Mike, List, Excuse my delay in responding to your post.Of course I'm happy that you concur with this idea:
GR: ". . .the process of reasoning, including the creation of meaning, commences as abductive inference -- the imaginative leap -- and that Peirce insists that this leap is a naturally human tendency to 'guess right' about certain matters: so, from experience to abduction/ hypothesis formation /retroduction. You remarked that as a member of the KR community that what piqued your interest in semiotics wasn't EGs as such but Sowa's presentation of semiosis in such a way that motivated you to explore semiotic concepts in the context of the semantic Web.. My own involvement in the KG community was rather intensive for a time. I attended, presented at, gave keynote addresses, and developed and participated in workshops for over a decade at the ICCS conferences developed by John Sowa and Mary Keeler around KR in general and CGs in particular (and, so, necessarily, also EGs upon which Sowa's CGs are based). I will never be able to express my thanks to Keeler for bringing me into that KR fold of brilliant mathematicians, logicians, scientists and philosophers. Although in truth I have no more interest in CGs than in EGs, I learned a great deal from my colleagues there, for example, De Moor, Delugach, Polovina (and many others). One memorable moment in that creative period was when Aldo de Moor, Mary Keeler, and I, already very interested in the developic of the syntactic and semantic web, wrote one of the first, if not *the* first, paper on a proposed pragmatic web. MB: I appreciate the formalization of the logic afforded by the graphs, and the cleaner presentation of relations provided by the graphs (in their various Alpha to Gamma guises), but they have never really "spoken" to me. The application of semiosis to natural language is the blackboard I prefer. I suspect we align on this. GR: We do agree to some extent. While Peirce once characterized EGs as 'a moving picture of thought', I never saw the 'picture' in the icons of those EGs I studied. However, I hope that there are others working on developing "more iconic" expressions of logical relations, including trichotomic ones. I am still in the process of developing my trikonic diagrams as a "more iconic" way of presenting Peirce three category theory, especially as it relates to phenomenology, semeiotics, and metaphysics. I'm now doing further work on trikonic vectors, how each of these six relate to each other in interesting ways, the possibility of trikonic vector cycles, etc. If [Gamma Graphs or related represent the syntax of abduction], then Pragmatism perhaps provides both the semantics and pragmatics (the semeiotic teleology of abduction, so to speak) explaining how those quite different icons acquire meaning through their bearing on practical life and inquiry. MB: Reasoned argument and natural language can accomplish the same end, one which is more easily nuanced than diagrammatic icons. (In other words, Peirce could have thought and written another 100 years but would still be frustrated at his 'zeta graphs' to express his intentions.) GR: Again, I think that EGs may not prove capable of truly providing "a movie picture" of modality, possibilities, would-be's. It would seem that Peirce himself found their development challenging. But they are not the only graphical logic that can be put to bear on Peirce's semeiotic, three category theory, and his profound understanding of continuity. MB: I do not believe that mastering the EGs is essential to understand Peirce. I think I understand Peirce's objectives with his graphs, and they have mostly to do with the frustration of being able to precisely communicate in any medium or context. [. . . but ] expressiveness also comes from a larger number of tokens, leading to as many rules and conventions as natural language affords. Iconic representations seem to have lower ceilings to convey expressiveness". GR: While I agree that it is not essential for Peirce scholars to master EGs (although I do think that at least a basic study of them is valuable), I see no reason why some *other* iconic representations need to have lower ceilings to convey expressiveness. Having said that, I believe that EGs (and CGs) indeed do not allow for much expressiveness. I just wouldn't generalize this to *all *iconic representations, however. MB: Semiosis has undue prominence in the inspection of Peirce's insights. I have oft stated my preference for grounding Peirce's architectonic in his universal categories. GR: I agree that Peirce's architectonic needs to be grounded in his categories -- he said as much. But this architectonic 'system'* lives* in its rich investigatory details as the various sciences unfold, grow, show