www.nefafoundation.org Implications for al-Qa'ida after the killing of Usama bin Ladin May 4 2011 http://nefafoundation.org//file/UBLDead050411NEFA.pdf Implications for al-Qa'ida after the killing of Usama bin Ladin The killing of Usama bin Ladin in a heavily secured compound in Abbottabad is not only a highly symbolic achievement, but will also be the catalyst for what will most likely be an ugly fight for leadership within core al-Qa'ida. Within al-Qa'ida, longstanding animosities between particular factions, especially Egyptians and Yemeni fighters, could well erupt again. The animosities go back to the late 1990s and never relented. >From published internal al-Qa'ida correspondence, we know that even before 9/11, scores of Yemenis contemplated leaving Afghanistan due to the tensions with Egyptian fighters. After al-Qa'ida lost its base in Afghanistan, and the top leadership of al-Qa'ida went into hiding, the fighting between Yemeni and Egyptian fighters within core al-Qa'ida was the predominant reason the Yemenis desired to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas and return to the Arabian Peninsula. When the Yemenis left, the Egyptians within al-Qa'ida were able to consolidate and then expand their grip on the organization. The most important positions within al-Qa'ida were held by Egyptians in the years following 9/11. After 9/11, when al-Qa'ida was forced to flee to Afghanistan, it was decided early on that al-Qa'ida would not fight ISAF and OEF forces head on as it would be too costly for the organization. Since that time, al-Qa'ida developed a strategy that allowed them to work as a force multiplier for jihadi groups entering Afghanistan to attack Coalition forces. Over the years, many of the most experienced al-Qa'ida leaders have been killed, especially over the last few years after the U.S. initiated an intense campaign of drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Soon after 9/11, the most senior al-Qa'ida leaders were hiding in Pakistani cities. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was arrested in Rawalpindi, Ramzi Binalshib was picked up in Karachi, and Abu Faraj al-Libi was arrested in Mardan. When it became clear that the cities were not safe for al-Qa'ida's leadership, Ayman al-Zawahiri reportedly relocated to the Tribal Areas. There were accounts that stated Bin Ladin was also reported to have been hiding out for some time in the rural mountainous areas of Afghanistan and the tribal areas in Pakistan, but decided later to take up residence in Abbottabad, north of Islamabad, close to the disputed Kashmir region. NEFA Foundation - C2011 http://www.nefafoundation.org New Emir? While the drone campaign was taking its toll on the al-Qa'ida leadership, during the last year, Iran decided to release a group of top al-Qa'ida leaders. This group of senior leaders including Military Committee leader Saif al-Adl, and religious leaders Abu Hafs al-Mauritani and Suleiman Abu al-Ghaith who have, over the years, become very critical of the 9/11 attacks and were close to becoming dissidents within al-Qa'ida. Since their return, perhaps under the protection of Iranian Special Forces, these al-Qa'ida leaders have again taken up senior positions within the organization, and it is possible either the Mauritanian, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani. or Kuwaiti, Suleiman Abu al-Ghaith, might be considered an acceptable new leader (Emir) of Qaidat al-Jihad. Although, at first glance, it might appear likely that Ayman al-Zawahiri would be the natural choice to assume the top leadership position in the organization, in the near future, it is more likely that because he is widely known to be a polarizing person, his leadership would cause controversy at a time when the organization needs unity. Therefore, he might remain in his current position as Deputy Emir and serve as the de facto leader of the organization. The Emir role would serve a more 'religious' function, especially if Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, or Suleiman Abu al-Ghaith were to be chosen. Before escaping to Iran, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani was the head of the Religious Committee of al-Qa'ida and Suleiman Abu al-Ghaith was the official spokesman for al-Qa'ida. Other names that have been mentioned as possible replacements for UBL are Anwar al-Awlaki and Abu Yahya al-Libi. Being that Awlaki is not located in the Afghanistan-Pakistan arena, it might be assessed by the leadership in this region that because he is not core al-Qa'ida, he is not a promising option. Also, Abu Yahya al-Libi is not considered to be a viable option by insiders due to the fact that Abu Yahya fell out of favor, especially with the Egyptian senior leadership within al-Qa'ida in 2009, and it was reported that Ayman al-Zawahiri