pas encore notre Lech Walesa ou notre Vaclav Havel»
Interview
Pour Abdelwahab Meddeb, écrivain, la transition prendra nécessairement du
temps :
Par MARC SEMO
http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012314311-nous-n-avons-pas-encore-notre-lec
h-walesa-ou-notre-vaclav-havel

Ecrivain et essayiste (1), Abdelwahab Meddeb évoque les enjeux et les défis
du processus démocratique qu’entame la Tunisie après vingt-trois ans de
dictature du clan Ben Ali.

Quels sont les premiers défis à relever?

Même s’il passe pour intègre, le Premier ministre Mohamed Ghannouchi [qui
n’a pas quitté son poste, ndlr] reste un homme de l’ancien régime, une ombre
de ce théâtre d’ombres, car seul décidait vraiment Ben Ali. Or la politique
est aussi de l’ordre du symbolique et, sur ce plan, c’est catastrophique. Il
faut au plus vite tourner la page sur tout ce qui peut rappeler le pouvoir
de celui que nous surnommions ironiquement Chéri-Bibi. Il faut d’urgence un
geste fort comme, par exemple, la dissolution du RCD, parti- Etat devenu
parti-mafia, qui pourrait être un signal en ce sens.

Le défi est de savoir comment mener ce processus nécessairement assez long
et définir un certain nombre de priorités. Dans l’immédiat, il me semble
nécessaire de se conformer à l’actuelle légalité constitutionnelle. La
Constitution a été malmenée, défigurée, d’abord par Habib Bourguiba
lui-même, quand il a créé la présidence à vie, puis par Ben Ali. Mais malgré
ces déformations, le noyau de ce texte datant de 1957 est à préserver, car
il affirme des points toujours essentiels, comme la laïcité ou l’égalité de
tous les citoyens quels que soient leur sexe, leur religion, leur ethnie.
Dans cette constitution, il n’y a pas de trace de la charia, aucune
référence à la loi islamique comme inspiratrice du droit, contrairement aux
constitutions de nombreux autres pays arabo-musulmans. Mais il faut
d’urgence nettoyer ce texte de tout ce qui en a dénaturé l’esprit. Et la loi
électorale a été modifiée afin de donner plus de temps que soixante jours
pour la tenue des premières élections libres. Une nouvelle constitution ne
peut s’élaborer dans l’urgence, mais après un grand débat national, qui peut
durer des années et qui seul permettra de fertiliser le désert de l’espace
public laissé par Ben Ali.

Quels peuvent être, selon vous, les principaux acteurs de la transition
démocratique ?

On parle aujourd’hui, en Tunisie, de gouvernement de salut public avec un
vocabulaire évoquant un peu la Révolution française. Mais l’opposition -
aussi bien l’opposition légale représentée dans le pseudo-Parlement du
régime que celle des partis clandestins - ne dispose que d’un personnel
politique d’assez piètre niveau. Elle contraste avec la qualité des
opposants issus de la société civile qui se sont engagés dans le mouvement :
des militants syndicaux de l’UGTT, les membres des associations d’avocats ou
d’organisations de défense des droits de l’homme. Il y a ce hiatus, d’autant
que ce mouvement sans précédent n’a pas encore produit la personnalité
charismatique qui l’incarnerait.

Nous nous trouvons face à un paysage politique dévasté. La situation n’est
pas sans rappeler celle de l’Europe de l’Est au moment de l’effondrement du
communisme. La figure de Mohamed Bouazizi [le jeune chômeur diplômé dont le
suicide, le 17 décembre dernier, a déclenché la révolte] rappelle celle du
jeune Tchèque Jan Palach, qui s’était aussi immolé par le feu pour protester
contre l’invasion soviétique d’août 1968. Mais si nous avons notre Jan
Palach, nous n’avons pas encore notre Lech Walesa ou notre Vaclav Havel.

Etes-vous préoccupé par les risques d’une montée des partis islamistes avec
les premières élections libres ?

Jusqu’ici, ils n’ont pas eu vraiment de rôle dans le mouvement qui a
renversé la dictature de Ben Ali. Ils étaient absents aussi de la
protestation populaire qui, à Sidi-Bouzid, a donné le coup d’envoi de la
révolte, que parmi les couches moyennes éduquées et très francophones qui
ont pris le relais. Mais les directs de la télévision Al-Jezira mettent
systématiquement en avant des islamistes ou des gens proches de cette
mouvance, et cela peut avoir pour effet de les remettre sur le devant de la
scène politique. L’inquiétude est déjà palpable parmi ces jeunes de la
blogosphère qui furent parmi les premiers à s’engager dans la bataille. Mais
il ne faut pas en faire un épouvantail, car il y a dans de nombreux secteurs
de la société tunisienne un rejet profond de tout ce qui peut évoquer
l’islamisme. Ce problème ne se résout pas par les interdictions, ni par la
violence d’un Etat policier, mais par le débat démocratique, la
confrontation d’idées. S’ils utilisent les armes et prônent la violence, ils
doivent alors être traités comme des séditieux.