us more of 'reality' with each advance. And here the study and application of semeiotics is of great value. MB: I also find his insights on cosmology, evolution, and logic nuances (aside from the categories and the three reasoning methods) more fertile grounds for finding insights relevant to modern science and epistemological questions than the semiotic process per se. GR: I see no reason not to employ *all* these kinds and modes of research -- including, and I would say, along with the categories, semeiotic are of great utility -- in consideration of matters "relevant to modern science and epistemological questions." Of course we are all to some extent 'specialist' (Peirce was a prominent exception). Let's just all do our best work and hope others are doing theirs. Best, Gary R Hi Gary, > > I very much concur with this sentiment: > On 10/17/2025 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > the process of reasoning, including the creation of meaning, commences as > abductive inference -- the imaginative leap -- and that Peirce insists that > this leap is a naturally human tendency to 'guess right' about certain > matters: so, from experience to abduction/ hypothesis formation > /retroduction. > > Yet, as a member of the 'Knowledge Representation (KR) community' as you > refer, and one first introduced to Peirce by Sowa, it was not Sowa's > tutorials on existential graphs (EGs) or EGs more broadly that peaked my > interest. It was Sowa's presentation of semiosis in a dynamic way that > struck a cord. I first wrote about this connection in 2010 when I was > exploring the idea of concepts and reference in the context of the semantic > Web [1]. > > I think I understand Peirce's view that an icon is more primitive than an > expression, but I find the syntactic latitude presented by Peirce's graphs > to not be compelling for the contexts I want to express. I appreciate the > formalization of the logic afforded by the graphs, and the cleaner > presentation of relations provided by the graphs (in their various Alpha to > Gamma guises), but they have never really "spoken" to me. The application > of semiosis to natural language is the blackboard I prefer. I suspect we > align on this. > > You go on to speculate: > > If [Gamma Graphs or related repesent the syntax of abduction] is so, then > Pragmatism perhaps provides both the semantics and pragmatics (the > semeiotic teleology of abduction, so to speak) explaining how those quite > different icons acquire meaning through their bearing on practical life and > inquiry. > > The iconicity of Gamma graphs may do just that, but I do not believe that > is the only path. Reasoned argument and natural language can accomplish the > same end, one which is more easily nuanced than diagrammatic icons. (In > other words, Peirce could have thought and written another 100 years but > would still be frustrated at his 'zeta graphs' to express his intentions.) > > Your observations brought to the fore two observations I would make about > the Peircean scholarship community generally. Observation 1): I do not > believe that mastering the EGs is essential to understand Peirce. I think I > understand Peirce's objectives with his graphs, and they have mostly to do > with the frustration of being able to precisely communicate in any medium > or context. An icon is surely prescinded from natural language and > therefore by definition more 'grounded'. But expressiveness also comes from > a larger number of tokens, leading to as many rules and conventions as > natural language affords. Iconic representations seem to have lower > ceilings to convey expressiveness. Observation 2): Semiosis has undue > prominence in the inspection of Peirce's insights. I have oft stated my > preference for grounding Peirce's architectonic in his universal > categories. I also find his insights on cosmology, evolution, and logic > nuances (aside from the categories and the three reasoning methods) more > fertile grounds for finding insights relevant to modern science and > epistemological questions than the semiotic process per se. > > Best, Mike > > [1] My blog post was on "What is a Reference Concept? > <https://www.mkbergman.com/938/what-is-a-reference-concept/>". My > reference to Sowa was John Sowa, 2000. “Ontology, Metadata, and Semiotics,” > presented at ICCS’2000 in Darmstadt, Germany, on August 14, 2000; see > http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/ontometa.htm. > On 10/17/2025 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jon, Atila, List, > > While over the decades I've taken only a modest interest in Peirce's > Existential Graphs, early on I made a point of studying them since I > quickly realized their relevance and importance for Peirce's logic and, so, > for