Jon, List1: I have used a second email to post this as not sure what was happening with my primary? Many technical issues (not just with the list) there. Anyway, this post hit the forum, which I think few read, but was not being circulated on the email-list which is primary. I think this an important thread and would like to encourage definitional/descriptive discussion regarding a series of key terms which JAS and myself intentionally and inadvertently introduced within various premises in previous posts. I merely I have changed the thread title as I'm not sure if my reply was sent or not last night (was having general computer problems it seems and no idea as to the status of that). Nonetheless, I think this deserves its own thread for clarification. It is the bold/underlined/italic which requires clarificaiton (for me at least) because as of now it signifies a categoricl error (a few) and I have to assume I am misunderstanding something for lack of context — I've read the Peirce citations attached but that does not go coeval with the alleged statement qua "congition", "experience", and "semiosis". Thus:JAS:Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree example," you initially said the following off-List.JRKC: Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero proof (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's reality may have no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, it would always be beyond us to ever know.Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only Kantian epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on your part — experience is a strictly cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not. "It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). At this point, I join Peirce in despairing of making this "broader conception" understood, at least in your case. As you said later, "we probably diverge and that's fine."ME: I have highlighted the bold, because that's the part I find incomprehensible.If semiosis occurs in crystals, and “experience is ... strictly cognitive...” but “semiosis is not [cognitive],” then we have a clear contradiction. These two propositions in the same statement — “experience is... strictly cognitive” and “semiosis is not [cognitive]” — make no sense together.If semiosis is not cognitive (as JAS wrote), then by his own definition it cannot apply to “experience,” which he says is strictly cognitive. So how can semiosis be part of experience if it is not cognitive?I would add that "experience" as "strictly" cognitive is one view among a great many. It is somewhat dualist unless you suppose all is cognition to erase the dualist distinction, but that is not your position here — though, in that Peirce passage you quote, it does seem much closer to what Peirce seemed to think: that semiosis is "cognitive" (signs corresponding with thought — within that exact citation you provide).Nonetheless, as for semiosis being present in crystals, I have little to no idea what that means, and the explanation above does not clarify it. I maintain that there is no proof that semiosis exists in crystals, however fascinating the idea is, but more fundamentally, I must now ask JAS this:What exactly is semiosis if, by what is posted above, it is constrained so it cannot be cognitive or experiential? What then remains of its meaning?Edwina is right — definitions provided in the discussion must be much clearer. Simply citing a series of quotations is insufficient, especially when the claim itself appears logically contradictory.JAS, I have to believe you are fundamentally mistaken in your reply — it makes no sense, regardless of what version of Peirce you might cite. And if you dismiss the ding-an-sich because it is incognizable, then how can you accept semiosis when you say it is neither cognitive nor experiential, as such. Unless it's just a logical mistake where you equate experience strictly with cognition and say semiosis is not [cognitive]?I add that semiosis in a crystal, to me, is what a person might "think" is happening with respect to a crystal but need not be what is actually true at all.I have spoken with people off-list who have helped clarify what Peirce might mean and I respect their views, but given the glaring logical contradiction here, I must ask JAS to clarify. To be clearer in his use of terms. That is, I must be missing something Jon would otherwise say/mean here, I do not doubt, because those two propositions in the same statement make no sense, within any Peircean system I can agree or disagree with, so I merely ask for clarity.Best wishes, Jack
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