Report from the Libyan-Tunisian Border, Part I Created May 17 2011 - 05:21 Report from the Libyan-Tunisian Border, Part I <http://assets.stratfor.com/files/mmf/3/8/387851cc5124deab339478d1ef1b80153a770864_two_column.jpg> BORNI HITCHEM/AFP/Getty Images Libyan rebels check vehicles in Libya along the Tunisian border April 23 Though the bastion of the Libyan opposition is centered in the eastern half of the country, there are still two areas in the west that remain in open rebellion: the <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110421-libyan-battle-misurata> coastal town of Misurata and the Nafusa Mountains (also known as the Western Mountains), which run roughly from the Libyan town of Gharyan westward into the neighboring country of Tunisia. On April 21, Libyan rebels in the Nafusa Mountains seized control of the lone border crossing in the area. Since then, troops loyal to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi have tried on several occasions to reclaim it. Aside from a brief moment on April 28, Gadhafi’s army has been unsuccessful, primarily because it is fighting against an elevated position and dealing with stretched supply lines. Rebel supply lines in this isolated area of Libya, surrounded by pro-Gadhafi forces and empty tracts of desert, depend on control of the corridor that connects Wazin, Libya, to the Tunisian town of Dehiba. Without the Wazin-Dehiba crossing, Libyan guerrillas in the mountains would be forced to smuggle all of their gasoline, weapons, ammunition and almost all of their food past Gadhafi’s forces, all while having to fend off constant mortar and rocket attacks. The rebels in this part of Libya are for the most part not Arabs. They are part of the Amazigh nation, more commonly known as Berbers, who have historically resisted assimilation into the Libyan state. While they share a common interest in toppling the Gadhafi regime, rebels in the Nafusa Mountains should not be viewed as one in the same with those fighting in Misurata or Benghazi. <http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/Libya_nafusa_800.jpg> <http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/Libya_nafusa_800.jpg> (click here to enlarge image) <http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/Libya_nafusa_800.jpg> NATO airstrikes did not begin to focus on government forces in this region until late April, but they have helped the rebels here to resist the daily bombardments by the Libyan army in recent weeks. Though the eastern portion of the mountain range is outside of the rebels’ control, they currently hold Zentan and everything west and are able to use Tunisia as a strategic redoubt in the fight against Gadhafi’s forces, many of whom are reported to be stationed in Gaziya, located on the plains below. The guerrilla fighters in the Nafusa Mountains have been able to hold their positions but with their dire financial situation and lack of heavy weaponry, they lack the capability to go on the offensive. Editor’s Note: What follows is a field report from a STRATFOR source in the region. “I am currently in Dehiba, which is the last town on the Tunisian side of the border before Libya. There are around 5,000 inhabitants here plus at least as many Libyan refugees — about a thousand in a camp, the rest living with the local populace. There is another camp in Remada with 2,500 refugees, there are 5,000 Libyans living with the local population in Tataouine (the nearest bigger town, about a 90-minute drive on a semi-dirt road), and finally there is the camp of Ras Jedir, a bit further in the north, with 12,000 refugees (30 percent Egyptian, 30 percent Sudanese, 30 percent Eritrean, some Iraqi). At the border post here — the only rebel-held one in western Libya — about 1,500 people pass every day into Tunisia; 400 enter Libya. The border post is regularly run by the Tunisians on the one side, and by a ragtag group of rebels on the other side. The Tunisians check cars carefully, searching for drugs and weapons and finding a decent amount of both (especially hashish and Kalashnikovs). This is a smuggler town though; every youngster knows how to get across the mountains and most have a four-wheel drive vehicle with which to do it. The <javascript:launchPlayer('kd758822',%20'',%20640,%20360)> Dehiba-Wazin border post — Wazin is on the Libyan side — is strategically highly important, as it is the only possible port of entry for supplies for the rebels in a whole string of “liberated” cities, such as Wazin, Nalut, Cabao and Zentan. Note that all of these towns are a) in the mountains and b) Berber-populated (with the partial exception of Zentan, which is populated by a mixed Arab-Berber tribe). If Gadhafi’s troops manage to take control of the post again, resistance in those towns would most likely cease in the foreseeable future. The rebels on the Libyan side are your “student revolutionaries,” with Kalashnikovs, bandannas, Libyan monarchy caps and not much of anything else. There are about 30-50 of them at the border post and about 200 total in the area, most of them up on the mountain range. Allegedly they have