Gary R., List: GR: Although I find much to admire in Jon's explanation of a universal semiosic continuum, I noted on List that a question remained. Actually, there may be several.
I changed the subject line since this post will focus entirely on answering your multiple specific questions about my hypothesis. I apologize for its resulting length, but as a tradeoff, it will be my only post today. GR: First, is the semiosic sign that is the cosmos a system? That depends on your definition of "system" in this context. Again, I conceive the universe as one immense sign to be a *topical *continuum--the whole is ontologically prior to the parts, all those parts are likewise signs, all their parts are likewise signs, and so on. GR: If it is a system, how is it that its object is viewed by Jon as outside that system? According to Peirce, it is a fundamental semiotic principle that *every *sign is determined by a dynamical object that is external to that sign, independent of that sign, and unaffected by that sign. Therefore, if the entire universe is a sign--as Peirce himself clearly maintained--then it *must *be determined by a dynamical object that is external to the entire universe, independent of the entire universe, and unaffected by the entire universe. Moreover, this does not conflict with the idea that every sign *within *the universe is connected to every other sign *within *the universe. Peirce says that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904), and that "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906); but he also says the following. CSP: [I]t is impossible that any sign whether mental or external should be perfectly determinate. If it were possible such sign must remain absolutely unconnected with any other. It would quite obviously be such a sign of its entire universe, as Leibniz and others have described the omniscience of God to be, an intuitive representation amounting to an indecomposable feeling of the whole in all its details, from which those details would not be separable. For no reasoning, and consequently no abstraction, could connect itself with such a sign. (CP 4.583, 1906) Again, the entire universe as a *hyperbolic *continuum encompassing *all *time--from the infinite past to the infinite future--is "the fact that is not abstracted but complete" (EP 2:304, NEM 4:239-40, 1901) and the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). If it is indeed one immense sign, then it is "absolutely unconnected with any other" sign, because *there are no other signs*. More on "the omniscience of God" below. GR: If an object of the universe as semiosic continuum can be located, was it located as such by Peirce and, if so, outside the vast universal sign? I am not aware of any texts by Peirce where he *specifically *applies that fundamental semiotic principle to the entire universe as one immense sign. The closest that he comes is when he refers to the universe as "a great symbol of God's purpose" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903) and similarly calls nature "the symbol of God to Humanity" (R 288:92[180], 1905). However, he does argue explicitly, on more than one occasion, that the reality of a *necessary *being--one that is *not immanent* in any or all of the three universes corresponding to his three categories--is the only rational explanation for *their *co-reality. This is what I discuss at length in my forthcoming *Transactions *paper, much of which I derived from my posts in several List threads about a year ago, presenting and explicating two previously unpublished manuscript passages in conjunction with Peirce's other relevant writings. GR: Must that semiosic object be God or is there some other agency possible? What else but God could be external to the entire universe, independent of the entire universe, and unaffected by the entire universe, while nevertheless *determining *the entire universe? Although Peirce insists that our conception of God should remain vague instead of being made too precise, he also ascribes many of the traditional attributes to God--always with the caveat that they must likewise be understood vaguely, figuratively, loosely, and analogously. An example is what he says about "the omniscience of God" as quoted above (CP 4.583)--unlike all our knowledge of the universe from within it, God's knowledge of it does not require perception of it nor reasoning about it, because God timelessly knows "the whole in all its details." As the saying goes, "God knows the end from the beginning." GR: It has also been argued that God is the Ultimate Interpretant: if this is so, how can God be both object and interpretant, especially if God is seen as outside the semiosic system, or at least, outside the universal sign? My answer to this is based on Peirce's statement, "The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third" (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8). As I see it, God the Creator as *Ens necessarium*, God *per se*, is the dynamical object of the entire universe as a sign; while God completely revealed, God fully known, is its final interpretant. Accordingly, God's purpose in creating and (from our time-bound perspective) constantly determining the universe as one immense sign is increasingly definite self-disclosure. As I said yesterday, this is a *hyperbolic *cosmology--the entire universe as a semiosic continuum is proceeding from the unattainable limit of complete ignorance in the infinite past, through a mix of true and false beliefs (as dynamical interpretants) at any assignable date, toward the unattainable limit of complete knowledge (as the final interpretant) in