Dear JAS, Atila, list,

JAS said:

*It again says nothing about "the theory of signs," "Germans and their
American followers," or "going to sleep.”*


To be fair, JAS, neither did *you* say anything about *sleep*.

Would you mind presenting a few selections from Peirce on what *you* think
is significant about what Peirce said about ‘sleep’, please?


For instance, in CP 2.183, Peirce says something along the lines of “Reason
is but choosing”:


*This does not imply that we must be aware of the whole process of the mind
in reasoning or, indeed, of any portion of it. It is very desirable to have
a clear apprehension of this distinction. We are, so to speak, responsible
for the correctness of our reasonings. That is to say, unless we
deliberately approve of them as rational, they cannot properly be called
reasonings. But for this purpose, all that is necessary is that we should,
in each case, compare premisses and conclusion, and observe that the
relation between the facts expressed in the premisses involves the relation
between facts implied in our confidence in the conclusion. What we call a
reasoning is something upon which we place a stamp of rational approval. In
order to do that, we must know what the reasoning is. In that sense, it
must be a conscious act, just as a man is not bound by a contract if it can
be proved that he signed it in his sleep. It must be his conscious act and
deed. *


CP 7.573 .. *When you sleep, you are not so largely asleep as you fancy
that you be. *


Thank you and, sincerely yours,

jerry r

On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 10:17 PM Atila Bayat <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> When Peirce says that metaphysics is not to be settled by “drawing a few
> definitions and then going to sleep,” he means: don’t build a closed system
> out of words; use exact logic, testable consequences, and continuous
> reasoning instead. I interpreted the passage as a critique of German
> idealism, and in sharp contrast he proposes his guides in contrast as
> follows;
>
> (German Idealism): A linear one-step deduction — start with
> concepts/definitions, deduce a closed system, no empirical testing.
>
> (Peirce): A self-correcting cycle — abduction → deduction → induction →
> back again, open-ended and fallible.
>
> German Idealism: Seeks certainty and closure by definitions and
> dialectical deduction.
>
> Peirce: Seeks fallible but self-correcting knowledge by combining
> abduction, deduction, and induction in an open-ended inquiry.
>
> Atila
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 10:33 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Atila, List:
>>
>> It is not a quotation from CP 5.423, but perhaps a loose paraphrase of
>> it. Peirce states there that the doctrine of pragmatism "will serve to show
>> that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either
>> meaningless gibberish--one word being defined by other words, and they by
>> still others, without any real conception ever being reached--or else is
>> downright absurd; so that all such rubbish being swept away, what will
>> remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation
>> by the observational methods of the true sciences ..." It again says
>> nothing about "the theory of signs," "Germans and their American
>> followers," or "going to sleep."
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 8:40 PM Atila Bayat <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry,
>>>
>>> Actually, I read that passage and it is from CP 5.423, 1905, and a
>>> disparaging reference to 'German and their American followers' asleep doing
>>> armchair metaphysics, rather than scientific metaphysics, as an inquiry
>>> guided by the scientific spirit of reasoning and experience.
>>>
>>> Your CP 5.189 is on abduction, a wonderful subject by itself. Run your
>>> prompt again.
>>>
>>> Atila
>>>
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