Jack, List: For the record, this is your statement that I found (and still find) inscrutable, in case you would now like to clarify it.
JRKC: I can prove that to/through (mediation) the human being, the thing cannot be what it is in asbentia of that relation nor need it even be similar or remotely equivalent. I did not invent the notion that it blocks the way of inquiry to claim that there is something real that is absolutely unknowable, it comes directly from Peirce. "The second bar which philosophers often set up across the roadway of inquiry lies in maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be known" (CP 1.138, EP 2:49, 1898). "The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy" (CP 6.492, c. 1896). "[A]n unknowable reality is nonsense" (CP 8.43, c. 1885). By contrast, he *never *suggests that it blocks the way of inquiry to claim that something does not *exist*, as long as one has good reason for taking that position--which he does in the case of the thing-in-itself, as spelled out in my post earlier today ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00035.html). There is nothing self-contradictory about my statement in a post on Wednesday (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00017.html) that "experience is a strictly cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not." It neither says nor implies that "semiosis ... cannot be cognitive or experiential," only that semiosis (unlike experience) is not *strictly * cognitive. *All experience is cognitive, and all cognition is semiosis, but not all semiosis is cognition.* This is Peirce's "broader conception," and responses to it like yours are why he despaired of making it understood. We primarily study and discuss *human *semiosis because of its familiarity, but then we generalize it to other contexts. That is exactly what Peirce does when he asserts, "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" (CP 4.551, 1906). He is plainly characterizing those phenomena *themselves *as manifestations of thought, not referring to our cognitions *about *such things. *All cognition is thought, but not all thought is cognition.* Peirce adds later in the same paragraph (and elsewhere) that "there cannot be thought without Signs," i.e., *all thought is semiosis*; so, he is effectively saying that *all physical processes are semiosis*. Again, this is a reformulation of his "objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891). "Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289n, EP 1:42n, 1868). That is why Peirce explicitly (and quite famously) states, "the Universe is a vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). This is almost exactly synonymous with my "Peirce and I" example yesterday that apparently caused some consternation, "the entire universe is one immense sign." I almost included the parallel quotation in my post to demonstrate that my summary was accurate but left it out because I figured--wrongly, as it turned out--that it would be familiar enough to most people on the List to preclude any controversy. He goes on to say that the universe is "working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-4). Hence, describing the universe as one sign is fully consistent with Peirce's statement elsewhere "that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906). According to him, "There is a science of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs [plural] are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign [singular] ... and the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). "Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs [plural] which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign [singular]; and we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself" (EP 2:545n25, 1906). In summary, if indeed the entire universe is perfused with signs, all of which are connected to each other, then it also constitutes one immense sign. It thus conforms to the definition of a *continuum *given by Kant and endorsed by Peirce as one aspect of his late topical conception--"that of which every part has itself parts of the same kind" (CP 6.168, c. 1903-4). As I said in my other post yesterday ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00023.html), "the upshot is that every individual existing thing is a token of a type, an instance of a sign, an actual exemplar of a real general; and ... every dyadic reaction between such discrete things is a degenerate manifestation of continuous and triadic semiosis." In other words, thought/semiosis (but not cognition) "appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 7:20 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List > 1: I have used a second email to post this as not sure what was happening > with my primary? Many technical issues (not just with the list) there. > Anyway, this post hit the forum, which I think few read, but was not being > circulated on the email-list which is primary. I think this an important > thread and would like to encourage definitional/descriptive discussion > regarding a series of key terms which JAS and myself intentionally and > inadvertently introduced within various premises in previous posts. > I merely > I have changed the thread title as I'm not sure if my reply was sent or > not last night (was having general computer problems it seems and no idea > as to the status of that). Nonetheless, I think this deserves its own > thread for clarification. It is the bold/underlined/italic which requires > clarificaiton (for me at least) because as of now it signifies a categoricl > error (a few) and I have to assume I am misunderstanding something for lack > of context — I've read the Peirce citations attached but that does not go > coeval with the alleged statement qua "congition", "experience", and > "semiosis". > Thus: > *JAS:* > Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree > example," you initially said the following off-List. > JRKC*:* Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero > proof (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's reality > may have no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, it would > always be beyond us to ever know. > Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only Kantian > epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, this > reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on your part — *experience is a > strictly cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not.* > > "It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely > physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that > the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). > > At this point, I join Peirce in despairing of making this "broader > conception" understood, at least in your case. As you said later, "we > probably diverge and that's fine." > ------------------------------ > *ME:* I have highlighted the bold, because that's the part I find > incomprehensible. > If semiosis occurs in crystals, and “experience is ... strictly > cognitive...” but “semiosis is not [cognitive],” then we have a clear > contradiction. These two propositions in the same statement — “experience > is... strictly cognitive” and “semiosis is not [cognitive]” — make no sense > together. > If semiosis is not cognitive (as JAS wrote), then by his own definition it > cannot apply to “experience,” which he says is strictly cognitive. So how > can semiosis be part of experience if it is not cognitive? > I would add that "experience" as "strictly" cognitive is one view among a > great many. It is somewhat dualist unless you suppose all is cognition to > erase the dualist distinction, but that is not your position here — though, > in that Peirce passage you quote, it does seem much closer to what Peirce > seemed to think: that semiosis is "cognitive" (signs corresponding with > thought — within that exact citation you provide). > Nonetheless, as for semiosis being present in crystals, I have little to > no idea what that means, and the explanation above does not clarify it. I > maintain that there is no proof that semiosis exists in crystals, however > fascinating the idea is, but more fundamentally, I must now ask JAS this: > *What exactly is semiosis if, by what is posted above, it is constrained > so it cannot be cognitive or experiential? What then remains of its > meaning?* > Edwina is right — definitions provided in the discussion must be much > clearer. Simply citing a series of quotations is insufficient, especially > when the claim itself appears logically contradictory. > JAS, I have to believe you are fundamentally mistaken in your reply — it > makes no sense, regardless of what version of Peirce you might cite.* And > if you dismiss the ding-an-sich because it is incognizable, then how can > you accept semiosis when you say it is neither cognitive nor experiential, > as such.* Unless it's just a logical mistake where you equate experience > strictly with cognition and say semiosis is not [cognitive]? > I add that semiosis in a crystal, to me, is what a person might "think" is > happening with respect to a crystal but need not be what is actually true > at all. > I have spoken with people off-list who have helped clarify what Peirce > might mean and I respect their views, but given the glaring logical > contradiction here, I must ask JAS to clarify. To be clearer in his use of > terms. That is, I must be missing something Jon would otherwise say/mean > here, I do not doubt, because those two propositions in the same statement > make no sense, within any Peircean system I can agree or disagree with, so > I merely ask for clarity. > Best wishes, > Jack >
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