Mike, List, Should there be more discussion on chirality in Peirce's work I will try to find additional passages which speak to 'handedness" in Peirce's work. But since that would require quite a bit of research on my behalf, for now let me point to a key passage, one which decades ago convinced me that Peirce was interested in chirality and its implications for facets of science and philosophy.
Here Peirce argues that the separation of right- and left-handed molecules cannot be explained by the laws of mechanics (which recognize no difference between right and left). He concludes that there being such asymmetry refutes the “Corpuscular Philosophy," being the view that all phenomena are reducible to motion of particles obeying mechanical laws. “Such, for example, are the right-handed and left-handed screw-structures of the molecules of those bodies which are said to be ‘optically active.’ Of every such substance there are two varieties, or as the chemists call them, two modifications, one of which twists a ray of light that passes through it to the right, and the other, by an exactly equal amount, to the left. All the ordinary physical properties of the right-handed and left-handed modifications are identical. Only certain faces of their crystals, often very minute, are differently placed. No chemical process can ever transmute the one modification into the other. And their ordinary chemical behaviour is absolutely the same, so that no strictly chemical process can separate them if they are once mixed. Only the chemical action of one optically active substance upon another is different if they both twist the ray the same way from what it is if they twist the ray different ways. There are certain living organisms which feed on one modification and destroy it while leaving the other one untouched. This is presumably due to such organisms containing in their substance, possibly in very minute proportion, some optically active body. Now I maintain that the original segregation of levo-molecules, or molecules with a left-handed twist, from dextro-molecules, or molecules with a right-handed twist, is absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation. Of course you may suppose that in the original nebula at the very formation of the world right-handed quartz was collected into one place, while left-handed quartz was collected into another place. But to suppose that, is ipso facto to suppose that that segregation was a phenomenon without any mechanical explanation. The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between right-handed and left-handed screws, and a mechanical explanation is an explanation founded on the three laws of motion. There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolutely inexplicable by mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the Corpuscular Philosophy.” CP 5.65 (note: this passage is excerpted from a very long paragraph and can be found about half-way through it). Again, should there be sufficient interest, I'll try to find additional passages where Peirce references 'handedness'. Best, Gary R On Sun, Oct 5, 2025 at 10:49 AM Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Gary, > > I, for one, would be interested in what Peirce passages you believe speak > directly to the question of chirality. > > Thanks, Mike > On 10/5/2025 12:21 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jerry, List > > Thank you for your post, especially in introducing the idea of > 'handedness' (chirality) into the discussion. I would hold that across > science and philosophy that chirality has moved from a 'quirk' of geometry > to a fundamental principle of asymmetry not only in chemistry, but in > physics, biology, and metaphysics. It shows that left - right > distinctions are not conventional but deeply real. I am assuming that you'd > agree. > > [For those who are not familiar with the concept of chirality, I'd > recommend: Martin Gardner, *The Ambidextrous Universe *(1964), a popular > science book which has as a central theme, chirality, specially in > biochemistry, where life’s molecular 'building blocks' display handedness.] > > While I will most certainly have to defer to you in matters of chemistry, > Jerry, I would like to make a few general comments since chirality has long > interested me, and I was pleased to find it discussed in Peirce's work. (I > can't offer specific passages here, but will do so if there is interest in > this thread). > > In geometry, a left hand and a right hand are congruent in most respects > yet can't be superimposed. Peirce tied this to his larger interest in > dimensionality, noting that chirality arises in 3-D space in a way it > cannot in two, exemplifying how new qualities emerge with higher continua. > > In logic and semiotics chirality served as an analogy for the > non-interchangeability of relations. Just as a right-hand glove cannot be > worn on the left hand, certain logical relations cannot be reversed. Peirce > argued that signs operate within ordered structures where directionality > matters. The left - right distinction shows how relations may be > asymmetrical in principle, not just in practice. > > At a metaphysical level, Peirce connected handedness to certain > cosmological doctrines. Chirality, as seen in natural phenomena -- like the > handedness of biological molecules -- right-handed and left-handed > "screw-structures” (as Peirce terms them) --in certain molecules) -- point > to the role of spontaneous asymmetry in the emergence of order. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2025 at 12:07 AM Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> List: >> >> This shift of philosophical perspective was profound; I noted it years >> ago. >> >> I have a chemical lens through which I read. I concluded that the shift >> corresponded with the scientific discovery of the electron as a logical >> particle, circa 1898. This discovery annihilated his theory of the discrete >> mathematics of chemistry and forced his logic to accommodate the geometric >> consequences of Pastuer’s discover of the handedness of tartaric acid >> isomers and the subsequent explanation of the same by Vant Hoff and LaBell >> in the late 1870’s as continuous mathematical functions. >> >> I have previously mentioned CSP’s role in the development of the perplex >> number systems; it contributed to the triadic modal logic of chemical >> sentences. More specifically, to the relationships between the copulative >> relatives as indices becoming the legisign. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> On Oct 3, 2025, at 5:28 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> List, >> >> Over the many years that we've been discussing Peirce's speculative >> cosmology on Peirce-l, and my being especially interested in the topic -- >> and so having read as much about it as I've been able to get my hands on -- >> I have come to the conclusion that there is a shift in Peirce's speculative >> cosmology between the 1860's, '70's and early 80's, and his later writings >> of the 1890s, especially the Cambridge Lectures of 1898, then into the 20th >> century. I would further argue that he never dropped the earlier view, but >> developed, 'complicated', and reframed it, including as regards his three >> categories. First, I'll lay out the contrast between his earlier and later >> views as I see them, and then suggest how they might be integrated. >> >> The early cosmology would seem to suggest an emergence from pure 1ns. In >> the 1860's, '70's, and especially in the 1880's (see: "A Guess at the >> Riddle," “Design and Chance,” "The Law of Mind"), Peirce described the >> universe as originating in a state of absolute nothingness. However, he >> defined this “nothing” not as a negation, but as a positive kind of pure >> potentiality associated with 1ns: sheer, unbounded possibility without law, >> relation, or determinacy. >> From this initial 'chaos of feeling', the beginnings of 2ns: (brute >> action/reaction, resistance, etc.) gradually emerged, and then, over time, >> 3ns (regularities, habits, eventually general laws) began to form. So, this >> view is one of a world arising from formless possibility, with law and >> order as products of evolution >> >> However, by the time of his 1898 Cambridge lectures, Peirce had begun to >> imagine something somewhat different. There, in his famous 'blackboard' >> analogy, he suggests that before any actual universe could come into >> existence that there must have been a kind of general continuity (what I've >> termed 'ur-continuity', 3ns) already in place, this analogous to the empty >> but (for the purpose of the analogy)* continuous *expanse of a >> blackboard on which marks might be made. This *proto-universe* is not a >> chaos of pure 1ns, but rather a background of continuity (3ns) and >> generality (3ns) in which certain possibilities and actualities could >> appear. So, instead of laws developing out of chaos, Peirce in 1898 >> stressed that the general (3ns) itself is primordial. What comes 'first' is >> not a 'nothing' teeming with 1ns, but rather the indefinite continuum of >> 3ns, an ur-generality that makes possible both the play of qualities and >> the clash of events. (I've occasionally pointed to the "Mathematics of >> Logic" paper as Peirce himself suggesting how difficult it is for some >> (especially some of the best minds, he remarks) to imagine 3ns as 1st >> (first); but top-down logic requires it.) >> >> Can these two accounts be integrated? Well, I'm not sure of that, but I >> do think that they need not essentially contradict each other, that they >> rather represent a shift in emphasis. So: >> >> In his earlier cosmological thinking (from the side of 1ns) Peirce >> underscores that the universe had to arise from a state *prior to >> determination*, from sheer spontaneity (1ns), vague possibility (1ns). >> Without this, nothing new could ever come about. >> >> In his later view (from the side of 3ns), Peirce argues that possibility >> (1ns) cannot be considered except against the backdrop of a general >> continuity (3ns). Pure spontaneity, pure possibility would be nothing at >> all unless they subsist within a continuum, a field in which they can >> appear, disappear, reappear, connect, and stabilize. In short, the >> blackboard (3ns) provides the proto-condition for the manifestation of 1ns, >> while the chalk marks (the 'difference', 2ns) portend the proto-conditions >> for the brute emergence that will begin the process of cosmogenesis of a >> universe, viz., ours. (While I do not, some might want to think of this >> "brute emergence" initiating cosmogenesis as the Big Bang.) >> >> What I am suggesting is that Peirce’s speculative cosmology might be read >> in a kind of dialectical overlay: pure 1ns affording the possibility of >> emergence in sheer spontaneity. However, this possibility only can become a >> cosmos within the more primordial field of general continuity (3ns, >> ur-continuity, the 'blackboard' on which potential qualities and reactions >> can begin to register). >> >> The above is but a brief outline of what I've been thinking about for >> years regarding these two phases -- as I see it -- of Peirce's cosmological >> thinking. It is, of course, dependent on many sources too numerous to name, >> but here are a few: >> Vincent Colapietro, Carl Hausman, Cheryl Misak, Richard Kenneth Atkins, >> Kelly A. Parker, Jon Alan Schmidt, Lucia Santaella. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> On Fri, Oct 3, 2025 at 3:17 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary R, list >>> >>> I appreciate your attempt to bring disparate views together, but I think >>> they must remain – disparate. >>> >>> For example, I consider that JAS’s view of the universe and mine – are >>> polar opposites. >>> >>> I consider JAS’s outline with its top down framework to be a >>> deterministic, a priori centralized process, ignoring Peirce’s outline of >>> >>> - The formation of the universe from NOTHING [ 1.412,, >>> 6.217, EP2:322] which means – there is no determinism, no specific focus – >>> only a ‘desire’ to be instantiated. – which instantiations are always in a >>> triadic set [EP2;394] >>> >>> - >>> >>> - The reality of Firstness as a basic >>> categorical/organizational mode, which means that freedom and chance are a >>> basic component of the universe. See the element of absolute chance in >>> nature’ 7.514 >>> >>> - >>> >>> - - the reality of Thirdness, which means that >>> self-organization of the ‘instantiations [in Secondness] of the universe >>> operates by means of communal habits which enable both complex networks of >>> relations and continuity of type - which in turn prevents entropic >>> dissipation >>> >>> - >>> >>> - - the reality that Thirdness as the laws of organization >>> evolves and changes, A habit might have evolved by chance [ 7: 521] ‘the >>> first germ of law was an entity, which itself arose by chance, that is as a >>> First”…but, this habit would then become a continuity of organization for[ >>> 7.515 ], “a law can evolve or develop itself…with a ‘generalizing >>> tendency”. See also7.512 ‘the laws of nature are the results of an >>> evolutionary process’..which is ‘still in progress’ 7.514. >>> >>> - >>> >>> - As he writes” the laws of the universe have been formed >>> under a universal tendency of all things toward generalization and >>> habit-taking [7.515]. This means – that these laws are formed within and BY >>> the universe itself as a semiosic process- and- that this is a dynamic of >>> changing process, for, in both cerebral theory and molecular ‘”the >>> non-conservative elements are the predominant ones”.- which makes sense, >>> since the instantiations [ entities organized in Secondness] have finite >>> life spans >>> >>> - >>> >>> - Given this brief outline – my view of the Peircean >>> semiosis is that there is no ‘semiotic whole’ and certainly, no >>> ‘constituent parts’. Instead, the universe is a CAS, a complex adaptive >>> system of energy forming itself into matter,, as triadic instantiations or >>> Signs, within all three categorical modes [1ns, 2ns, 3ns]which are >>> networked with each other …. >>> >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Oct 1, 2025, at 8:59 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> List, >>> >>> This thread seems to me to have the potential of *possibly* bridging >>> *some* of the conceptual gaps between seemingly *very different views* >>> regarding basic understandings of Peirce's semeiotic. So, thanks for >>> introducing it, Gary F. and for providing links to the very relevant >>> passages in your Turning Signs from which we read, for example: >>> >>> >>> GF: rather than think of meanings as built up from their component >>> parts, we might better think of them as processes analyzed into those parts >>> for semiotic purposes. Semiosis, even at the most primitive level, is >>> always a process which must continue for some time in some direction >>> (toward the making of some pragmatic difference such as a habit-change). >>> Irreducible Thirdness is essential to it. With this in mind, Peirce gives a >>> holistic top-down account of the relations between arguments, propositions >>> and ‘names’ (i.e. ‘terms’), upending ‘the traditional view that a >>> Proposition is built up of Names, and an Argument of Propositions.’ >>> "… an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is >>> built up of positions." CSP >>> >>> >>> Gary’s initial framing of the discussion as Peirce’s semeiotic holism >>> might prove to be an important touchstone here reminding us that perceived >>> objects can themselves be understood as 'artifacts of analysis' in much the >>> same way that individual signs are abstractions from the general semeiotic >>> flow. Gary's reference to current neurobiological research provides >>> posteriori support for Peirce’s insight that at least the perceptual >>> continuum precedes our analytic parsing of it. >>> >>> GF: Unhealthy as it may be for a special interest or subsystem to >>> dominate a system, there is a kind of temporary dominance which may be >>> necessary for a complex system to act as a unit. For instance, >>> >>> >>> In human as well as nonhuman species, functions seem to be apportioned >>> asymmetrically to the cerebral hemispheres, for reasons which probably have >>> to do with the need for one final controller rather than two, when it comes >>> to choosing an action or a thought. If both sides had equal say on making a >>> movement, you might end up with a conflict – your right hand might >>> interfere with the left, and you would have a lesser chance of producing >>> coordinated patterns of motion involving more than one limb. — Damasio >>> (1994) >>> >>> . . . . . . . . >>> >>> . . . it's the left hemisphere's function to ‘break up the holistic >>> fabric of reality’. In this way neuropsychology confirms Peirce's >>> phenomenology which puts the wholeness of feelings First and analysis into >>> parts Second. From this follows Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or >>> the essence of Semeiotics.’ >>> >>> >>> Jon takes this holism as ontologically fundamental: the universe is not >>> assembled from elementary sign-units but is 'perfused with signs' within a >>> vast continuum from which particulars are prescinded. This aligns with >>> Peirce’s *late cosmological vision* of the cosmos as 'one immense >>> sign'. In this view, both perception and reasoning begin as undivided >>> wholes, and terms and propositions are artifacts of analysis. >>> >>> Edwina pushes back against the idea of ontological priority for the >>> whole stressing Peirce’s *realism*, that is, that there are real things >>> whose characters are independent of our opinions, of our analyses. For >>> her, semiosis is a matter of triadic processes constantly forming and >>> dissolving real entities that exist for varying durations within a CAS. In >>> her view (if I'm not mistaken), individuality is emergent, operating >>> through networks of triadic relations. >>> >>> Edwina’s view would seem to resonate with Peirce’s early/middle realism >>> and the concreteness of triadic relations, while Jon’s view resonates more >>> with Peirce’s late philosophy (including a cosmology of continuity, >>> universe as sign, synechism, agapism, etc.) where the holism of semiosis is >>> central. Still, Edwina is correct, I think, in arguing that Peirce never >>> abandoned his 'critical' realism about real things and his insistence >>> on *the irreducibility of triadic relations in the generation of these >>> things*. In a word, Jon’s reading stresses Peirce’s synechistic holism, >>> Edwina’s his insistence on real triadic relations. >>> >>> Do Gary F's comments perhaps help bridge these positions? To me they >>> suggest that Peirce’s holistic semeiotic can be grounded in both >>> phenomenological analysis and empirical science, that Peirce’s insights can >>> be seen to gel with contemporary scientific perspectives. Still: >>> >>> GF: . . . neuropsychology confirms Peirce's phenomenology which puts the >>> wholeness of feelings First and analysis into parts Second. From this >>> follows Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics.’ >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:10 PM Edwina Taborsky < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> List >>>> >>>> I disagree with the outline >>>> >>>> the semeiotic whole is ontologically prior to its constituent parts >>>> (top-down); not the other way around, as if the former were >>>> *assembled *from the latter as its basic units in the reductionist >>>> sense (bottom-up). The entire universe is not *composed *of individual >>>> signs as its building blocks, it is instead *perfused *with signs (CP >>>> 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--a vast symbol that *involves *indices and >>>> icons (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-4, 1903). >>>> >>>> The above, in my view, is moving into romantic mysticism. In my >>>> understanding of Peirce’s semiosis, the universe, as a semiotic whole is >>>> not ontologically prior to its constituents, but is instead, totally >>>> composed in the ‘here and now’ of its constituent parts – which are triadic >>>> sets- functioning as semiosic processes. There is neither an >>>> ontological prior nor post reality; ie, no top down nor bottom up. . >>>> >>>> Instead, as