Supplement:
i have thought about it a bit, and have come to this conclusion:
To assess a probability, even if it is only an estimation, is always a deduction or a tautology. A complete induction is a tautology, because the conclusion is already in one of the premisses. Mathematical probability calculation is deductive.
What I wrote about the limited group, cannot be used for probability calculation. Example:
Counterfactually given, that beans be either white or black. You have a bag of beans, put your hand inside, and feel, that there are four beans in the bag. You take out three of them, they are white. Now what is the probability, that all of them are white?
Answer: Uncalculable. You don´t know anything about the motivation of beanbag-manufacturers to sort the beans after their colours into bags. It may be, that the beanbags contain beans from the same farmer or cooperative, then all should be white, but it may as well be, that the beanbags are designed for Peirce-related experiments in schools, with same amount of white and black beans mixed, then the probability is a bit smaller than a half.
So an incomplete induction is uncalculable, even if you know the total number of items. For plasusibility/ abduction I have already written, that it is impossible to know, which and how many other hypotheses there might be. Only if you have two or a fixed number of them, you can apply Ockham´s razor to estimate, which one is the more plausible. For example, if you compare theism with anthropic principle, you can say, that theism requires only one universe for explanation, anthropic principle a vast number of universes, so theism is more plausible. But that is not a calculus, just a vague principle, which might fail.
Or does anybody know more about this topic? It overlaps with mathematics, about which I know close to nothing.
Best, Helmut
Jon, List,
Thank you! Interesting, that William James wrote this book "The will to believe". Good question, whether there are or may be standards to assess probability (incomplete induction), and plausibility (abduction, hypothesis), but I don´t know modal logic, especially not, whether it just deals with "is probable" and "is plausible", or as well with calculating or estimating their values on their gradients. Is there an objective gradient anyway? I think, sometimes yes, sometimes not. Is there a gradient in the eye of the beholder, I think, of course. Then one could interview a representative group of beholders, but that would not deliver an objective value, but an objective value of subjective values. I can easily imagine an objective value for metaphysical questions, that concern a limited group virtually within human reach of experience, for example, the group is all events that happen, and the hypothesis is a semiotic theory. But I guess, with a metaphysical question, concerning something extra-universal, like in theology, it is hard or maybe impossible to get an objective value of probability or plausibility. That is, because a counter-argumenter then too is allowed to introduce extra-universal ideas for his counter-hypothesis, e.g multiverses (anthropic principle).
Best, helmut
25. August 2025 um 18:54
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
wrote:Helmut, Ivar, List:
Given the subject line, it seems relevant to note that William James advocated "the will to believe," even writing a book with that title and dedicating it to his good friend Charles Peirce. However, Peirce himself disagreed, going so far as to identify this as one of the "seeds of death" with which James and other nominalists had "infected" pragmatism (CP 6.485, EP 2:450, 1908), thereby prompting him to coin "pragmaticism" for his own scholastic realist version. Instead, he was a proponent of "the Will to Learn" (CP 5.583, EP 2:47, 1898), calling this "The First Rule of Logic" (lecture title) and presenting his famous maxim, "Do not block the way of inquiry," as a corollary that follows from it (CP 1.135, EP 2:48, 1898).
Of the four methods of inquiry that he outlined two decades earlier (CP 5.377-87, EP 1:115-23, 1877), the first three effectively subordinate belief to will--in the case of tenacity and a priori, the will of the individual; in the case of authority, the will of the state or another institution. By contrast, the method of science subordinates all other considerations to the will to learn, aiming for the adoption of only true beliefs. It is intrinsically self-correcting, such that this is bound to happen in the long run--a false belief is one whose corresponding habits of conduct would eventually be confounded some future experience, while a true belief is one whose corresponding habits would never be confounded by any possible future experience.
