On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxw...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Trevor Perrin <tr...@trevp.net> wrote: >> Deniability is easily achieved if you just use Diffie-Hellman based >> key agreements without signatures > > Thats a whole lot of DH for a room with 100 people in it (3*N^2).
You're concerned about computation cost? And you're talking about mpOTR's requirement for key agreement between all pairs of participants, and assuming triple-DH? Whether the key agreement between each pair requires 3 DHs or (1 DH, 1 sign, 1 verify), the computation cost is about the same. If computation cost matters here (probably not, mpOTR's many rounds of setup communication probably dominate the overhead), you could reduce it roughly in half with MQV, which is more efficient that can be done with signature-based key agreement. Trevor _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list OTR-dev@lists.cypherpunks.ca http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