his entire semeiotic and metaphysics, truly, for all the branches of > Discovery Science (Pure Research Science) beginning with mathematics. > Indeed Peirce suggested that -- in good time -- no rush; get the semeiotics > and metaphysics right first! -- he expected that some logical and > metaphysical 'discoveries' and 'advances' would influence communities and > societies (firstly, scientific communities). > > I began my study of EGs as I believe many did (perhaps especially those > involved in the Knowledge Representation (KR) community) with John Sowa's > “Tutorial on Existential Graphs." That was the first of several 'tutorials' > I diligently studied. But truth be told, I was especially influenced by > Joseph Ransdell's and Kenneth Ketner's broader contexts for understanding > the role of EGs within Peirce’s semeiotic and metaphysics. Joe was > something of a mentor to me in my ongoing Peirce studies, while Ken and I > had stimulating discussions on various aspects of Peirce's work. As for the > Gamma Graphs, I got a brief introduction to them from a series of lectures > -- actually two in as many years -- which Fernando Zalamea gave in NYC a > few years ago. Some of those lectures were logically 'above my pay grade', > but I did come away with one certainty: that Zalamea situates Gamma > squarely within Peirce’s philosophy of continuity. In any event, I must > admit that I was much more interested in those "broader contexts' of Joe > and Ken (and many others) rather than to EGs as such. That is still the > case as the rest of this post might suggest. > > As you know, both Peirce’s *Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic* and > his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism were delivered in 1903. Recently I've > been thinking that these lecture series may represent two aspects of one > and the same project. In the *Lowell Lectures*, Peirce develops his EGs > as a diagrammatic logic, while in the *Harvard Lectures* he characterizes > pragmatism as “the logic of abduction.” As I see it, these two lecture > series taken together seem to represent an attempt by Peirce to show that > the process of reasoning, including the creation of meaning, commences as > abductive inference -- the imaginative leap -- and that Peirce insists that > this leap is a naturally human tendency to 'guess right' about certain > matters: so, from experience to abduction/ hypothesis formation > /retroduction. > > I read that Peirce once described the Gamma Graphs as something like "the > calculus of reasoning about 'would-be’s'." [Note: in the 'real world', > including the existential world, each possibility may-be, can-be, but only > *'would-be'* if the conditions are such as to be conducive to realizing > that possibility (biological evolution follows this logic).] So Gamma > Graphs would then seem to serve as the *formal* counterpart to the kind > of reasoning that guesses/ retroduces/ invents new ideas as hypotheses. > [So, one might hope that Gamma Graphs -- or some other tool should the > Gamma development of EGs prove impossible -- would eventually be developed > to serve as a tool for helping to bring into being the conditions for the > 'meliorization' (as Peirce puts it) of some aspect of life on earth > (including, of course, the life of the Mind).] > > Another way of putting this is that Peirce's describing pragmatism as “the > logic of abduction” suggests that he was extending his 'would-be' logic > into the realm of meaning and conduct.This represents a process of creative > thinking*** about the conceivable consequences of creating the conditions > for *possible humane desiderata* to be realized (Peirce insisted on > adding the 'e' to 'human' in its adjectival form). So Peirce's > pragmatism would seem to offer the same logic of abduction that the Gamma > Graphs would hope to express diagrammatically. > ***parenthetically, critical and creative thinking are subjects I taught > for a number of years at CUNY and The Cooper-Union: in my opinion, critical > and creative thinking truly ought to be required subjects beginning in > grammar school.] > > A helpful lesson I learned from Joe Ransdell, an expert in 'iconicity', > was that just as EGs function as icons of the thought or situation it > represents in that it reveals the logical relations among its parts > that, similarly, Joe argued that *pragmatic meanings are also icons*. > Further, meaning-icons represent not only possible effects in experience > but they also can serve as guides to rational and humane conduct. To think > abductively is to construct an icon of a possible world, which is to say > that such an icon is a model of how things 'would-be' if the conditions > were such as to be able to bring about some desirable