Thank you for your informative response, sir. On Fri, 3 Oct 2025, 3:17 am Jon Alan Schmidt, <[email protected]> wrote:
> Suteerth, List: > > Almost a year ago, you introduced yourself to the List by asking why > Peirce sought to prove the truth of his maxim of pragmatism, and a few of > us offered some answers. I take it that you have come to understand his > motivation, since you are now looking for such a proof yourself. What you > outline below is not the answer because it is primarily based on one of his > earliest published works, and he was still trying to formulate his own > proof more than four decades later. > > As a reminder, Nathan Houser provides a helpful summary of Peirce's > various attempts in his introduction to volume 2 of *The Essential Peirce* (EP > 2:xxxiii-xxxviii), including what in my opinion is his most successful one, > based on his theory of signs. Again, pragmatism is not about the *sole > *interpretant > of *any* sign, but only the *final logical* interpretant (*ultimate *meaning) > of "intellectual concepts," which are "those upon the structure of which > arguments concerning objective fact may hinge" (EP 2:401, 1907). Here is > Houser's "much abbreviated" reconstruction (EP 2:xxxv-xxxvi). > > 1. "Every concept and every thought beyond immediate perception is a sign." > 2. The object of a sign is necessarily unexpressed in the sign. > 3. The interpretant is the "total proper effect of the sign" and this > effect may be emotional, energetic, or logical, but it is the logical > interpretant alone that constitutes "the intellectual apprehension of the > meaning of a sign." > 4. "A sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates > between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the > object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in > reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be > determined by the object through the mediation of this 'sign.'" > 5. The logical interpretant does not correspond to any kind of object, but > is essentially in a relatively future tense, what Peirce calls a > "would-be." Thus the logical interpretant must be "general in its > possibilities of reference." > 6. Therefore, the logical interpretant is of the nature of habit. > 7. A concept, proposition, or argument may be a logical interpretant, but > not a final logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a sign > in some other way, does not call for further interpretation. It calls for > action. > 8. "The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit ... is the *living > definition*, the veritable and final logical interpretant." > 9. "*Consequently*, the most perfect account of a concept that words can > convey will consist in a description of that habit which that concept is > calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a > description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the > specification of the conditions and of the motive?" > > > A few months ago, I posted my own speculative sketch of what Peirce might > have had in mind for a proof based on his Existential Graphs ( > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-04/msg00009.html). I also > have the following comments on your remarks below. > > SV: Now terms are mostly signs of firstness, propositions are signs of > secondness and arguments sign of thirdness. > > > This is loosely correct, but it is more accurate to say that a term > (generalized to rheme in 1903 and seme in 1906) is a sign whose relation > with its final interpretant is *possible*, corresponding to 1ns; a > proposition (dicisign, pheme) is a sign whose relation with its final > interpretant is *existent*, corresponding to 2ns; and an argument > (delome) is a sign whose relation with its final interpretant is > *necessitant*, corresponding to 3ns. > > SV: Now for some reason that I do not understand fully, Peirce associates > secondness with volition and action. > > > Peirce's assignments of his three categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) to various > phenomena are often context-dependent, not absolute, reflecting their > relations *with each other*. As discovered in phaneroscopy, they are > quality/reaction/mediation. The three normative sciences of > esthetics/ethics/logic correspond to feeling/action/thought. In Peirce's > 1903 speculative grammar, besides term/proposition/argument for the sign's > relation with its final interpretant, there are qualisign/sinsign/legisign > (later tone/token/type or potisign/actisign/famisign) for the sign itself > and icon/index/symbol for the sign's relation with its dynamical object; > and in his later taxonomies, there are seven additional trichotomies. In > metaphysics, we find possibility/actuality/necessity and > chance/law/habit-taking. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Oct 2, 2025 at 5:41 AM suteerth vajpeyi <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> The best that I have managed to do is to quote in agreement with Peirce >> in his paper "on a new list of categories" that the work of any conception >> is to reduce the manifold of sensuous experience to unity. If it is proved >> that this function cannot be performed except by considering practical >> effects then we will have a proof of the pragmatic maxim, without of >> course, proving Peirce's entire system of philosophy which this pragmatism >> implies. Now Peirce immediately after making the assertion that the >> function of conceptions is the unification of experience says that this >> unity is the unity of a proposition e.g. "this stove is black" reduces the >> confused tangle of qualities and relations that we call the stove to a >> conceptual unity by using black as a unifying conception. Now terms are >> mostly signs of firstness, propositions are signs of secondness and >> arguments sign of thirdness. So the unification of experience requires an >> apeal to secondness because propositions are signs of secondness. Now for >> some reason that I do not understand fully, Peirce associates secondness >> with volition and action. If we can know why then we have a common point of >> resemblance between an action and the object of a proposition. I personally >> think that Peirce classifies both of them as species of secondness because >> a proposition states relations and action or volition alters relations in >> the real world. Thus relations are key in our grasp of mind-independent >> reality. Let us try to formulate this more properly in words. 1. >> Conceptions are required for unification of experience. 2. Propositions are >> the signs that carry out this unification. 3. Propositions state relations. >> 4. Actions alter relations in the real world. 5. We cannot know one >> relation without changing some other relations. This has only been begun to >> be understood by modern science for example in the special case of the >> Heisenberg uncertainty principle which states that the momentum and >> position of an electron cannot be measured simultaneously. For bombarding >> an electron with light lays bare its position but changes its momentum >> while on calculating its momentum, we lose track of its exact instantaneous >> position. Position and momentum are both relations. This principle is >> applicable not only to the position and momentum of electrons but to all >> relations. Thus actions or operations upon the world or physical/mental >> models of it are our primary method for getting in touch with reality. 6. >> Therefore, the sole function of a concept, which is the unification of a >> domain of experience is impossible without action. All definitions must be >> ultimately reduced to operational definitions. Thus it is proved. >> Had it been that easy, I think Peirce himself would have come up with it >> in his teens. I may be missing something in my proof. I would be highly >> obliged to the person who points it out. >> >> On Thu, 2 Oct 2025, 3:24 pm suteerth vajpeyi, <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Respected members, I know that this question is a tough one but it >>> really needs answering. As per C.S. Peirce, the meaning of any conception >>> is exhaustively elaborated by the pragmatic maxim. I want to see a >>> demonstration or proof of this fact for it is not self evident, at least >>> not to me. It has been decades since interest in the work of Peirce has >>> risen. Many members of this group are illustrious and have written books of >>> their own. I do not think that zero people have worked on this question and >>> if there is no definitive answer already found, atleast we could have a >>> blueprint of the present state of inquiry regarding this question. So with >>> that, I invite you all to share your thoughts on the matter. >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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