-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA384 Dear OTR hackers,
I just implemented reassembly of OTR fragments... While doing this I stumbled upon (in Protocol-v3): OTR version 2 messages get fragmented in a similar format, but without the instance tags fields: "?OTR,%hu,%hu,%s," , sender_instance, receiver_instance, k , n , piece[k] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I think those arguments should be removed (OTRv2 only uses k, n, piece[k]). Furthermore, the protocol description does allow for fragmented fragments... I'm curious whether there is any use of it? (With my formal methods background, whenever I write a recursive function without a (straightforward) termination argument it hurts (tbh, the termination argument is rather straightforward since fragmentation prepends and appends some bytes, thus it should all be safe). I'd explicitly only allow certain messages to be fragmented -- such as data (query is shorter without fragmentation anyways, ...). I'm roughly talking about (where arrows indicate fragmentation, using v2 here for simplicity (and I didn't try to execute this..)): ?OTRv2 --> ?OTR,1,2,?O, ?OTR,2,2,TRv2, --> ?OTR,1,2,?OTR,1,2,?, ?OTR,2,2,O,, ?OTR,2,2,TRv2, --> ... Cheers, Hannes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCQAGBQJUkYtsAAoJELyJZYjffCjurKIP/iiWZVlZIz/iPI1QE695pFIw TAPWMZO9vlNMz/dD3ENDXVGoxe1HdASo0IRuphmGbVRWAPY+qIr0siRxW/SXpywx oeEbKTe+UBVZkLDiEcIPGOvqV4H/pg0+ENpRUfrsmhhjgXNpupNKoMOjfDMI3RFE B/5lRzHrvMFDlQPf/gpwaviDweJBAJNPpj9yuSl0zhl+vtI4yk/+ZVX/GDF0mN9r JA2OCdu7XET0DbQApp2XdvFAr+HIWHxNcOOdmujsSD1l7gDyRkQh+eVbW9VWDG7X gc0sE6oHo1at5+VY9rTHr+YPHBeUajuCW6O04OLDY3NOOGu3T7ORhuhq/SlP6KMn lJmYCVb6rTFX02dF49PO1s875a3hC06Ruit7oxKq6/htJXk8VfVmWwcn0UYQd2K6 jC8EWqXXPyUk7NpIkxIu35V1YotWG9fGrlqM1MWBvtta7tahJRFWNTdGiH6wFcUb OdmvLzIpDCFrkh0KzCmKNJHUkqz/LljEUJ6oPK63ZlzdmPI5ovlLcgm5Tjq7RT2u 4tWVXblZwjCnFAlwJPMGTc36v4ZKPb2jH92aJqmfkRhtC6Fy74+cF3HgagrStob9 +YnRURE/FpaPFyS0UJCWRMD/WTUk4D6rk/M5rvu+dh+k3HoW787JVjsj9Ezaqwwx K5bJsfI17laym6odcfcz =49Vw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list OTR-dev@lists.cypherpunks.ca http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev