Jerry, List

Thank you for your post, especially in introducing the idea of 'handedness'
(chirality) into the discussion. I would hold that across science and
philosophy that chirality has moved from a 'quirk' of geometry to a
fundamental principle of asymmetry not only in chemistry, but in physics,
biology, and metaphysics. It shows that left - right distinctions are not
conventional but deeply real. I am assuming that you'd agree.

[For those who are not familiar with the concept of chirality, I'd
recommend: Martin Gardner, *The Ambidextrous Universe *(1964), a popular
science book which has as a central theme, chirality, specially in
biochemistry, where life’s molecular 'building blocks' display handedness.]

While I will most certainly have to defer to you in matters of chemistry,
Jerry, I would like to make a few general comments since chirality has long
interested me, and I was pleased to find it discussed in Peirce's work. (I
can't offer specific passages here, but will do so if there is interest in
this thread).

In geometry, a left hand and a right hand are congruent in most respects
yet can't be superimposed. Peirce tied this to his larger interest in
dimensionality, noting that chirality arises in 3-D space in a way it
cannot in two, exemplifying how new qualities emerge with higher continua.

In logic and semiotics chirality served as an analogy for the
non-interchangeability of relations. Just as a right-hand glove cannot be
worn on the left hand, certain logical relations cannot be reversed. Peirce
argued that signs operate within ordered structures where directionality
matters. The left - right distinction shows how relations may be
asymmetrical in principle, not just in practice.

At a metaphysical level, Peirce connected handedness to certain
cosmological doctrines. Chirality, as seen in natural phenomena -- like the
handedness of biological molecules -- right-handed and left-handed
"screw-structures” (as Peirce terms them) --in certain molecules) -- point
to the role of spontaneous asymmetry in the emergence of order.

Best,

Gary R


On Sat, Oct 4, 2025 at 12:07 AM Jerry LR Chandler <
[email protected]> wrote:

