Jon, Helmut, Ivar, List, Really interesting conversation by all. I'm wondering about something I'm just going to call the "will to truth" or "will of truth".
Or, qua the real as principle, do any of you surmise that what is "real" (not merely after infinite inquiry) must also be present. I.e., the real, what in Peirce's view would be the truthful understanding a community would come to in a hypothethical infinity, — surely we can assert that such is always present even if we cannot understand it whether individually or collective. In the more general sense, I don't see how we can talk very well, within Peirce's system, about will without considering the "real". As for metaphysical testing — it cannot be empirically tested (as such) which is what one gets from reading Hume and Kant (whether one accepts either of their conclusions and so forth being a different matter). It would be something that logical inquiry would have to demonstrate exists in some way of necessary inference (pure reason or something akin to that). For Kant, and the thing in itself, it's either something which you consider necessary to infer after logical analysis and thinking and so forth, or else dismiss. Regardless of the ding-an-sich (I'm not trying to make this a post about that...), I think the method Kant outlines stands regardless of whether one accepts his conclusions (at least, the regulations he imposes having read Hume). It is worth reading the Prolegomena if only for Kant's reasoning about how it would be possible (if and only if... with respect to Hume's thesis) to infer metaphysical necessity. Insofar as will exists, in Peircean mode, it would have to, if true at least, correspond to the real? Or the real (as truth-standard here whatever the ideal/principle) would be that which we will toward in inquiry/practice? Just some thoughts. Best, Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, August 25, 2025 5:54 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Will and Belief, WAS: The Object of the Universe as a Sign (was Peirce's Blackboard) Helmut, Ivar, List: Given the subject line, it seems relevant to note that William James advocated "the will to believe," even writing a book with that title and dedicating it to his good friend Charles Peirce. However, Peirce himself disagreed, going so far as to identify this as one of the "seeds of death" with which James and other nominalists had "infected" pragmatism (CP 6.485, EP 2:450, 1908), thereby prompting him to coin "pragmaticism" for his own scholastic realist version. Instead, he was a proponent of "the Will to Learn" (CP 5.583, EP 2:47, 1898), calling this "The First Rule of Logic" (lecture title) and presenting his famous maxim, "Do not block the way of inquiry," as a corollary that follows from it (CP 1.135, EP 2:48, 1898). Of the four methods of inquiry that he outlined two decades earlier (CP 5.377-87, EP 1:115-23, 1877), the first three effectively subordinate belief to will--in the case of tenacity and a priori, the will of the individual; in the case of authority, the will of the state or another institution. By contrast, the method of science subordinates all other considerations to the will to learn, aiming for the adoption of only true beliefs. It is intrinsically self-correcting, such that this is bound to happen in the long run--a false belief is one whose corresponding habits of conduct would eventually be confounded some future experience, while a true belief is one whose corresponding habits would never be confounded by any possible future experience. In the thread on "Peirce's Blackboard," I asked a couple of times whether grand metaphysical hypotheses such as his objective idealism, his hyperbolic cosmology, and my semiosic synechism are amenable to inductive testing. In other words, are they capable of being evaluated in accordance with the method of science, even in principle? If not, is there some other way in which we should go about it? In the thread on "The Object of the Universe as a Sign," I asked yesterday whether my specific ontological and cosmological hypotheses are plausible, and if not, why not. However, are there any consensus standards for assessing the plausibility of a metaphysical hypothesis, or is it like beauty--entirely in the eye of the beholder? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 8:25 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Ivar, List, I think, a physical (as opposed to metaphysical) belief may be refuted by deduction or complete induction, that is, proven the opposite. For example most conspiracy theories. A metaphysical belief can be altered too, but not proven the opposite. It is vulnerable only by incomplete induction, or abduction. So it can only be gradually altered, by showing, that it is e.g. less probable or less plausible, than the believer thought it was. But, has it been a belief then, or a supposition? I would say, supposition is belief too, a weak one, and a metaphysical belief can only be a supposition (of probability or plausibility). But when I talk to religious or quasi-religious (ideological) believers, I see, that their beliefs are absolute. How can that be? I guess, they have had visions. A former german chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, said: "Anyone who