for response to Mike
On Sat, Oct 18, 2025 at 1:39 AM Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Gary, > > I very much concur with this sentiment: > On 10/17/2025 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > the process of reasoning, including the creation of meaning, commences as > abductive inference -- the imaginative leap -- and that Peirce insists that > this leap is a naturally human tendency to 'guess right' about certain > matters: so, from experience to abduction/ hypothesis formation > /retroduction. > > Yet, as a member of the 'Knowledge Representation (KR) community' as you > refer, and one first introduced to Peirce by Sowa, it was not Sowa's > tutorials on existential graphs (EGs) or EGs more broadly that peaked my > interest. It was Sowa's presentation of semiosis in a dynamic way that > struck a cord. I first wrote about this connection in 2010 when I was > exploring the idea of concepts and reference in the context of the semantic > Web [1]. > > I think I understand Peirce's view that an icon is more primitive than an > expression, but I find the syntactic latitude presented by Peirce's graphs > to not be compelling for the contexts I want to express. I appreciate the > formalization of the logic afforded by the graphs, and the cleaner > presentation of relations provided by the graphs (in their various Alpha to > Gamma guises), but they have never really "spoken" to me. The application > of semiosis to natural language is the blackboard I prefer. I suspect we > align on this. > > You go on to speculate: > > If [Gamma Graphs or related repesent the syntax of abduction] is so, then > Pragmatism perhaps provides both the semantics and pragmatics (the > semeiotic teleology of abduction, so to speak) explaining how those quite > different icons acquire meaning through their bearing on practical life and > inquiry. > > The iconicity of Gamma graphs may do just that, but I do not believe that > is the only path. Reasoned argument and natural language can accomplish the > same end, one which is more easily nuanced than diagrammatic icons. (In > other words, Peirce could have thought and written another 100 years but > would still be frustrated at his 'zeta graphs' to express his intentions.) > > Your observations brought to the fore two observations I would make about > the Peircean scholarship community generally. Observation 1): I do not > believe that mastering the EGs is essential to understand Peirce. I think I > understand Peirce's objectives with his graphs, and they have mostly to do > with the frustration of being able to precisely communicate in any medium > or context. An icon is surely prescinded from natural language and > therefore by definition more 'grounded'. But expressiveness also comes from > a larger number of tokens, leading to as many rules and conventions as > natural language affords. Iconic representations seem to have lower > ceilings to convey expressiveness. Observation 2): Semiosis has undue > prominence in the inspection of Peirce's insights. I have oft stated my > preference for grounding Peirce's architectonic in his universal > categories. I also find his insights on cosmology, evolution, and logic > nuances (aside from the categories and the three reasoning methods) more > fertile grounds for finding insights relevant to modern science and > epistemological questions than the semiotic process per se. > > Best, Mike > > [1] My blog post was on "What is a Reference Concept? > <https://www.mkbergman.com/938/what-is-a-reference-concept/>". My > reference to Sowa was John Sowa, 2000. “Ontology, Metadata, and Semiotics,” > presented at ICCS’2000 in Darmstadt, Germany, on August 14, 2000; see > http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/ontometa.htm. > On 10/17/2025 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jon, Atila, List, > > While over the decades I've taken only a modest interest in Peirce's > Existential Graphs, early on I made a point of studying them since I > quickly realized their relevance and importance for Peirce's logic and, so, > for his entire semeiotic and metaphysics, truly, for all the branches of > Discovery Science (Pure Research Science) beginning with mathematics. > Indeed Peirce suggested that -- in good time -- no rush; get the semeiotics > and metaphysics right first! -- he expected that some logical and > metaphysical 'discoveries' and 'advances' would influence communities and > societies (firstly, scientific communities). > > I began my study of EGs as I believe many did (perhaps especially those > involved in the Knowledge Representation (KR) community) with John Sowa's > “Tutorial on Existential Graphs." That was the first of several 'tutorials' > I diligently studied. But truth be told, I was especially influenced by > Joseph Ransdell's and Kenneth Ketner's broader contexts for understanding > the role of EGs within Peirce’s semeiotic and metaphysics. Joe was > something of a mentor to me in my ongoing Peirce studies, while Ken and I > had stimulating discussions on various aspects of Peirce's work. As for the > Gamma Graphs, I got a brief introduction to them from a series of lectures > -- actually two in as many years -- which Fernando Zalamea gave in NYC a > few years ago. Some of those lectures were logically 'above my pay grade', > but I did come away with one certainty: that Zalamea situates Gamma > squarely within Peirce’s philosophy of continuity. In any event, I must > admit that I was much more interested in those "broader contexts' of Joe > and Ken (and many others) rather than to EGs as such. That is still the > case as the rest of this post might suggest. > > As you know, both Peirce’s *Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic* and > his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism were delivered in 1903. Recently I've > been thinking that these lecture series may represent two aspects of one > and the same project. In the *Lowell Lectures*, Peirce develops his EGs > as a diagrammatic logic, while in the *Harvard Lectures* he characterizes > pragmatism as “the logic of abduction.” As I see it, these two lecture > series taken together seem to represent an attempt by Peirce to show that > the process of reasoning, including the creation of meaning, commences as > abductive inference -- the imaginative leap -- and that Peirce insists that > this leap is a naturally human tendency to 'guess right' about certain > matters: so, from experience to abduction/ hypothesis formation > /retroduction. > > I read that Peirce once described the Gamma Graphs as something like "the > calculus of reasoning about 'would-be’s'." [Note: in the 'real world', > including the existential world, each possibility may-be, can-be, but only > *'would-be'* if the conditions are such as to