List, GaryR, JAS,
I won't’ comment on JAS’s personal beliefs in God and will only comment on two assumptions in his analysis that, I think, are open to debate. These two assumptions are [1] the definition of the sign, and [2] the definition of the Dynamic Object. As I previously wrote: In my understanding of Peirce, a ‘sign’ is a spatiotemporal triadic entity – and is existentially real in spatial and temporal perimeters in the Phaneron. JAS confines his definition of the sign to, in my view, only the meditative relation, the Representamen, rather than the triad. I personally don’t see how this mediative relation can function, on its own, within the universe..ie..you can’t say that the whole universe is ‘composed of signs’ if by this term, you mean ONLY the mediative relation!. It is inherently part of a triad. Peirce wrote: “I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of any one consciousness’. EP 2: 363. If there is a phaneron ,the idea of combination is an indecomposable element of it. This idea is a triad;.[ EP2 362-3. And CP: 8.305” I shall define a Sign and show its triadic form. “ My understanding is that this triadic entity, the Sign, in its triadic form, is an existential spatiotemporal entity, an organized form of energy, whether it be in the form of an atom, molecule, insect, animal, human being, word, thought. As Peirce noted, 5.449f. ‘the universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs”. What is the triad? This brings us to the other term, the ‘Dynamic Object. ..rem3mb3ring that the semeiotic triad is made up of O-R-I. JAS, to my understanding defines the Dynamic Object as a separate entity. Detached and unaffected by the semiotic process.As such, he defines it as external to theUniverse and as ‘god’. I think this descibes the External Object rather than the Dynamic Object. See Peirce’s differentiation of the two in his well-known description of his interaction with the weather. Note where he differentiates them: “This is a sign whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window curtains” 8.314.my emphasis And Peirce also writes: ” By the way, the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual experience” EP2.478. Edwina > On Aug 19, 2025, at 11:34 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > Well, that's a lot to take in! So I'll just try a chunk of it today. I had > written: > > GR: If it is a system, how is it that its object is viewed . . . as outside > that system? > > JAS: According to Peirce, it is a fundamental semiotic principle that every > sign is determined by a dynamical object that is external to that sign, > independent of that sign, and unaffected by that sign. Therefore, if the > entire universe is a sign--as Peirce himself clearly maintained--then it must > be determined by a dynamical object that is external to the entire universe, > independent of the entire universe, and unaffected by the entire universe. > > I'm still a bit mystified. Firstly, doesn't the OD (which you've argued is > God) need to be known by collateral observation or some sort of acquaintance? > What sort of collateral knowledge could the Universe-as-Vast-Sign have of its > OD, God? And what is its IO? Isn't the Vast Sign itself necessarily within a > mind or something like a mind if it is 'conceived' at all? I would assume it > can't have self-reference? So who is reading the Vast Sign? Is the Cosmic > Sign out of God's Mind altogether. But if the mind I'm inquiring into is the > Mind of God, then how can the Vast Cosmic Sign stand apart from that? What's > its IO? That is, where is that Sign situated in relation to > consciousness/mind? It surely can't be mind-less? Our own minds are evidence > that it isn't. So, if not the mind of God (who stands apart from it and yet, > you say, somehow sustains and evolves it), then what? Again, how is the > Cosmic Sign determined by God when, I assume, no physical determination is > meant in your semiotic use of 'determine? Again, the Sign has no effect upon > the OD, but isn't an OI required? Where is that located? > > I know I could wait for your Transactions paper, but I've followed you to > some extent so far and yet questions keep arising. I guess the trust of the > questions above is 'Where is Mind in all This?' And another big question the > shorthand of which is: Where is the OI, or isn't there one or something like > it (but how could that be)? > > I have little doubt that some might see these kinds of questions and this > kind of discussion as akin to 'how many angels can sit on the head of a pin'? > But for those of us who take metaphysical questions such as Peirce (and you) > have posed, well we find that they stimulate thinking in us about cosmic > spiritual matters of importance to us. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > On Tue, Aug 19, 2025 at 6:14 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: Although I find much to admire in Jon's explanation of a universal >> semiosic continuum, I noted on List that a question remained. Actually, >> there may be several. >> >> I changed the subject line since this post will focus entirely on answering >> your multiple specific questions about my hypothesis. I apologize for its >> resulting length, but as a tradeoff, it will be my only post today. >> >> GR: First, is the semiosic sign that is the cosmos a system? >> >> That depends on your definition of "system" in this context. Again, I >> conceive the universe as one immense sign to be a topical continuum--the >> whole is ontologically prior to the parts, all those parts are likewise >> signs, all their parts are likewise signs, and so on. >> >> GR: If it is a system, how is it that