the infinite future. GR: Is it legitimate to extrapolate from Peirce's characterizing the universe as a vast argument/Symbol/poem (all to be found in his writings) to a theological conclusion--his? (or yours)--but rather to one more amenable to contemporary science? As I see it, my Peircean (not Peirce's own) abductive conclusion--that the entire universe is one immense sign, with God the Creator as its dynamical object and God completely revealed as its final interpretant--is semiotic and cosmological, not theological. It is a hypothesis about the nature of the universe, not a doctrine about the nature of God. Frankly, it seems to me that *any *metaphysical hypothesis affirming scholastic realism and/or objective idealism is *not *amenable to contemporary science, because the latter is steeped in nominalism and materialism--even when stripped down to "minimal physicalism." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Aug 17, 2025 at 8:19 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, Jon, Gary F., List, > > I'm relieved and gratified to learn -- both in comments on List and off -- > that I apparently didn't misrepresent Peirce's blackboard narrative, at > least not too much. I still tend to think of it as an 'analogy', while Jon > reminds us Peirce referred to it as a diagram. Perhaps it is a diagram of > an analogy. > > Jeff wrote: Thank you for sharing this interpretation of the Blackboard > analogy. I wanted to ask about one assertion: "Sure, this is all > conjectural -- there is certainly no scientific means to explore it" and > offered three alternatives of what I might have been suggesting by that > comment. > > JD: (1) at the present time, there doesn't appear to be any scientific > means to explore or test Peirce's cosmological conjectures about the > evolution of order, including the spatial and temporal ordering of things > in the very early universe; > GR: The short answer is that I do *not* think of the blackboard diagram > as representing "the very early universe" but, rather, as imagining a > possible proto-universe anterior to any actual universe, and in that > proto-universe there is no space nor time. > > JD: (2) at the present time, we can't conceive of any possible tests, but > we might be in a better position to come up with some in the future; > GR: I cannot conceive of any possible tests ever being devised. These are > Peirce's metaphysical conjectures which may resonate with some scientists > and other scholars, but not with others. > > In some past threads, and in a recent one, Jon discussed the universe as a > single vast sign, an evolutionary semiosic continuum, arguing that it > requires an object outside that universe which that single vast sign > represents, which it seems to thrust into real being and (in some way that > I'm not clear about) energize and sustain it . Although I find much to > admire in Jon's explanation of a universal semiosic continuum, I noted on > List that a question remained. Actually, there may be several. > > First, is the semiosic sign that is the cosmos a system? If it is a > system, how is it that its object is viewed by Jon as outside that system? > If an object of the universe as semiosic continuum can be located, was it > located as such by Peirce *and,* if so, outside the vast universal sign? > *Must* that semiosic object be God or is there some other agency > possible? It has also been argued that God is the Ultimate Interpretant: if > this is so, how can God be both object and interpretant, especially if God > is seen as outside the semiosic system, or at least, outside the universal > sign? Is it legitimate to extrapolate from Peirce's characterizing the > universe as a vast argument/Symbol/poem (all to be found in his writings) > to a theological conclusion -- his? (or yours) -- but rather to one more > amenable to contemporary science? > > JD: (3) there are no such tests, as a matter of principle, that can be > conducted to confirm one hypothesis and disconfirm another perhaps because > we are talking about a "time before time". > GR: Exactly. As a matter of principle it seems to me that Peirce's -- or > anyone's for that matter -- metaphysical conjectures about a "time before > time" will never be open to scientific confirmation nor disconfirmation. > Nor will many-universes, etc. I personally find Peirce's > proto-cosmological musings valuable: they help me think about the genesis > of the universe which, from what I understand of most versions of Big Bang > theory, comes out of nothing. > > For Peirce, pure nothingness is not a possible state, indeed it is not > even conceivable except as the negation of being. > > > We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of > negation. For not means other than, and other is merely a synonym of the > ordinal numeral second. As such it implies a first; while the present pure > zero is prior to every first. The nothing of negation is the nothing of > death, which comes second to, or after, everything. But this *pure zero > is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no > compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in > which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is > absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility.* > There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom. > > So of potential being there was in that initial state no lack. CP > 6.217-218 > > Couple this idea with the blackboard analogy and, for me, you have a more > persuasive idea of the proto-origins of our universe. Testable? No. Never. > > Best. > > Gary R > >>
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