declared him "persona non grata" in the tribal areas; since that time, Abu Yahya's profile has declined. It is certainly not clear at this time who will become the new leader of core al-Qa'ida in the immediate future. Even prior to the death of UBL, the organization was hit hard, suffering a major decline in its numbers in the Afghanistan-Pakistan arena, reportedly to the low hundreds. A coming nuclear threat? Press sources in Pakistan report that al-Qa'ida's Shura Council met within hours of the death of UBL in Mir Ali. Over the course of several meetings, it was decided the Shura Council would run the organization and they would choose a new emir at a later time. It was also decided, according to the reports, that there would be an immediate and fierce retaliation against Pakistan and that all ceasefire agreements with the Pakistan military would be null and void. www.nefafoundation.org - [email protected] NEFA Foundation - C2011 http://www.nefafoundation.org Many Western analysts expect massive retaliations from core al-Qa'ida, al-Qa'ida affiliated organizations, and al-Qa'ida-inspired jihadi groups. Reports have highlighted Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's assertions to his interrogators that al-Qa'ida had planned to create a nuclear "hell storm" in the U.S. Although it is well known that al-Qa'ida has tried to acquire nuclear material since at least the mid-1990s, it is still assessed that al-Qa'ida's nuclear capabilities are rudimentary at best. It was reported that when Saif al-Adl left Afghanistan for Iran, in the first half of 2002, he was allegedly transporting a device that was surmised to be a rudimentary nuclear device. At what stage of development the device was in is unknown, however, it is known that al-Qa'ida has been acquiring nuclear material since the mid-1990s. Within the leadership of al-Qa'ida, it was assessed that this nuclear device was transported to Europe and was hidden somewhere there. It was in mid-2004 that Sharif al-Masri and Abu Faraj al-Libi discussed this issue in depth and saw the inherent challenges in attempting to transport the device from Europe to the U.S. Approximately a year later, some reports described al-Qa'ida member and American citizen Adnan al-Shukrijumah as allegedly trying to smuggle elements of weapons of mass destruction into the U.S. across the Mexican border. Because it was Saif al-Adl who had the alleged rudimentary nuclear device in his possession when he crossed the Afghan-Iranian border, it can be assessed that may have been at least some involvement on the part of the Iranians. It is known that al-Qa'ida and the Quds Force, a special operations unit within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, have a longstanding working relationship, so it is assessed that the Quds Force may have taken control of the item al-Adl brought into the country. The possibility that Iranian elements may have helped in developing the device that Saif al-Adl brought in the country cannot be discounted. Another important point to take into account is the fact that Saif al-Adl is considered to be part of the 'dissidents' within al-Qa'ida's leadership. In Al-Adl's 2002 letter to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he was very critical of the events of 9/11 and stated that KSM and Bin Ladin made a mistake by attacking the U.S. So, the key question is if al-Adl - who is most likely serving again as al-Qa'ida's head of operations - would launch a round of retaliatory attacks against the West. Expectations As al-Qa'ida's Shura Council has already had several meetings to discuss the pressing issues at hand, it can be expected that the jihadi organizations in Pakistan will attack targets in that country very soon. It is not anticipated that core al-Qa'ida will be able to pull off a 'spectacular' attack in the West soon. The most serious threat will come from al-Qa'ida affiliated organizations like al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or local al-Qa'ida inspired jihadi outfits, including the possibility of isolated individuals willing to retaliate. www.nefafoundation.org - [email protected] NEFA Foundation - C2011 http://www.nefafoundation.org www.nefafoundation.org - [email protected] Core al-Qa'ida is still under pressure and second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri has remained silent for a long period of time and only recently emerged after the revolution in his home country of Egypt. A strategic discussion internally must take place soon if core al-Qa'ida is to have a chance to succeed as one organization. With the death of its leader, who was the unifying element, the ranks will need to be closed as soon as possible. However, whether or not that is a real possibility remains to be seen. 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