Les islamistes représentent-ils à terme le principal défi pour la Tunisie ?

Les islamistes tunisiens pourront, j’espère, évoluer comme les islamistes
turcs de l’AKP qui, malgré des ambiguïtés, ont effectué une mutation et ont
accepté la démocratie. J’étais un intégriste laïc et j’ai évolué. On ne peut
pas imposer d’en haut et par la force la laïcité et la démocratie. La
liberté est un droit naturel.

(1) Dernier ouvrage paru : Pari de civilisation. Seuil (2009)

......................................................................

MIXED FEELINGS
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110118/jsp/opinion/story_13454086.jsp

Revolutions are not a thing of the past. But that is not the only lesson the
overthrow of the 23-year-old regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia is
teaching the world. The upheaval in the north African nation that followed a
mass movement against the president shows the potency popular uprisings
still retain. It also reaffirms the fact that contrary to the presumption of
an increasingly Islamophobic world, religion is not the sole factor
motivating a Muslim-majority nation. The reasons behind the downfall of Mr
Ben Ali were high unemployment, wide economic disparities, incessant price
rise and corruption. These are not factors affecting Tunisia alone. In fact,
a combination of these has brought on similar mass movements in many of
Tunisia’s neighbours in Africa, particularly Algeria, which has witnessed a
simultaneous mass aggression on the same issues. The reason why the movement
in Tunisia led to a sudden regime change may take some more time to fathom.
But there is no doubt that the aspirations Mr Ben Ali had created with his
liberal reforms and emphasis on literacy had come up against a wall when
faced with the other more repressive and regressive facets of his
dictatorial regime. Mr Ben Ali’s inability to deal with the contradiction in
his policies and the lack of support from the traditional backers of his
government, such as France, may have forced him to throw in the towel and
seek asylum in Saudi Arabia.

The success of the mass uprising in Tunisia, the first of its kind in the
Arab world, should have been greeted with joy. Yet, it is causing a lot of
apprehension, both in the West and in Muslim-majority nations. The latter
fear that Tunisia’s experiment with democracy could have a domino effect on
other nations in the Arab world that are undergoing similar economic crises.
There are even chances that Mr Ben Ali’s failed liberalism may set off these
nations on a more regressive path. The fears of the West are even more real.
Tunisia, given its place in the Islamic Maghreb, was seen as a bulwark
against the religious radicalism of the Levant, and its attendant ills. Mr
Ben Ali’s willingness to play his part in this was also one reason the West
turned a blind eye to his dictatorial style. With him gone, and chaos
reigning unabated in Tunisia, it may not be too long before the Islamic
radicals, once banned by Mr Ben Ali, seize their chance.

...................................................................

Why the Tunisian revolution won't spread
Posted By Stephen M. Walt Sunday, January 16, 2011 - 4:50 PM Share
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/15/why_the_tunisian_revolution_w
ont_spread

The toppling of the Tunisian regime led by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has led a
lot of smart people -- including my FP colleague Marc Lynch -- to suggest
that this might be the catalyst for a wave of democratization throughout the
Arab world. The basic idea is that events in Tunisia will have a powerful
demonstration effect (magnified by various forms of new media), leading
other unhappy masses to rise up and challenge the stultifying dictatorships
in places like Egypt or Syria. The obvious analogy (though not everyone
makes it) is to the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe, or perhaps the
various "color revolutions" that took place in places like Ukraine or
Georgia.

Color me skeptical. In fact, the history of world revolution suggests that
this sort of revolutionary cascade is quite rare, and even when some sort of
revolutionary contagion does take place, it happens pretty slowly and is
often accompanied by overt foreign invasion. 

For starters, the French revolution did not in fact ignite sympathetic
revolutions across Europe. True, assorted monarchies were eventually
toppled, but that was mostly done by the bayonets of the French army.
Similarly, although many people feared that Bolshevism would spread across
Europe after 1917, it did not in fact prove to be very contagious and the
expansion of international communism didn't take place until World War II,
once again largely backed by the might of the Red Army (or by indigenous
communists like Mao Zedong, and only after decades of civil war). The
Iranian revolution in 1979 did not prove to be an especially contagious
model either; although sympathizers did emerge in several places (e.g.,
Lebanon), we've hardly seen a wave of Khomeini-style revolutions over the
past 30 years.