change. > > For some years the scholar, Aldo de Moor and I were interested in how > 'more iconic graphs' (such as EGs versus, say, Algebra) might function in > relation to: > syntax > |> pragmatics > semantics > > As I currently see it, Gamma Graphs -- or something functioning as they > were intended by Peirce to function -- might represent the *syntax* of > abduction as they have the promise of showing how icons of possible > relations can be generated and manipulated within a given logical space. If > that is so, then Pragmatism perhaps provides both the semantics and > pragmatics (the semeiotic teleology of abduction, so to speak) explaining > how those quite different icons acquire meaning through their bearing on > practical life and inquiry. I am suggesting they are both expressions of > Peirce’s broader semeiotic vision: that reasoning, meaning, and conduct all > evolve through the continual creation, interpretation, and testing of *signs > of possibility* by an open community of interest. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Thu, Oct 16, 2025 at 5:23 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Atila, List: >> >> Following up on my previous post in this thread, Peirce begins his >> "slight sketch" of Existential Graphs (EG) in the entry for "symbolic >> logic" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902) by >> describing what he later distinguishes as the Alpha part for propositional >> logic. Rather than thin oval lines as cuts, "to facilitate the printing," >> he uses square brackets, parentheses, and braces to enclose different >> areas; for example, he represents "if A then B" as [A(B)]. >> >> >> >> Upon introducing the line of identity, Peirce does not immediately shift >> to the (future) Beta part for first-order predicate logic, where it denotes >> an indefinite individual to which general concepts are attributed by >> attaching names. Instead, he initially uses a heavy line connecting A and B >> to denote a "quasi-instant" at which both propositions are true. This >> directly anticipates his Logic Notebook entry of 1909 Jan 7 (R 339:340r >> <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$637i>), where >> the heavy line represents "circumstances" or "times" when propositions >> attached to it are true--a candidate notation for implementing modal logic. >> Accordingly, I have suggested in two recent papers (here >> <https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60449/46975> >> and here <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/939654>) that this might be what >> he had in mind nearly three years later when he expressed the need "to add >> a *Delta* part in order to deal with modals" (R 500, 1911 Dec 6). >> >> >> >> Returning to Baldwin's *Dictionary*, Peirce does move on quickly to what >> we know today as Beta, although he continues to attach capital letters to >> lines of identity instead of names. The only exception is when he briefly >> switches to lowercase letters when assigning specific words to them--*l* >> for the relation of loving, *m* for man, *w* for woman, etc. He >> concludes with the following remarks. >> >> >> CSP: For all considerable steps in ratiocination, the reasoner has to >> treat qualities, or collections, (they only differ grammatically), and >> especially relations, or systems, as objects of relation about which >> propositions are asserted and inferences drawn. It is, therefore, necessary >> to make a special study of the logical relatives "____ is a member of the >> collection ____," and "____ is in the relation ____ to ____." The key to >> all that amounts to much in symbolical logic lies in the symbolization of >> these relations. But we cannot enter into this extensive subject in this >> article. (CP 4.390) >> >> >> >> After some further investigation, I now strongly suspect that this is the >> "certain fault in the system" and "vexatious inelegance" that Peirce >> mentions in his third 1903 Harvard Lecture (PPMRT 186, EP 2:176)--in the >> Beta part of EG that implements first-order predicate logic, heavy lines of >> identity *only* denote individuals, such that there is no way to denote >> qualities, collections, relations, or abstractions as *subjects* of >> propositions. The remedy, which he evidently discovered along with other >> "new possibilities of perfectionment" upon reexamining EG "from the point >> of view of the categories," was to develop the Gamma part that he >> subsequently introduced in his 1903 Lowell Lectures. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]"; > <[email protected]>>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your > subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go > tohttps://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
