List: Both replies to my initial post in this thread seem to exhibit the very confusion that prompted my specific formulation of its new subject line. I had in mind Peirce's statement in an unpublished manuscript, "It is of the first importance in studies like this that the two correlates that are essential to a sign, its Object and its Meaning, or, as I usually call it, its Interpretant, should be clearly distinguished" (R 318, 1907). In the first complete version of that text for an introductory article about pragmatism, omitted from both CP and EP but recently published in *Cognitio *( https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/51310/40420), he puts it this way.
CSP: Now any sign, of whatsoever kind, professes to mediate between an Object, on the one hand, that to which it applies, and which is thus in a sense the cause of the sign, and on the other hand, a Meaning, or to use a preferable technical term, an *Interpretant*, that which the sign expresses, the result which it produces in its capacity as sign. Discussions concerning logic can come to nothing but that muddle that prevailingly we find in the logic-books, unless (for one thing,) the distinction between these two essential correlates of the sign be drawn clean and clear, and be kept so. (p. 5) As I keep emphasizing, *reality *pertains to the *dynamical objects *of signs, while *truth *pertains to the *final interpretants *of signs. Neither reality nor truth is *established *by the consensus of an *actual *community, since that consists entirely of *dynamical *interpretants, which are fallible. As a result, there is always more for us as individuals and members of *finite *communities to *learn* about reality, but our (hopefully) increasing knowledge of it has no effect on that reality *itself*. The ideal aim of inquiry is to *conform *our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, which is why logic as semeiotic is a *normative *science. A real flower is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it, and the truth about it is what an *infinite *community would believe about it after infinite inquiry and thus infinite experience. However, those beliefs are not true *because *an infinite community would adopt them; rather, an infinite community would adopt them because they are true, i.e., the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience. Speaking of which, another evident ongoing confusion is between the qualitative (1ns) aspect of "experiencing" something and "experience" as a technical term for the compulsive (2ns) aspect of cognition (3ns), which is produced by the "outward clash" with reality. The former is indeed very different for a bee vs. a human, but that is beside the point; the latter is what ensures that an infinite community *ultimately would* affirm every true proposition and deny every false one, i.e., have complete knowledge of reality. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 16, 2025 at 5:51 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, List, > (Just gone 12 here, so post for the 17th qua the restrictions). > *JAS:* "the nature of reality in all of its aspects" is decidedly not "a > function of all perceivers and interactors"--by Peirce's own definition as > quoted above, it is such as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. > But if the final interpretant, under ideal conditions, is the truth of the > “thing” (or object), then reality would in some sense be a function of > perceivers and experiencers—for that interpretant would stand to/for (be > interpreted as) such. > That is: how do you handle this in terms of the broader teleological > argument? That the truth would-be/is the final interpretant, which surely > requires, in and out of the ideal, interpretation (semiosis)? And which, > surely, is not abstracted from the *commens* (community, I use it coeval > here) which interprets, in theory, said final interpretant. > I am, of course, aware of Peirce’s definitions of the real, and so forth > (including DO/IO/EO), “whatever it is regardless.” Yet do you—such it > appears—think that, in theory at least, such a thing can be known? And if > it *can* be known, I do not see how you can so easily preclude those to > whom it would be known. You may say, and I might agree, that it is such > whether they come to know it or not—but insofar as they *do* come to know > it, the FI, they surely would play some part here. > And in fact, this seems to be precisely Peirce’s point about the *community > of inquirers*: that reality is what it is regardless, but that the “final > interpretant” can only be approached through the indefinite process of > inquiry, which is always communal, fallible, and yet asymptotically > convergent?? > > Thus, even if the real is independent, the pathway to it—the very > possibility of the FI—seems, here, to include interpretation within a > community, which means that perceivers/experiencers may not be (or may be?) > constitutive of reality itself, but surely are indispensable to the > realization and recognition of its truth (in this idea(l)/understanding of > what such truth would be qua the final interpretant which > presupposes/includes some community of some kind doing some interpretative > "work")? > Is it *whatever it is, the real, regardless of whatever anyone thinks of > it except in the instance of infinite inquiry under ideal circumstances, > where it would be what? *Also "not-regardless" of what people think, for > by the final interpretant, they would, in this ideal sense, also "know" it? > More questions than statements to be fair. It's an interesting area and I > see disagreements. > *Edwina*: I’m not sure what a ‘real flower’ is. Again - that’s partly the > point. Mike’s example makes sense to me- he is explaining that the > semiosic capacities and Thirdness modes of different species differ *and > when a human connects with the External Object [ the flower] it produces a > particular Interpretant according to the knowledge base [ interpretive > capacities, Thirdness*] of the human being. > And surely, unless I am mistaken, the kind of experience a bee has of a > flower, or a flower of a bee, is such a radically ontological difference in > experience of said "object" (however termed) that you cannot bridge that? > That is, as nominalism and realism was discussed, I wonder if you don't > have to be an inverted nominalist — one who would deny the real existence > of the human as distinct and universal to some respect — to also claim that > we can have the same experience, in knowledge, of a flower as a flower has > of a bee or a bee of a flower? I see that as a necessarily unbridgeable gap > — knowing about, here, insofar as we do, is not being. I don't see what > would change here, over time, in the ideal to remove that obstacle. A human > can only experience as a human experience, and so forth... > Best > Jack >
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