four or five trucks with Soviet-era KPV 14.5x114 mm anti-aircraft guns on them that they took from Gadhafi’s troops, but I could not see any of those. They are said to have improvised rocket launchers about the length of an arm. Supposedly 40-50 percent of their ranks are made up of former soldiers, including all of their officers. Again, I did not see any proof of that nor talk to anyone who had actually been a soldier. Gadhafi’s troops are based in Gaziya, just 3 kilometers (nearly 2 miles) outside of Dehiba. They are said to have at least three BMP armored personnel carriers, a number of trucks from which they launch Grad rockets, and some anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, as I have heard they are in possession of both. They are stationed within and just outside of Gaziya. All these towns are tribal units as well, and Gaziya is made up of an Arabic tribe, as are most of the neutral or pro-Gadhafi towns around here. Pro- or anti-Gadhafi really seems to be determined by town/tribe. To some extent — no one has told me this, it is just my general impression — the Berbers seem to have seized an occasion, only superfluously connected to the motives of the rebels in the east, to go against the national government. The governmental troops are shelling the rebels up on the mountains virtually every evening — sometimes more, sometimes less. In the evening on May 15, they were hitting the rebels hard with anti-aircraft fire for an hour interspersed by Grad multiple-rocket launchers; most of the latter were considerably far off target, some of them landing close to the Tunisian border. Basically, the situation here is a stalemate. The rebels lack the weapons and probably training to take the government troops head on, yet they hold the mountain tops, which Gadhafi’s troops have five times already unsuccessfully tried to take. Last week, the government troops tried to circle around the mountains and take the border post from behind. But the Tunisian troops reportedly took positions with a small number of tanks and armored vehicles of their own and are preventing any incursion into Tunisian territory, which would be necessary to avoid crossing the mountains to retake the border post. The Tunisian army also patrols the area with airplanes every morning in order to assure that the Libyan troops remain on their territory. The rebels definitely are in contact with Benghazi. I have talked to a few who had come from there (flying out of Benghazi to Tunis through Maltese airspace). All the ones I talked to were in civilian positions, but there are 24 of them in all, and if the rebels have the capacity to do that I am sure they flew in some military personnel/advisers as well. Zentan, the most important and most eastern rebel-held city in the area, has around 60,000 inhabitants and another 70,000 in the suburbs and villages around it. A man who had left Zentan 12 days ago estimated that 25 percent of the population might have stayed, almost exclusively young men. Gadhafi’s troops hold the north, south and east of Zentan, shelling from the north while attempting infiltrations from the south and east. The <javascript:launchPlayer('pcbju3f7',%20'',%20640,%20360)> rebels keep open the western access road going to Tunisia, and infiltrations to Zentan have not been successful. The second-biggest town in the area that is rebel-held, Nalut, lies on that road. It has about 18,000 inhabitants, only about 10 percent of whom are still there. It is being shelled, but Gadhafi’s troops have not yet even tried to take it in any other way. Gadhafi’s troops usually shell all of these towns 2-3 times a week; they seem to have supply problems as well because Tripoli is so far away. Obviously, there are a lot of rumors circulating here. Supposedly much of the rebels’ financing comes from an association of foreign businessmen of Libyan descent. The Libyans are also desperately selling all kinds of things — sheep, cows, cars, cement and jewels — dirt-cheap here because they need money. Men from all over the region are coming in with trucks to build up their sheep herds. Some (Tunisian) locals who have friends in Gaziya told me that the leader of Gadhafi’s troops has been replaced because of his soft attitude toward the rebels, who effectively are his neighbors. Now the troops in Gaziya are dominated by people from Tripoli or southern Libya who are less locally connected. I was also told that 200 cars with African mercenary reinforcements for Gadhafi’s troops arrived last night. Locals were said to have seen them.” SOURCE: Report from the Libyan-Tunisian Border, Part I <http://www.stratfor.com/print/194588> This information is provided by PURE PURSUIT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, as a service to Military and Air Defense Communities with the purpose of offering relevant and timely information on (open source) defense, aviation, emergency, law enforcement and terrorism issues. Posts may be forwarded to other individuals, organizations and lists for non-commercial purposes. This list is now closed. 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