has visions should go to the doctor". The revelation by John in the bible to me does give me the impression of someone who has eaten magic mushrooms with a problematic mood. On the other hand I have respect for introspect experiences in meditation. Then belief is based on experience, but an introspect experience´s reality cannot be proven. Well, the only conclusion i so far have, is to agree with the claim, that theology should be kept out of a scientific discussion. And other metaphysical beliefs, like in this or that semiotical or philosophical model, should be treated as probabilities or plausibilities, but not with pure hermeneutics, because to apply pure hermeneutics performatively shows absolute belief. Best, Helmut 24. August 2025 um 21:58 Ivar <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Helmut, List, Interesting topic! Right of the bat I just want to challenge your claim that metaphysical beliefs cannot be criticized. For example. Many have scratched their heads about Kant's Ding-an-Sich. As regulative ideas they work quite unproblematically, but to strictly block access to them, on apriori grounds, was something Peirce objected to on grounds of blocking the way of inquiry (as I recall it at least!). It reminds me of Sisyphos, why go on exploring if we never will get to an end, per Kant? Returning to the claim again, are metaphysical beliefs only epiphenomenal objects of consciousness? Are they not produced and altered by inquiry? On another note. My guess as to why you feel closer connection to will rather than belief as being real might relate to their experiential closeness. I believe will is closer to our experience, as being sensed somehow ("I really want some candy now"), whereas beliefs are more abstract, theoretic entities encoding behaviour. Can we sense beliefs the same way we sense a will? Though, beliefs seems almost necessary for willing too. Why would something will anything if it was not motivated by some conscious or unconscious prediction? I feel an itch in my throat, a will is introduced towards water, based on the belief that water will cure the itch. Perhaps beliefs look more real on paper, while will feels more real in person. I apologize if I have been unclear. This post was made a bit hasty, but I will gladly return with a better formulation soon and connect to Peirce more. Best regards Ivar -------- Message d'origine -------- Le 24/08/2025 21:13, Helmut Raulien a écrit : Jon, List, my motivation about this topic "Will and Belief" is awakened by a talk I had with an otherwise very rational thinker (engineer), who also nevertheless is a strong christian believer. I was scared by his belief in hell. I feel to experience, that in reality, will and belief are sometimes relatedly positively coupled, sometimes contingent with each other, and sometimes lead to polar opposition. Examples: -- Relatedly positively coupled: A missionary man wants others to want to believe. So he sees belief as a function of will. I too often, introspecting myself, see, that I believe what I want to be real (wishful thinking). And things like self-fulfilling-prophecy, placebo-, and nocebo- effect, are obviously real. -- Contingent: A person can not be blamed for her/his metaphysical belief, is not responsible for it. The consistence of physical theory might be proved by some consistent metaphysical theory, if there was any, but not the other way (Goedel). Meaning, if we have a consistent physical theory, we are not able to prove the consistency of any metaphysical theory by it. If I have understood it correctly. Metaphysical belief thus is not susceptible to critique, is neither verifiable, nor falsifiable. It is logically isolated, contingent, one cannot be blamed for it. -- Leads to polar opposition: The polar opposition is between good and bad in its thirdness extremes benevolent and evil: If a missionary man, who believes in hell, tries to convince others of hell´s existence, he wants to warn about it, and save people from going there. So his belief in hell is benevolent. But if someone´s will is, that there be a hell, he is extremely evil, as hell is meant to be a place people go to, so he wishes for these people to go to hell. So belief in, and will of, a hell, are polar opposites. At Peirce, I have not found an explicit relation between will and belief, though one might say, that will takes part in habit-formation, and belief is some sort of habit. But both are not part of a common classes or modes system or the like, as far as I have found. Will is a sub-sub-aspect of consciousness: Consciousness has the modes primsense (1ns), altersense (2ns), and medisense (3ns), and altersense has the modes sensation (2.1.), and will (2.2.). Belief has four fixing kinds: A priori, tenacity, authority, scientificness. I think, Peirce´s "A priori" means instinct or intuition, so is not identical with the Kantian "A priori", but that is a different topic. My conclusion is: I don´t have any. The relation or non-relation between will and belief is a mystery to me. Some neuroscientists say, will is an illusion, I rather feel, that belief is an illusion. Or are both illusions? My will is, that will is real. About belief I don´t emotionally care. Best, Helmut
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