> List:
>
> This shift of philosophical perspective  was profound; I noted it years
> ago.
>
> I have a chemical lens through which I read. I concluded that the shift
> corresponded with the scientific discovery of the electron as a logical
> particle, circa 1898. This discovery annihilated his theory of the discrete
> mathematics of chemistry and forced his logic to accommodate the geometric
> consequences of Pastuer’s discover of the handedness of tartaric acid
> isomers and the subsequent explanation of the same by Vant Hoff and LaBell
> in the late 1870’s as continuous mathematical functions.
>
> I have previously mentioned CSP’s role in the development of the perplex
> number systems; it contributed to the triadic modal logic of chemical
> sentences.  More specifically, to the relationships between the copulative
> relatives as indices becoming the legisign.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> On Oct 3, 2025, at 5:28 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> Over the many years that we've been discussing Peirce's speculative
> cosmology on Peirce-l, and my being especially interested in the topic --
> and so having read as much about it as I've been able to get my hands on --
> I have come to the conclusion that there is a shift in Peirce's speculative
> cosmology between the 1860's, '70's and early 80's, and his later writings
> of the 1890s, especially the Cambridge Lectures of 1898, then into the 20th
> century. I would further argue that he never dropped the earlier view, but
>  developed, 'complicated', and reframed it, including as regards his three
> categories. First, I'll lay out the contrast between his earlier and later
> views as I see them, and then suggest how they might be integrated.
>
> The early cosmology would seem to suggest an emergence from pure 1ns. In
> the 1860's, '70's, and especially in the 1880's (see: "A Guess at the
> Riddle,"  “Design and Chance,” "The Law of Mind"), Peirce described the
> universe as originating in a state of absolute nothingness. However, he
> defined this “nothing” not as a negation, but as a positive kind of pure
> potentiality associated with 1ns: sheer, unbounded possibility without law,
> relation, or determinacy.
> From this initial 'chaos of feeling', the beginnings of 2ns: (brute
> action/reaction, resistance, etc.) gradually emerged, and then, over time,
> 3ns (regularities, habits, eventually general laws) began to form. So, this
> view is one of a world arising from formless possibility, with law and
> order as products of evolution
>
> However, by the time of his 1898 Cambridge lectures, Peirce had begun to
> imagine something somewhat different. There, in his famous 'blackboard'
> analogy, he suggests that before any actual universe could come into
> existence that there must have been a kind of general continuity (what I've
> termed 'ur-continuity', 3ns) already in place, this analogous to the empty
> but (for the purpose of the analogy)* continuous *expanse of a blackboard
> on which marks might be made. This *proto-universe* is not a chaos of
> pure 1ns, but rather a background of continuity (3ns) and generality (3ns)
> in which certain possibilities and actualities could appear. So, instead of
> laws developing out of chaos, Peirce in 1898 stressed that the general
> (3ns) itself is primordial. What comes 'first' is not a 'nothing' teeming
> with 1ns, but rather the indefinite continuum of 3ns, an ur-generality that
> makes possible both the play of qualities and the clash of events. (I've
> occasionally pointed to the "Mathematics of Logic" paper as Peirce himself
> suggesting how difficult it is for some  (especially some of the best
> minds, he remarks) to imagine 3ns as 1st (first); but top-down logic
> requires it.)
>
> Can these two accounts be integrated? Well, I'm not sure of that, but I do
> think that they need not essentially contradict each other, that they
> rather represent a shift in emphasis. So:
>
> In his earlier cosmological thinking (from the side of 1ns) Peirce
> underscores that the universe had to arise from a state *prior to
> determination*, from sheer spontaneity (1ns), vague possibility (1ns).
> Without this, nothing new could ever come about.
>
> In his later view (from the side of 3ns), Peirce argues that possibility
> (1ns) cannot be considered except against the backdrop of a general
> continuity (3ns). Pure spontaneity, pure possibility would be nothing at
> all unless they subsist within a continuum, a field in which they can
> appear, disappear, reappear, connect, and stabilize. In short, the
> blackboard (3ns) provides the proto-condition for the manifestation of 1ns,
> while the chalk marks (the 'difference', 2ns) portend the proto-conditions
> for the brute emergence that will begin the process of cosmogenesis of a
> universe, viz., ours. (While I do not, some might want to think of this
> "brute emergence" initiating cosmogenesis as the Big Bang.)
>
> What I am suggesting is that Peirce’s speculative cosmology might be read
> in a kind of dialectical overlay: pure 1ns affording the possibility of
> emergence in sheer spontaneity. However, this possibility only can become a
> cosmos within the more primordial field of general continuity (3ns,
> ur-continuity, the 'blackboard' on which potential qualities and reactions
> can begin to register).
>
> The above is but a brief outline of what I've been thinking about for
> years regarding these two phases -- as I see it -- of Peirce's cosmological
> thinking. It is, of course, dependent on many sources too numerous to name,
> but here are a few:
> Vincent Colapietro, Carl Hausman, Cheryl Misak, Richard Kenneth Atkins,
> Kelly A. Parker, Jon Alan Schmidt, Lucia Santaella.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> On Fri, Oct 3, 2025 at 3:17 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> I appreciate your attempt to bring disparate views together, but I think
>> they must remain – disparate.
>>
>>  For example, I consider that JAS’s view of the universe and mine – are
>> polar opposites.
>>
>> I consider JAS’s outline with its top down framework to be a
>> deterministic, a priori centralized process, ignoring Peirce’s outline of
>>
>> -             The formation of the universe from NOTHING [ 1.412,,
