List: As I have pointed out previously, in the handful of places where Peirce refers to an "external object," he is not defining a *third *semiotic object as distinguished from the dynamical and immediate objects. Two such passages are especially relevant. First, "An external object is anything that is not affected by any cognitions, whether about it or not, of the man to whom it is external" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). For any dynamical object of a sign, if it is not affected by *my *cognitions about anything, then it is an external object *to me*; but it is also possible for the dynamical object of a sign to be an *internal *object to me, such as when I describe a dream that I had last night. Second, when we invoke Peirce's maxim of pragmatism, "the *real *becomes that which is such as it is regardless of what you or I or any of our folks may think it to be. The *external *becomes that element which is such as it is regardless of what somebody thinks, feels, or does, whether about that external object or about anything else. Accordingly, the external is necessarily real, while the real may or may not be external; nor is anything absolutely external nor absolutely devoid of externality" (CP 8.191, c. 1904). Every external object is a *real *object, and therefore a *possible *dynamical object of a sign; and even an internal object is not "absolutely devoid of externality," so it is likewise a *possible *dynamical object of a sign.
Peirce provides semiotic analyses of two different sign tokens in CP 8.314 (EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14) without ever employing the term "external object." The first sign token is his wife's question, "What sort of a day is it?" Its "Object, as expressed" is what Peirce defines earlier in the same paragraph as "the Immediate Object--the Object as represented in the sign," namely, "the weather at that time." Its "Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign *cannot *express, which it can only *indicate *and leave the interpreter to find out by *collateral experience*," is "the *impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window curtains*." This dynamical object is an external object to Peirce's wife but an internal object to Peirce himself. The second sign token is his answer, "It is a stormy day." As he goes on to explain, "Its *Immediate Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,--not the *character *of it, but the *identity *of it," i.e., "the weather at that time"--the same immediate object as the first sign token. However, in this case, "The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity *of the actual and *Real *meteorological conditions at the moment." This dynamical object is an external object to both Peirce and his wife. Notice his emphasis on the fact that the immediate and dynamical objects *both *have to do with the *identity *of what the sign is about. Moving on to Mike's example, a real flower is an external object to *everyone *because it is not affected by *anyone's *cognitions about anything. We *directly *perceive and experience the real flower *itself *when we encounter it--it is the dynamical *object *of our perceptual judgments and subsequent inferences about the flower, independent of and unaffected by those and any other representations of it. By contrast, "What we understand the flower to be" is our dynamical *interpretant *of those thoughts, and what we *would *understand the flower to be under ideal circumstances is their *final *interpretant. We *misunderstand *the flower to the extent that our dynamical interpretants deviate from that final interpretant, which is the *truth *about the flower. Accordingly, "the nature of reality in all of its aspects" is decidedly *not *"a function of all perceivers and interactors"--by Peirce's own definition as quoted above, it is such as it is *regardless *of what anyone thinks about it. In my own formulation, reality is the dynamical *object *of every sign whose final *interpretant *is the truth--not what any *finite* community of inquirers *actually does *affirm, but what an *infinite *community of inquirers *ultimately would* affirm. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 16, 2025 at 10:55 AM Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > In my opinion, Edwina keeps pointing to us on the list about the true > nature of Peirce's formulation of the triadic process in semiosis. Here is > another example. Humans can not see in the UV spectrum, but bees and > butterflies do. When we (humans) look at the External Object of certain > flowers, the Dynamic Object that we perceive lacks the UV clues seen by > pollinators, which act sometimes like runway lights guiding to the nectar > sources (for many colorful flowers). We know these UV markers are there > because we have been able to enhance our native perceptions with UV filters > on cameras and such, so our knowledge of the External Object is somewhat > enhanced even though we can not directly perceive these markers. In fact, > there are other markers including scents and pheromones that are also > beyond our direct perception. What we understand the flower to be (the > Dynamic Object) can continually grow and become more refined over time as > we add additional sensors and indirect knowledge, but we can never truly > know the fulsome External Object. The powerful insight of Peirce was that > the nature of reality in all of its aspects is a function of all perceivers > and interactors, human or not, individual or not, and it is the combination > of all of these interpreters that gets us closer to the full reality of > external objects. > > It is a lesson of humility and says much about what we may each claim to > be the 'truth'. > > Best, Mike > On 9/15/2025 9:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > List, Jerry,Jack, > > Again, I need to define terms.- the External Object and the Dynamic > Object: > > The Dynamic Object is, in my understanding, the 2nd correlate of the > Peircean triad [ DO-R-I] . The triadic process begins within the > sign-unit or sign-vehicle which holds the Representamen or knowledge base > of ‘mediation. The Representamen picks up data from the External Object > which data then becomes known as the Dynamic Object. > > See Peirce’s well known outline of the weather 8.314, where he writes; > > “This is a sign, *whose Object, as expressed is the weather at the that > time*, but whose dynamical Object is the impression which I have > presumably derived from peeping between the window curtains. “ [Note; In > this example, the sign unit or sign-vehicle is either Peirce or Mrs. Peirce > and my emphasis points out the External Object ]. > > And “By the way, the dynamical object does not mean something out of the > mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including > more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual experience” EPII, p > 478 > > Note – the External Object is ‘the weather at the time’, while the DO is > the 2nd correlate of the semiosic triad, the ‘impression of that External > ‘weather at the time’. > > There” are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our > opinions about them; those reals affect our senses according to regular > laws, ….5.384. This is a definition of the External Object. > > Now- as to Ethics – I’m not sure how it fits in with my > comparative outline of Thirdness as ’genuine’ [pure] or degenerate[ > affiliated with Secondness and/or Firstness]. I would say only that Ethics > is as pointed out in 5.34 is a ‘normative science’ that > differentiates between good and bad- and, in particular, uses ” efforts of > will’ – which obviously has to mean that it involves Secondness or > indexicality. Or- one could conclude that analysis based on ethics is > Thirdness-as-Secondness, because it considers the pragmatic effects of the > semiosic interaction. > > Edwina > >
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