Just randomly asking unanswerable questions here. But I find the thread
engaging and efficient.
On 17/07/12 11:36 AM, James A. Donald wrote:
On 2012-07-17 8:48 AM, nir izraeli wrote:
[snip]
one could also add a "vouching" mechanism where other (random) peers may
cast a vote whether the file is either unknown, malicious or good. that
will complicate the network a bit but will allow the "neutral selection"
process that either-way occurs in a more rapid way.
Sybil attack. Voting never works.
Hmmm, yes.
You need to select the virtuous and
wise voters.
How do you reward the virtuous and wise so they can defend themselves
from the evolved generation of attackers?
obviously all of what I've said is vulnerable to the same weakness family
all current DHTs are vulnerable to - taking control of a big
percentage of
the p2p network will allow an adversary to manipulate it to his
advantage.
That is OK if the only way to take control of a big proportion of the
p2p network is to provide a big proportion of the useful services. The
problem is that the attacker may be able to manufacture millions of
sybils at very low cost.
To prevent the sybil attack, to prevent the attacker from creating very
large numbers of sybils at low cost, it must be costly to create sybils.
For it to be costly to create an identity allowed to contribute to the
reputation system, that identity first needs to provide significant
services to those already entitled to contribute to the reputation
system before it is allowed to contribute to the reputation system.
Yeah that: reputation costs money. Money can be lost, and can be stolen.
iang
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