>> 6.217, EP2:322]  which means – there is no determinism, no specific focus –
>> only a ‘desire’ to be instantiated. – which instantiations are always in a
>> triadic set [EP2;394]
>>
>> -
>>
>> -             The reality of Firstness as a basic
>> categorical/organizational mode, which means that freedom and chance are a
>> basic component of the universe. See the element of absolute chance in
>> nature’ 7.514
>>
>> -
>>
>> -             - the reality of Thirdness, which means that
>> self-organization of the ‘instantiations [in Secondness] of the universe
>> operates by means of communal habits which enable both complex networks of
>> relations and continuity of type - which in turn prevents entropic
>> dissipation
>>
>> -
>>
>> -             - the reality that Thirdness as the laws of organization
>> evolves and changes, A habit might have evolved by chance [ 7: 521] ‘the
>> first germ of law was an entity, which itself arose by chance, that is as a
>> First”…but, this habit would then become a continuity of organization  for[
>> 7.515 ], “a law can evolve or develop itself…with a ‘generalizing
>> tendency”. See also7.512 ‘the laws of nature are the results of an
>> evolutionary process’..which is ‘still in progress’ 7.514.
>>
>> -
>>
>> -              As he writes” the laws of the universe have been formed
>> under a universal tendency of all things toward generalization and
>> habit-taking [7.515]. This means – that these laws are formed within and BY
>> the universe itself as a semiosic process- and- that this is a dynamic of
>> changing process, for, in both cerebral theory and molecular ‘”the
>> non-conservative elements are the predominant ones”.- which makes sense,
>> since the instantiations [ entities organized in Secondness] have finite
>> life spans
>>
>> -
>>
>> -             Given this brief outline – my view of the Peircean
>> semiosis is that there is no ‘semiotic whole’ and certainly, no
>> ‘constituent parts’.  Instead, the universe is a CAS, a complex adaptive
>> system of energy forming itself into matter,, as triadic instantiations or
>> Signs,  within all three categorical modes [1ns, 2ns, 3ns]which are
>> networked with each other ….
>>
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Oct 1, 2025, at 8:59 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>> List,
>>
>> This thread seems to me to have the potential of *possibly* bridging
>> *some* of the conceptual gaps between seemingly *very different views*
>> regarding basic understandings of Peirce's semeiotic. So, thanks for
>> introducing it, Gary F. and for providing links to the very relevant
>> passages in your Turning Signs from which we read, for example:
>>
>>
>> GF: rather than think of meanings as built up from their component parts,
>> we might better think of them as processes analyzed into those parts for
>> semiotic purposes. Semiosis, even at the most primitive level, is always a
>> process which must continue for some time in some direction (toward the
>> making of some pragmatic difference such as a habit-change). Irreducible
>> Thirdness is essential to it. With this in mind, Peirce gives a holistic
>> top-down account of the relations between arguments, propositions and
>> ‘names’ (i.e. ‘terms’), upending ‘the traditional view that a Proposition
>> is built up of Names, and an Argument of Propositions.’
>> "… an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built
>> up of positions." CSP
>>
>>
>> Gary’s initial framing of the discussion as Peirce’s semeiotic holism
>> might prove to be an important touchstone here reminding us that perceived
>> objects can themselves be understood as 'artifacts of analysis' in much the
>> same way that individual signs are abstractions from the general semeiotic
>> flow. Gary's reference to current neurobiological research provides
>> posteriori support for Peirce’s insight that at least the perceptual
>> continuum precedes our analytic parsing of it.
>>
>> GF: Unhealthy as it may be for a special interest or subsystem to
>> dominate a system, there is a kind of temporary dominance which may be
>> necessary for a complex system to act as a unit. For instance,
>>
>>
>> In human as well as nonhuman species, functions seem to be apportioned
>> asymmetrically to the cerebral hemispheres, for reasons which probably have
>> to do with the need for one final controller rather than two, when it comes
>> to choosing an action or a thought. If both sides had equal say on making a
>> movement, you might end up with a conflict – your right hand might
>> interfere with the left, and you would have a lesser chance of producing
>> coordinated patterns of motion involving more than one limb. — Damasio
>> (1994)
>>
>> . . . . . . . .
>>
>> . . .  it's the left hemisphere's function to ‘break up the holistic
>> fabric of reality’. In this way neuropsychology confirms Peirce's
>> phenomenology which puts the wholeness of feelings First and analysis into
>> parts Second. From this follows Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or
>> the essence of Semeiotics.’
>>
>>
>> Jon takes this holism as ontologically fundamental: the universe is not
>> assembled from elementary sign-units but is 'perfused with signs' within a
>> vast continuum from which particulars are prescinded. This aligns with
>> Peirce’s *late cosmological vision* of the cosmos as 'one immense sign'.
>> In this view, both perception and reasoning begin as undivided wholes,
>> and terms and propositions are artifacts of analysis.
>>
>> Edwina pushes back against the idea of ontological priority for the whole
>> stressing Peirce’s *realism*, that is, that there are real things whose
>> characters are independent of our opinions, of our analyses. For her,
>> semiosis is a matter of triadic processes constantly forming and dissolving
>> real entities that exist for varying durations within a CAS. In her view
>> (if I'm not mistaken), individuality is emergent, operating through
>> networks of triadic relations.
>>
>> Edwina’s view would seem to resonate with Peirce’s early/middle realism
>> and the concreteness of triadic relations, while Jon’s view resonates more
>> with Peirce’s late philosophy (including a cosmology of continuity,
>> universe as sign, synechism, agapism, etc.) where the holism of semiosis is