its object is viewed by Jon as outside >> that system? >> >> According to Peirce, it is a fundamental semiotic principle that every sign >> is determined by a dynamical object that is external to that sign, >> independent of that sign, and unaffected by that sign. Therefore, if the >> entire universe is a sign--as Peirce himself clearly maintained--then it >> must be determined by a dynamical object that is external to the entire >> universe, independent of the entire universe, and unaffected by the entire >> universe. Moreover, this does not conflict with the idea that every sign >> within the universe is connected to every other sign within the universe. >> Peirce says that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all >> thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904), and that >> "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906); but he also says the >> following. >> >> CSP: [I]t is impossible that any sign whether mental or external should be >> perfectly determinate. If it were possible such sign must remain absolutely >> unconnected with any other. It would quite obviously be such a sign of its >> entire universe, as Leibniz and others have described the omniscience of God >> to be, an intuitive representation amounting to an indecomposable feeling of >> the whole in all its details, from which those details would not be >> separable. For no reasoning, and consequently no abstraction, could connect >> itself with such a sign. (CP 4.583, 1906) >> >> Again, the entire universe as a hyperbolic continuum encompassing all >> time--from the infinite past to the infinite future--is "the fact that is >> not abstracted but complete" (EP 2:304, NEM 4:239-40, 1901) and the "one >> individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of >> reality" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). If it is indeed one immense sign, then >> it is "absolutely unconnected with any other" sign, because there are no >> other signs. More on "the omniscience of God" below. >> >> GR: If an object of the universe as semiosic continuum can be located, was >> it located as such by Peirce and, if so, outside the vast universal sign? >> >> I am not aware of any texts by Peirce where he specifically applies that >> fundamental semiotic principle to the entire universe as one immense sign. >> The closest that he comes is when he refers to the universe as "a great >> symbol of God's purpose" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903) and similarly calls >> nature "the symbol of God to Humanity" (R 288:92[180], 1905). However, he >> does argue explicitly, on more than one occasion, that the reality of a >> necessary being--one that is not immanent in any or all of the three >> universes corresponding to his three categories--is the only rational >> explanation for their co-reality. This is what I discuss at length in my >> forthcoming Transactions paper, much of which I derived from my posts in >> several List threads about a year ago, presenting and explicating two >> previously unpublished manuscript passages in conjunction with Peirce's >> other relevant writings. >> >> GR: Must that semiosic object be God or is there some other agency possible? >> >> What else but God could be external to the entire universe, independent of >> the entire universe, and unaffected by the entire universe, while >> nevertheless determining the entire universe? Although Peirce insists that >> our conception of God should remain vague instead of being made too precise, >> he also ascribes many of the traditional attributes to God--always with the >> caveat that they must likewise be understood vaguely, figuratively, loosely, >> and analogously. An example is what he says about "the omniscience of God" >> as quoted above (CP 4.583)--unlike all our knowledge of the universe from >> within it, God's knowledge of it does not require perception of it nor >> reasoning about it, because God timelessly knows "the whole in all its >> details." As the saying goes, "God knows the end from the beginning." >> >> GR: It has also been argued that God is the Ultimate Interpretant: if this >> is so, how can God be both object and interpretant, especially if God is >> seen as outside the semiosic system, or at least, outside the universal sign? >> >> My answer to this is based on Peirce's statement, "The starting-point of the >> universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute First; the terminus of the >> universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of >> the universe at a measurable point of time is the third" (CP 1.362, EP >> 1:251, 1887-8). As I see it, God the Creator as Ens necessarium, God per se, >> is the dynamical object of the entire universe as a sign; while God >> completely revealed, God fully known, is its final interpretant. >> Accordingly, God's purpose in creating and (from our time-bound perspective) >> constantly determining the universe as one immense sign is increasingly >> definite self-disclosure. As I said yesterday, this is a hyperbolic >> cosmology--the entire universe as a semiosic continuum is proceeding from >> the unattainable limit of complete ignorance in the infinite past, through a >> mix of true and false beliefs (as dynamical interpretants) at any assignable >> date, toward the unattainable limit of complete knowledge (as the final >> interpretant) in the infinite future. >> >> GR: Is it legitimate to extrapolate from Peirce's characterizing the >> universe as a vast argument/Symbol/poem (all to be found in his writings) to >> a theological conclusion--his? (or yours)--but rather to one more amenable >> to contemporary science? >> >> As I see it, my Peircean (not Peirce's own) abductive conclusion--that the >> entire universe is one immense sign, with God the Creator as its dynamical >> object and God completely revealed as its final interpretant--is semiotic >> and cosmological, not theological. It is a hypothesis about the nature of >> the universe, not a doctrine about the nature of God. Frankly, it seems to >> me that any metaphysical hypothesis affirming scholastic realism and/or >> objective idealism is not amenable to contemporary science, because the >> latter is steeped in nominalism and materialism--even when stripped down to >> "minimal physicalism." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Sun, Aug 17, 2025 at 8:19 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Jeff, Jon, Gary F., List, >>> >>> I'm relieved and gratified to learn -- both in comments on List and off -- >>> that I apparently didn't misrepresent Peirce's blackboard narrative, at >>> least not too much. I still tend to think of it as an 'analogy', while Jon >>> reminds us Peirce referred to it as a diagram. Perhaps it is a diagram of >>> an analogy. >>> >>> Jeff wrote: Thank you for sharing this interpretation of the Blackboard >>> analogy. I wanted to ask about one assertion: "Sure, this is all >>> conjectural -- there is certainly no scientific means to explore it" and >>> offered three alternatives of what I might have been suggesting by that >>> comment. >>> >>> JD: (1) at the present time, there doesn't appear to be any scientific >>> means to explore or test Peirce's cosmological conjectures about the >>> evolution of order, including the spatial and temporal ordering of things >>> in the very early universe; >>> GR: The short answer is that I do not think of the blackboard diagram as >>> representing "the very early universe" but, rather, as imagining a possible >>> proto-universe anterior to any actual universe, and in that proto-universe >>> there is no space nor time. >>> >>> JD: (2) at the present time, we can't conceive of any possible tests, but >>> we might be in a better position to come up with some in the future; >>> GR: I cannot conceive of any possible tests ever being devised. These are >>> Peirce's metaphysical conjectures which may resonate with some scientists >>> and other scholars, but not with others. >>> >>> In some past threads, and in a recent one, Jon discussed the universe as a >>> single vast sign, an evolutionary semiosic continuum, arguing that it >>> requires an object outside that universe which that single vast sign >>> represents, which it seems to thrust into real being and (in some way that >>> I'm not clear about) energize and sustain it . Although I find much to >>> admire in Jon's explanation of a universal semiosic continuum, I noted on >>> List that a question remained. Actually, there may be several. >>> >>> First, is the semiosic sign that is the cosmos a system? If it is a system, >>> how is it that its object is viewed by Jon as outside that system? If an >>> object of the universe as semiosic continuum can be located, was it located >>> as such by Peirce and, if so, outside the vast universal sign? Must that >>> semiosic object be God or is there some other agency possible? It has also >>> been argued that God is the Ultimate Interpretant: if this is so, how can >>> God be both object and interpretant, especially if God is seen as outside >>> the semiosic system, or at least, outside the universal sign? Is it >>> legitimate to extrapolate from Peirce's characterizing the universe as a >>> vast argument/Symbol/poem (all to be found in his writings) to a >>> theological conclusion -- his? (or yours) -- but rather to one more >>> amenable to contemporary science? >>> >>> JD: (3) there are no such tests, as a matter of principle, that can be >>> conducted to confirm one hypothesis and disconfirm another perhaps because >>> we are talking about a "time before time". >>> GR: Exactly. As a matter of principle it seems to me that Peirce's -- or >>> anyone's for that matter -- metaphysical conjectures about a "time before >>> time" will never be open to scientific confirmation nor disconfirmation. >>> Nor will many-universes, etc. I personally find Peirce's >>> proto-cosmological musings valuable: they help me think about the genesis >>> of the universe which, from what I understand of most versions of Big Bang >>> theory, comes out of nothing. >>> >>> For Peirce, pure nothingness is not a possible state, indeed it is not even >>> conceivable except as the negation of being. >>> >>> We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of >>> negation. For not means other than, and other is merely a synonym of the >>> ordinal numeral second. As such it implies a first; while the present pure >>> zero is prior to every first. The nothing of negation is the nothing of >>> death, which comes second to, or after, everything. But this pure zero is >>> the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no >>> compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in >>> which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is >>> absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility. >>> There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom. >>> >>> So of potential being there was in that initial state no lack. CP 6.217-218 >>> >>> Couple this idea with the blackboard analogy and, for me, you have a more >>> persuasive idea of the proto-origins of our universe. Testable? No. Never. >>> >>> Best. >>> >>> Gary R >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>?subject=SIG%20peirce-l">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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