The velvet revolution in Easter Europe are a partial exception, but mostly
because the Soviet Union's Eastern Europe satellites were all dependent on
the threat of Soviet invasion to keep their artificial regimes in power.
Once the common keystone of Soviet power was no longer credible, however,
all of these dominos could in fact fall down in a row.

But that's not the case in the Arab world. Although most Arab governments
are authoritarian, they are also all independent and depend on a slightly
different mix of political institutions and measures to keep the rulers in
power. The fact that Ben Ali ultimately mismanaged a challenge and was
driven from power does not mean that other Arab leaders won't be able to
deflect, deter, or suppress challenges to their rule.

There are three other reasons why the Tunisian example is unlikely to lead
to similar upheavals elsewhere. First, as Timur Kuran 
http://www.citeulike.org/user/pauljohn32/article/5433535
and others have shown, the actual revolutionary potential of any society is
very difficult to read in advance, and a rising revolutionary wave often
depends on very particular preferences and information effects within
society. Put differently, whether a genuine upheavel breaks out and gathers
steam is a highly contingent process. Second, Tunisia is an obvious warning
sign to other Arab dictatorships, and they are bound to be especially
vigilant in the months ahead, lest some sort of similar revolutionary wave
begin to emerge. Third, Tunisia's experience may not look very attractive
over the next few weeks or months, especially if the collapse of the
government leads to widespread anarchy, violence and economic hardship. If
that is the case, then restive populations elsewhere may be less inclined to
challenge unpopular leaders, reasoning that "hey, our government sucks, but
it's better than no government at all."

All of this is not to say that a cascade is impossible, that events in
Tunisia won't exert a long-term effect on political discussion elsewhere, or
that it is not a telling sign of democratic aspirations that are likely to
bear fruit eventually. But "eventually" could be a rather long time, and if
you are expecting to see a rapid transformation of the Arab world in the
wake of these events, you're likely to be disappointed.

For more extended reflections on some of these points, see this 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2000/11/01/fads_fevers_and_firestorms
or this.

..................................................................

Jan 19, 2011
'Mr Tunisia' goes out with a whimper
By Sami Moubayed
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MA19Ak02.html

DAMASCUS - After 23 years of autocratic rule, Tunisian President Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali was toppled from power in one of the most dramatic and
inspiring events in contemporary Arab history. It wasn't United States tanks
that rolled into Tunis on Friday night, like the ones that brought down
Saddam Hussein in 2003. It wasn't turbaned clerics seizing power, like what
happened when the Shah of Iran was deposed in 1979. Nor was it flamboyant
officers with no political experience like those who toppled King Farouk of
Egypt in 1952. It was the people of Tunis - the young and old, the educated
and ordinary citizen - who rose with one voice and demanded the downfall of
Ben Ali.

It all started when Tunisian police confiscated a fruit and vegetable
cart on the streets of Sidi Bouzid, 200 kilometers from the capital Tunis,
on December 17, 2010. Its owner, Mohammad Bouazizi, 26, seemingly did not
have a peddler's permit. Bouazizi, a fresh university graduate who had been
unable to find a decent job, was furious. He tried to lodge a complaint at a
local municipal office, with no luck. He then left his mother a farewell
note on Facebook, stood before a government building, and set himself
ablaze.

Three weeks later, he died from his wounds, igniting street protests and
demonstrations that demanded an end to political persecution, more jobs,
better pay, and more freedoms. Five thousand mourners took part in his
funeral, chanting: "We will avenge you Mohammad."

Police shot at the young men on the streets, dispersing them with brute
force, while on January 10, Ben Ali described them as "masked bandits"
manipulated by outside powers. The demonstrations, originally staged by
unions but quickly snowballing into an unstoppable youth movement, soon
reached far and wide, forcing Ben Ali to sack his top officials.

Last Thursday, he gave an ostensibly emotional speech to his citizens
saying: "I understand you; please stop the violence." He promised more
freedoms, in addition to 300,000 new jobs, and pledged that he would not
seek re-election in 2014. It was too late; the die had been cast and there
was no turning back for the angry people of Tunisia.

Twenty-four hours later, Ben Ali stepped down in disgrace. Realizing that he
was politically finished, the 75-year-old president boarded a plane along
with members of his family and left the country on January 14. Looting,
robbery, and chaos swept through the country as security collapsed -
criminals were set free from prisons, stores were stormed and vandalized and
self-armed militias emerged on the streets, protecting entire neighborhoods.

