On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 9:10 AM, David Goulet <dgou...@ev0ke.net> wrote: > done by broadcasting the ephemeral keys after usage, any entity with > some ressources (let say here a government) could make some time > correlated attack with a set of clear text logs and the OTR packets.
Yes, they must have sophisticated resources such as the sacred knoweldge of the "man" command. With that dark power in hand they can invoke the sacred ritual of "man otr_modify" which will teleport into their minds the lost knoweldge of OTR transcript forgery! :P On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Trevor Perrin <tr...@trevp.net> wrote: > Deniability is easily achieved if you just use Diffie-Hellman based > key agreements without signatures Thats a whole lot of DH for a room with 100 people in it (3*N^2). _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list OTR-dev@lists.cypherpunks.ca http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