In the thread on "Peirce's Blackboard," I asked a couple of times whether grand metaphysical hypotheses such as his objective idealism, his hyperbolic cosmology, and my semiosic synechism are amenable to inductive testing. In other words, are they capable of being evaluated in accordance with the method of science, even in principle? If not, is there some other way in which we should go about it? In the thread on "The Object of the Universe as a Sign," I asked yesterday whether my specific ontological and cosmological hypotheses are plausible, and if not, why not. However, are there any consensus standards for assessing the plausibility of a metaphysical hypothesis, or is it like beauty--entirely in the eye of the beholder?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 8:25 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
Ivar, List,I think, a physical (as opposed to metaphysical) belief may be refuted by deduction or complete induction, that is, proven the opposite. For example most conspiracy theories. A metaphysical belief can be altered too, but not proven the opposite. It is vulnerable only by incomplete induction, or abduction. So it can only be gradually altered, by showing, that it is e.g. less probable or less plausible, than the believer thought it was. But, has it been a belief then, or a supposition? I would say, supposition is belief too, a weak one, and a metaphysical belief can only be a supposition (of probability or plausibility). But when I talk to religious or quasi-religious (ideological) believers, I see, that their beliefs are absolute. How can that be? I guess, they have had visions. A former german chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, said: "Anyone who has visions should go to the doctor". The revelation by John in the bible to me does give me the impression of someone who has eaten magic mushrooms with a problematic mood. On the other hand I have respect for introspect experiences in meditation. Then belief is based on experience, but an introspect experience´s reality cannot be proven.Well, the only conclusion i so far have, is to agree with the claim, that theology should be kept out of a scientific discussion. And other metaphysical beliefs, like in this or that semiotical or philosophical model, should be treated as probabilities or plausibilities, but not with pure hermeneutics, because to apply pure hermeneutics performatively shows absolute belief.Best, Helmut24. August 2025 um 21:58Ivar <[email protected]>wrote:Helmut, List,
Interesting topic!
Right of the bat I just want to challenge your claim that metaphysical beliefs cannot be criticized. For example. Many have scratched their heads about Kant's Ding-an-Sich. As regulative ideas they work quite unproblematically, but to strictly block access to them, on apriori grounds, was something Peirce objected to on grounds of blocking the way of inquiry (as I recall it at least!). It reminds me of Sisyphos, why go on exploring if we never will get to an end, per Kant? Returning to the claim again, are metaphysical beliefs only epiphenomenal objects of consciousness? Are they not produced and altered by inquiry?
On another note. My guess as to why you feel closer connection to will rather than belief as being real might relate to their experiential closeness. I believe will is closer to our experience, as being sensed somehow ("I really want some candy now"), whereas beliefs are more abstract, theoretic entities encoding behaviour. Can we sense beliefs the same way we sense a will? Though, beliefs seems almost necessary for willing too. Why would something will anything if it was not motivated by some conscious or unconscious prediction? I feel an itch in my throat, a will is introduced towards water, based on the belief that water will cure the itch.
Perhaps beliefs look more real on paper, while will feels more real in person.
I apologize if I have been unclear. This post was made a bit hasty, but I will gladly return with a better formulation soon and connect to Peirce more.
Best regards
Ivar-------- Message d'origine --------
Le 24/08/2025 21:13, Helmut Raulien a écrit :
Jon, List,my motivation about this topic "Will and Belief" is awakened by a talk I had with an otherwise very rational thinker (engineer), who also nevertheless is a strong christian believer. I was scared by his belief in hell.I feel to experience, that in reality, will and belief are sometimes relatedly positively coupled, sometimes contingent with each other, and sometimes lead to polar opposition. Examples:-- Relatedly positively coupled: A missionary man wants others to want to believe. So he sees belief as a function of will. I too often, introspecting myself, see, that I believe what I want to be real (wishful thinking). And things like self-fulfilling-prophecy, placebo-, and nocebo- effect, are obviously real.-- Contingent: A person can not be blamed for her/his metaphysical belief, is not responsible for it. The consistence of physical theory might be proved by some consistent metaphysical theory, if there was any, but not the other way (Goedel). Meaning, if we have a consistent physical theory, we are not able to prove the consistency of any metaphysical theory by it. If I have understood it correctly. Metaphysical belief thus is not susceptible to critique, is neither verifiable, nor falsifiable. It is logically isolated, contingent, one cannot be blamed for it.-- Leads to polar opposition: The polar opposition is between good and bad in its thirdness extremes benevolent and evil: If a missionary man, who believes in hell, tries to convince others of hell´s existence, he wants to warn about it, and save people from going there. So his belief in hell is benevolent. But if someone´s will is, that there be a hell, he is extremely evil, as hell is meant to be a place people go to, so he wishes for these people to go to hell. So belief in, and will of, a hell, are polar opposites.At Peirce, I have not found an explicit relation between will and belief, though one might say, that will takes part in habit-formation, and belief is some sort of habit. But both are not part of a common classes or modes system or the like, as far as I have found. Will is a sub-sub-aspect of consciousness: Consciousness has the modes primsense (1ns), altersense (2ns), and medisense (3ns), and altersense has the modes sensation (2.1.), and will (2.2.). Belief has four fixing kinds: A priori, tenacity, authority, scientificness. I think, Peirce´s "A priori" means instinct or intuition, so is not identical with the Kantian "A priori", but that is a different topic.My conclusion is: I don´t have any. The relation or non-relation between will and belief is a mystery to me. Some neuroscientists say, will is an illusion, I rather feel, that belief is an illusion. Or are both illusions? My will is, that will is real. About belief I don´t emotionally care.Best, Helmut
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