Peirce wrote, “There are Real things, whose characters are >>>> entirely independent of our opinions about them’..5.384. We must >>>> acknowledge this. This does not mean that individual entities exist ‘per >>>> se’ in the atomic materialist sense – which has long been debunked. >>>> Instead, it acknowledges that this semiosic universe operates as >>>> energy/matter constantly forming existentially distinct units. Each entity- >>>> which actually has a morphology of a triadic- hexadic set of >>>> relations- may last as such for a nanosecond to a hundred, thousands of >>>> years ; eg, an atom, a tree, a mountain… When we examine individuality >>>> further in its indexicality, we see how the individual unit operates only >>>> within a network of relations with other ‘individual entities’ – which >>>> relationships can be outlined in any of the ten basic classes of triads, or >>>> the more complex 28 hexadic relationships. >>>> >>>> What does this mean? To me it means that the universe is a CAS, a >>>> complex adaptive system, a self-organized phaneron of energy-as-matter [aka >>>> signs], constantly developing new individual entities, operating within >>>> habits -of-morphological organization, which habits themselves evolve and >>>> adapt. The purpose? I’m afraid I go no further than ‘to prevent entropic >>>> dissipation of energy. ..and this is not an ’ontologically prior agenda’. >>>> >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> On Oct 1, 2025, at 1:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Gary F., List: >>>> >>>> I appreciate the subject line, emphasizing that the semeiotic whole is >>>> ontologically prior to its constituent parts (top-down); not the other way >>>> around, as if the former were *assembled *from the latter as its basic >>>> units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up). The entire universe is not >>>> *composed >>>> *of individual signs as its building blocks, it is instead *perfused *with >>>> signs (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--a vast symbol that *involves *indices >>>> and icons (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-4, 1903). >>>> >>>> I have indeed regularly quoted that 1906 passage in R 295 (finally >>>> published at LF 3/1:234-5) to support my conception of the universe as one >>>> immense sign, a semiosic continuum, an ongoing inferential process--an >>>> argument from which we prescind facts as represented by propositions using >>>> names, those "smaller" signs thus being artifacts of analysis along with >>>> their associated objects and interpretants (see also CP 2.27, 1902). I also >>>> maintain that perception is likewise an undivided whole from which we >>>> prescind predicates, hypostasize some of them into subjects, and attribute >>>> others to those subjects in propositions, namely, perceptual >>>> judgments-- "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP >>>> 2:191, 1903). I provide a few quotations from Peirce to support that >>>> understanding in section 3.5 of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper ( >>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf). >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / >>>> twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 11:38 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> If I may, I’d like to move on to some *a posteriori* reasoning (i.e. >>>>> evidence from the “positive sciences” of phenomenology, neuropsychology >>>>> and >>>>> biology) that seems to support aspects of Peirce’s category-based >>>>> semeiotics. >>>>> >>>>> Helmut, some time ago you expressed some skepticism about my remark in >>>>> a post that perceived objects are “artifacts of analysis” just as signs >>>>> are. I didn’t have the time to clarify what I meant back then, but perhaps >>>>> I can make up for that now, by offering this link: >>>>> https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#csptd . >>>>> >>>>> I’m sure that 1906 passage has been cited here before (probably by >>>>> JAS), but not the neurobiological work that supports it, which begins >>>>> here: >>>>> https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#x13 . That passage from *Turning >>>>> Signs* also links to the one above. >>>>> >>>>> Love, gary f >>>>> >>>>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >>>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . >>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >>>> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >>>> email account, then go to >>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>>> >>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . >>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >>>> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >>>> email account, then go to >>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> >>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]"; > <[email protected]>>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your > subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go > tohttps://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