be conducive to realizing > that possibility (biological evolution follows this logic).] So Gamma > Graphs would then seem to serve as the *formal* counterpart to the kind > of reasoning that guesses/ retroduces/ invents new ideas as hypotheses. > [So, one might hope that Gamma Graphs -- or some other tool should the > Gamma development of EGs prove impossible -- would eventually be developed > to serve as a tool for helping to bring into being the conditions for the > 'meliorization' (as Peirce puts it) of some aspect of life on earth > (including, of course, the life of the Mind).] > > Another way of putting this is that Peirce's describing pragmatism as “the > logic of abduction” suggests that he was extending his 'would-be' logic > into the realm of meaning and conduct.This represents a process of creative > thinking*** about the conceivable consequences of creating the conditions > for *possible humane desiderata* to be realized (Peirce insisted on > adding the 'e' to 'human' in its adjectival form). So Peirce's > pragmatism would seem to offer the same logic of abduction that the Gamma > Graphs would hope to express diagrammatically. > ***parenthetically, critical and creative thinking are subjects I taught > for a number of years at CUNY and The Cooper-Union: in my opinion, critical > and creative thinking truly ought to be required subjects beginning in > grammar school.] > > A helpful lesson I learned from Joe Ransdell, an expert in 'iconicity', > was that just as EGs function as icons of the thought or situation it > represents in that it reveals the logical relations among its parts > that, similarly, Joe argued that *pragmatic meanings are also icons*. > Further, meaning-icons represent not only possible effects in experience > but they also can serve as guides to rational and humane conduct. To think > abductively is to construct an icon of a possible world, which is to say > that such an icon is a model of how things 'would-be' if the conditions > were such as to be able to bring about some desirable change. > > For some years the scholar, Aldo de Moor and I were interested in how > 'more iconic graphs' (such as EGs versus, say, Algebra) might function in > relation to: > syntax > |> pragmatics > semantics > > As I currently see it, Gamma Graphs -- or something functioning as they > were intended by Peirce to function -- might represent the *syntax* of > abduction as they have the promise of showing how icons of possible > relations can be generated and manipulated within a given logical space. If > that is so, then Pragmatism perhaps provides both the semantics and > pragmatics (the semeiotic teleology of abduction, so to speak) explaining > how those quite different icons acquire meaning through their bearing on > practical life and inquiry. I am suggesting they are both expressions of > Peirce’s broader semeiotic vision: that reasoning, meaning, and conduct all > evolve through the continual creation, interpretation, and testing of *signs > of possibility* by an open community of interest. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Thu, Oct 16, 2025 at 5:23 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Atila, List: >> >> Following up on my previous post in this thread, Peirce begins his >> "slight sketch" of Existential Graphs (EG) in the entry for "symbolic >> logic" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902) by >> describing what he later distinguishes as the Alpha part for propositional >> logic. Rather than thin oval lines as cuts, "to facilitate the printing," >> he uses square brackets, parentheses, and braces to enclose different >> areas; for example, he represents "if A then B" as [A(B)]. >> >> >> >> Upon introducing the line of identity, Peirce does not immediately shift >> to the (future) Beta part for first-order predicate logic, where it denotes >> an indefinite individual to which general concepts are attributed by >> attaching names. Instead, he initially uses a heavy line connecting A and B >> to denote a "quasi-instant" at which both propositions are true. This >> directly anticipates his Logic Notebook entry of 1909 Jan 7 (R 339:340r >> <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$637i>), where >> the heavy line represents "circumstances" or "times" when propositions >> attached to it are true--a candidate notation for implementing modal logic. >> Accordingly, I have suggested in two recent papers (here >> <https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60449/46975> >> and here <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/939654>) that this might be what >> he had in mind nearly three years later when he expressed the need "to add >> a *Delta* part in order to deal with modals" (R 500, 1911 Dec 6). >> >> >> >> Returning to Baldwin's *Dictionary*, Peirce does move on quickly to what >> we know today as Beta, although he continues to attach capital letters to >> lines of identity instead of names. The only exception is when he briefly >> switches to lowercase letters when assigning specific words to them--*l* >> for the relation of loving, *m* for man, *w* for woman, etc. He >> concludes with the following remarks. >> >> >> CSP: For all considerable steps in ratiocination, the reasoner has to >> treat qualities, or collections, (they only differ grammatically), and >> especially relations, or systems, as objects of relation about which >> propositions are asserted and inferences drawn. It is, therefore, necessary >> to make a special study of the logical relatives "____ is a member of the >> collection ____," and "____ is in the relation ____ to ____." The key to >> all that amounts to much in symbolical logic lies in the symbolization of >> these relations. But we cannot enter into this extensive subject in this >> article. (CP 4.390) >> >> >> >> After some further investigation, I now strongly suspect that this is the >> "certain fault in the system" and "vexatious inelegance" that Peirce >> mentions in his third 1903 Harvard Lecture (PPMRT 186, EP 2:176)--in the >> Beta part of EG that implements first-order predicate logic, heavy lines of >> identity *only* denote individuals, such that there is no way to denote >> qualities, collections, relations, or abstractions as *subjects* of >> propositions. The remedy, which he evidently discovered along with other >> "new possibilities of perfectionment" upon reexamining EG "from the point >> of view of the categories," was to develop the Gamma part that he >> subsequently introduced in his 1903 Lowell Lectures. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]"; > <[email protected]>>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your > subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go > tohttps://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
