> . > > Most notably, if the certifying authority were to lose its legitimacy, side > rings could > emerge and take over on higher ethical grounds and with data loss on the > users' side. > From your messages and Stéphane Bortzmeyer remarks, it looks like a PGP web of trust would be an acceptable balance. From a political / social point of view, it would promote the emergence of multiple authorities instead of a single authority. For instance when a node tries to join a DHT by contacting a known node, it would also accept to only trust nodes that are connected to this node thru the PGP web of trust. From a technical point of view it would limit the nodes of the ring to those accepting the same rule.
That being said, I wonder how to set the default node(s) to connect to the ring. Or the default set of certificate authorities to trust. It also makes me think about the difficulties CAcert.org experiences to be accepted into the web browsers by default. And about the casual user of a search engine who will have a lot of trouble to even understand what it means to enter a trust ring. And about the need (or not) for a single view of the world (i.e. if someone knowningly joins a seeks search ring run by pranksters, answers are expected to be nonsense ;-). It is late saturday night and I'll let it rest for a few hours before trying to understand the impact in terms of software architecture ;-)
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