By Saturday, Ben Ali's speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, was in power as
an interim president, appointing Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi to form a
caretaker government that would supervise elections, which would take place
in six to seven months. The humiliated Ben Ali tried to head to France, a
country that had ardently supported him for two decades, but his ally
President Nicolas Sarkozy refused to grant him asylum.

He tried Malta, the United Arab Emirates, and Italy, with no avail. He
finally ended up in Saudi Arabia, at the same residence once occupied by
Ugandan ex-president Idi Amin. Amin, a brutal despot by all accounts, had
spent the final 13 years of his life at the same villa, dreaming of a
comeback to power in Uganda. He died there miserably in 2003. The residence,
with all its political symbolism, must have psychologically difficult for
Ben Ali to accept. So was the fact that after fighting veiled woman during
his entire career, and preventing mosques from loud prayer in Tunis, he
suddenly found himself in a country filled with veiled women, surrounded by
mosque prayers.

Arab youth were fixated on the Tunis revolt, which some have also called the
Bouazizi revolt. They were tuned into al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, while
millions changed their profile pictures on Facebook into the flag of Tunis.
Others typed in a status that read: "Go away Ben Ali", "Game Over" or "Viva
Tunis."

Most of the Arabs watching the saga unfold in Tunis knew very little about
Tunisia or Ben Ali. Apart from hosting the Palestinian Liberation
Organization in the 1980s and early 1990s, Tunis was never at the heart of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ben Ali was rarely mentioned in the Arabic press,
certainly no match for Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat or Hosni Mubarak - but
all Arabs below the age of 25 were born during his presidency and had grown
up knowing that he was "Mr Tunisia".

Arabs, however, were inspired by his thundering fall, dreaming of a day they
could carry out similar revolts in countries ruled for far too long by aged
and ailing dictators like Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Egypt's Mubarak.
Gaddafi's defense of Ben Ali only made things worse for unpopular Arab
leaders.

Over the weekend, he broke all silence within Arab officialdom by coming out
in defense of his old friend and neighbor, Ben Ali. "You have suffered a
great" loss he told the Tunisians, "There is nobody better to govern Tunis."
As far as he was concerned, Ben Ali - who by now had taken up temporary
residence in Saudi Arabia - was still the "legitimate president of Tunisia".

No sooner had Ben Ali left his country than demonstrations were staged
outside the Tunisian Embassy in Cairo, with Egyptians calling on Mubarak -
who has been in power since 1981 and plans on running for presidential
office again in 2011, at the age of 84 - to step down.

As the violence began to settle in different parts of Tunis, ordinary
citizens began to take a long hard look at what happened in their country.
Ironically, the circumstances that led to Ben Ali's rise to power in 1987
were very similar to the ones that toppled him in 2011.

Back then, it was also an uprising, known as an "intifada of bread"
triggered by ordinary citizens protesting the high cost of living,
unemployment and a government decision to lift subsidies over certain basic
commodities.

The aging president Habib Bourguiba carried out a series of symbolic changes
to please his angry countrymen, sacking the minister of interior and
summoning his ambassador from Warsaw - General Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali - and
appointing him director of national security. Ben Ali struck with an iron
fist, arresting union leaders who had staged the revolt, along with
heavyweights in the Islamic opposition.

Then in November 1987, he staged what has been called a "medical coup"
against president Bourguiba, declaring him unfit to resume his duties. Ben
Ali rose to the presidency at the relatively young age of 49, sidelining
Bourguiba s wife, who had her own plans for who would succeed her husband as
president of Tunis.

The masses originally cheered Ben Ali, who quickly released the same men he
had placed behind bars only two years earlier, and banned both torture in
jails and arbitrary arrests. Those reforms eventually evaporated into thin
air, as Ben Ali evolved into an autocrat, identical to his political
godfather, Bourguiba.

There are numerous lessons to be learned from Tunisia 2011. One is that the
will of the people - which brought down the king of Egypt in 1952 and the
Shah of Iran in 1979 - still matters in North Africa, the Middle East and
Arab Gulf. This might explain why there are two kinds of leaders in the Arab
world; those who rely on their people for support, and those who rely on the
West. Ben Ali, Farouk and the Shah relied on the West, but the West
abandoned them without even blinking when it was clear that their regimes
were no longer useful.

The other kinds of leaders are those like president Gamal Abdul Nasser of
Egypt, and Bashar al-Assad of Syria. When Nasser faced the Suez war of 1956,
the people of Egypt came out in his defense. When he stepped down in 1967,
the people of Egypt came out in millions, asking him to stay in power. The
same applied to Syria's Assad, whose people rallied around him during the
difficult years of the George W Bush White House, especially in 2003-2005.