>> central. Still, Edwina is correct, I think, in arguing that Peirce never
>> abandoned his 'critical' realism about real things and his insistence on *the
>> irreducibility of triadic relations in the generation of these things*.
>> In a word, Jon’s reading stresses Peirce’s synechistic holism, Edwina’s his
>> insistence on real triadic relations.
>>
>> Do Gary F's comments perhaps help bridge these positions? To me they
>> suggest that Peirce’s holistic semeiotic can be grounded in both
>> phenomenological analysis and empirical science, that Peirce’s insights can
>> be seen to gel with contemporary scientific perspectives. Still:
>>
>> GF: . . . neuropsychology confirms Peirce's phenomenology which puts the
>> wholeness of feelings First and analysis into parts Second. From this
>> follows Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics.’
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:10 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> List
>>>
>>> I disagree with the outline
>>>
>>>   the semeiotic whole is ontologically prior to its constituent parts
>>> (top-down); not the other way around, as if the former were *assembled *from
>>> the latter as its basic units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up). The
>>> entire universe is not *composed *of individual signs as its building
>>> blocks, it is instead *perfused *with signs (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394,
>>> 1906)--a vast symbol that *involves *indices and icons (CP 5.119, EP
>>> 2:193-4, 1903).
>>>
>>>  The above, in my view, is moving into romantic mysticism. In my
>>> understanding of Peirce’s semiosis, the universe, as a semiotic whole is
>>> not ontologically prior to its constituents, but is instead, totally
>>> composed in the ‘here and now’ of its constituent parts – which are triadic
>>> sets-  functioning as semiosic processes.  There is neither an
>>> ontological prior nor post reality; ie, no top down nor bottom up. .
>>>
>>> Instead, as Peirce wrote, “There are Real things, whose characters are
>>> entirely independent of our opinions about them’..5.384. We must
>>> acknowledge this.  This does not mean that individual entities exist ‘per
>>> se’ in the atomic materialist sense – which has long been debunked.
>>> Instead, it acknowledges that this semiosic universe operates as
>>> energy/matter constantly forming existentially distinct units. Each entity-
>>> which actually has a morphology of a triadic- hexadic set of
>>> relations-  may last as such for a nanosecond to a hundred, thousands of
>>> years ; eg, an atom, a tree, a mountain… When we examine individuality
>>> further in its indexicality, we see how the individual unit operates only
>>> within a network of relations with other ‘individual entities’ – which
>>> relationships can be outlined in any of the ten basic classes of triads, or
>>> the more complex 28 hexadic relationships.
>>>
>>> What does this mean? To me it means that the universe is a CAS, a
>>> complex adaptive system, a self-organized phaneron of energy-as-matter [aka
>>> signs], constantly developing new individual entities, operating within
>>> habits -of-morphological organization, which habits themselves evolve and
>>> adapt. The purpose? I’m afraid I go no further than ‘to prevent  entropic
>>> dissipation of energy. ..and this is not an ’ontologically prior agenda’.
>>>
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>> On Oct 1, 2025, at 1:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Gary F., List:
>>>
>>> I appreciate the subject line, emphasizing that the semeiotic whole is
>>> ontologically prior to its constituent parts (top-down); not the other way
>>> around, as if the former were *assembled *from the latter as its basic
>>> units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up). The entire universe is not 
>>> *composed
>>> *of individual signs as its building blocks, it is instead *perfused *with
>>> signs (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--a vast symbol that *involves *indices
>>> and icons (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-4, 1903).
>>>
>>> I have indeed regularly quoted that 1906 passage in R 295 (finally
>>> published at LF 3/1:234-5) to support my conception of the universe as one
>>> immense sign, a semiosic continuum, an ongoing inferential process--an
>>> argument from which we prescind facts as represented by propositions using
>>> names, those "smaller" signs thus being artifacts of analysis along with
>>> their associated objects and interpretants (see also CP 2.27, 1902). I also
>>> maintain that perception is likewise an undivided whole from which we
>>> prescind predicates, hypostasize some of them into subjects, and attribute
>>> others to those subjects in propositions, namely, perceptual
>>> judgments-- "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP
>>> 2:191, 1903). I provide a few quotations from Peirce to support that
>>> understanding in section 3.5 of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper (
>>> https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf).
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 11:38 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> If I may, I’d like to move on to some *a posteriori* reasoning (i.e.
>>>> evidence from the “positive sciences” of phenomenology, neuropsychology and
>>>> biology) that seems to support aspects of Peirce’s category-based
>>>> semeiotics.
>>>>
>>>> Helmut, some time ago you expressed some skepticism about my remark in
>>>> a post that perceived objects are “artifacts of analysis” just as signs
>>>> are. I didn’t have the time to clarify what I meant back then, but perhaps
>>>> I can make up for that now, by offering this link:
>>>> https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#csptd .
>>>>
>>>> I’m sure that 1906 passage has been cited here before (probably by
>>>> JAS), but not the neurobiological work that supports it, which begins here:
>>>> https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#x13 . That passage from *Turning
>>>> Signs* also links to the one above.
>>>>
>>>> Love, gary f
>>>>
>>>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>>>>
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