This is the hard lesson of what happened to Ben Ali, who gambled on the
French and the Americans during his 23 years in power. Both countries knew
exactly what kind of rule Ben Ali was applying in Tunis, with WikiLeaks
recently saying that the US Embassy in Tunisia described the government
there as a mafia. At curtain fall, however, the US did not lift a finger to
protect him, although it was about to grant him US$12 million in military
aid this year.

United States President Barack Obama, whose country has turned a blind eye
to all of Ben Ali's repressive measures, came out with a booming statement
last Friday about the "brave and determined struggle for the universal
rights we must all uphold".

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

.....................................................................

Did Iraq have something to do with Tunisia's uprising?
That's the question posed by Elizabeth Rubin, a conservative blogger for the
Washington Post.
By Dan Murphy, Staff writer / January 17, 2011
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0117/Did-Iraq-have-somethin
g-to-do-with-Tunisia-s-uprising

Elizabeth Rubin, a conservative commentator who writes the "Right Turn" blog
for the Washington Post has an extended set of musings on Tunisia's Jasmine
Revolution today, in which she criticizes Hillary Clinton for a
"wishy-washy" statement in support of the nation's protesters and advises
President Obama to push the region to give its people a real political
voice.

Dan Murphy, who has reported from Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, and more than a
dozen other countries, writes and edits Backchannels. The focus? War and
international relations, leaning toward things Middle East.

Obama should adopt "concrete polices that can assist democracy advocates not
only in Tunisia, but in Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere. If Obama wants to do
some more productive "Muslim Outreach," he should stop trying to ingratiate
himself with despotic leaders and show that America is, and will continue to
be, on the side of those yearning for freedom," she writes.

The problem has always been what concrete action Obama, or any American
president, should take as they seek to balance America's often competing
interests in the region. Sacrifice intelligence sharing with Egypt or Yemen
in exchange for a principled stand and cutting off military aid? Demand fair
elections that might well deliver political forces hostile to the US agenda
in the region into power?

And in the specific case of Tunisia, the fact that the uprising that drove
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was both spontaneous and entirely local,
has been one of its great assets in the eyes of activists that would like to
emulate the Jasmine Revolution in places like Egypt or Algeria. There's an
argument to be made that the US should express support for democratic change
in Tunisia, but avoid getting in the way of a revolution it's had nothing to
do with so far and whose ultimate outcomes remain unguessable. (Kristen
Chick, the Monitor's correspondent in Tunis, writes this afternoon that many
protesters are vowing to resist an interim government that is packed full of
Ben Ali's erstwhile underlings.)

One question in Ms. Rubin's column does have a clear answer however. "How
much did the emergence of a democratic Iraq have to do with this popular
revolt in Tunisia?" she asks.

Having covered Iraq and Egypt full time between 2003-2008, and having
explored the question of whether the US invasion of Iraq would spur regional
political change at length with academics, politicians, and average folks in
and out of the region over a period of years (and talked to people in touch
with current events in Tunisia the past few days) the answer to her question
is clear: "Little to nothing."

The sectarian bloodletting in Iraq, the insurgency, and the US role in
combating it claimed tens of thousands of Iraqi lives, and Iraq remains
unstable today. The regional view of the Iraq war was and is overwhelmingly
negative, the model of Iraq something to be avoided at all costs. Before I
read Rubin's piece earlier today, Simon Hawkins, an anthropology professor
at Franklin and Marshall, was kind enough to chat with me about Tunisian
politics and history.

Hawkins, whose dissertation was about Tunisia, has been coming and going
from the country since the late 1980s. He recounted (unprompted) how the
word "democracy" had been given a bad name among many of the Tunisian youth
(the same sorts who led the uprising against Ben Ali) because of the Iraq
experience, "That's democracy," a group of Tunisian youths said to him in
2006 of Iraq. "No thanks."

The Obama Administration's policies towards the Arab world, largely focused
on counterterrorism cooperation and avoiding pushing hard for political
reform in autocracies like Egypt, are in fact an almost straight
continuation of President Bush's approach, particularly in his second term.
It's true that Bush made a ringing call for freedom in the Middle East a
centerpiece of his inaugural address, but soon came up against the hard
reality that close regional allies like Egypt, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
weren't much interested in tolerating challenges to their rule.

After the Muslim Brotherhood tripled its share in Egypt's parliament in one
of the fairest (but still fraud marred) Egyptian elections in decades and
the Islamist group Hamas swept free and fair Palestinian elections in 2006,
the US took a big step back from Arab democracy promotion. That's a
situation that persists today. 





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