Robert, List: RM: I don't change thread titles
As the moderator has reminded us more than once recently, we should always change the thread title whenever we start discussing a different subject. In this case, we are still within the realm of speculative grammar, but not indexicality. RM: it is inconceivable that you could claim to explain a triadic model (whether that of 1903 without determinations or that of 1905 with two determinations) using concepts from a hexadic model conceived in 1908. As I have said before, Peirce's later taxonomies for sign classification do not constitute a complete break from those of 1903; on the contrary, they are further developments of it. Just like in cosmology, it is not only fully conceivable but often quite helpful to explain his earlier work in semeiotic using concepts that he did not express in his writings until later. For example, Peirce does not explicitly state the rule of determination until 1908--"a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (SS 84, EP 2:481)--but applies it in 1903 (without saying so) to derive ten sign classes (instead of 27) from three trichotomies. He introduces the "hexadic model" in 1904--one sign, two objects, three interpretants--along with the sign's additional external relation with its dynamical interpretant (CP 8.333-9, SS 32-5, 1904 Oct 12), without explaining *why *every sign has exactly two objects and exactly three interpretants. As I have pointed out previously, Peirce offers a clue about this already in 1903--the sign is the *first *correlate of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating, and thus the simplest; the object is its *second *correlate, and thus of middling complexity; and the interpretant is its *third *correlate, and thus the most complex (CP 2.235-42, EP 2:290). He eventually provides the definitive answer in his Logic Notebook, employing the terminology of phaneroscopic analysis. "A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the *immediate*, to which it is *degenerately *Secundan, the *dynamic*, to which it is *genuinely* Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the *immediate*, to which it is primarily Tertian, the *dynamic*, to which it is secundally Tertian, the *rational*, to which it is genuinely Tertian" (R 339:247r <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$467i>, 1905 Jul 7). In later entries, he likewise affirms that "The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant" (R339:276r <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$522i>, 1906 Apr 2) and refers to "the Dynamical, or Genuine Object" (R 339:279r <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$525i>, 1906 Apr 3). I trust that the equivalence of the "rational" and "normal" interpretants in these quotations with the *final *interpretant is not controversial, nor the alignment of "primarily Tertian" and "secundally Tertian" with doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and degenerate (2ns of 3ns), respectively. After all, Peirce similarly states back in 1903, "Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is 3ns ... the self-development of that essential idea ... results in a *trichotomy* giving rise to three subclasses, or genera, involving respectively a relatively genuine 3ns, a relatively reactional 3ns or 3ns of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a relatively qualitative 3ns or 3ns of the last degeneracy" (CP 5.72, EP 2:162). Accordingly, the final interpretant of the sign *itself *is "relatively genuine," the dynamical interpretant of a sign *token *is "relatively reactional," and the immediate interpretant of a sign *type *is "relatively qualitative." RM: Moreover, when I see that we write (S-O) or (S-Od) and talk about trichotomizing this entity without mentioning the trichotomies of the constituents, I believe that we are misinterpreting Peirce and creating confusion. Again in 1903, Peirce *himself *talks about the trichotomies for the sign's (dyadic) relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant without mentioning the trichotomies for those correlates themselves. The one for Od-S is icon/index/symbol, and the one for S-If is rheme/dicisign/argument (later seme/pheme/delome); while in 1906-8, the one for Od is abstractive/concretive/collective, and the one for If is gratific/actuous/temperative. When applying the rule of determination, the Od-S and S-If trichotomies both come *after *the one for the sign itself in 1903, which is qualisign/sinsign/legisign (later tone/token/type); and in 1908, Od comes *before *S (now tentatively potisign/actisign/famisign), while If comes *after* S (as do the other two interpretants). These are straightforward factual observations of what Peirce's own words unambiguously state, so they should not be objectionable or confusing to anyone. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 3:23 AM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, List, > > I will answer the second question first, as the answer (from Peirce) may > shed light on the first. My reply is a little late because I don't post > several times a day, I don't change thread titles, and I strive to respect > exact thinking by scrupulously following Peirce, which prevents me from > attributing errors to him that he did not commit. > > To understand what a trichotomy is, we must look for where Peirce defines > it precisely, because everyone knows that it is closely related to > universal categories, but exact thinking must strive to define each term > used clearly and unambiguously. Indeed, trichotomies are at work in the > classification of the sciences, particularly in the sciences of discovery. > It is in the first of the Lowell Lectures of November 1903 that Peirce > constructs "the ladder into the Well of Truth by successive trichotomies" > (see the Syllabus), a fractal-type progression. I have described it in C.S. > Peirce's Reasoned Classification Of The Sciences. I have carefully > distinguished between trichotomy and tripartition and have formalized the > notion of trichotomy in this chapter. However, in the 5th lecture, in the > context of triadic relations (MS 540), I find the following formulation: > > *Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as > the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere > possibility, an actual existent, or a law. *(CP 2.238; EP 2: 290) > > This is not yet a definition, as it is an attribution of nature to > correlates, but it is very similar. If we further compare it to the way > trichotomies operate in the classification of the sciences: > > *It turns out that in most cases the divisions are trichotomic; the First > of the three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second > arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, > the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and > endeavoring to explain them*. (An Outline Classification of the Sciences, > CP 1.180; EP2: 258) > > So, a formal definition, applicable in all circumstances, would be > something like: > > A trichotomy is a tripartite division of a phaneron into three parts > defined by the natures of the elements it contains, each of which is > characterized by one of the three classes: Thirdness, Secondness, and > Firstness. > > It follows that, since these categories are interdependent and verify > relations of involvement *a priori, *then the elements with which each > part is associated (which, for convenience, I call, as Peirce was, the > fact, Tertians, Secondans, and Primans) must be such that Tertians govern > Secondans, whose existence is by definition presupposed, and also Primans, > which, by their definition, only exist when incarnated in Secondans. > > This is why I proposed the 3D diagram of the podium in *"The 'Podium' of > Universal Categories and their degenerate cases."* > > Helmut, your question reflects a trouble you may feel when, proceeding > with a tripartite division according to universal categories, you find > yourself in the presence of parts which, to be trichotomies, must have > relations. If this is indeed the case, then I hope these few reflections > will have been helpful to you. > > As for your first question, it actually contains two questions, since, in > my opinion, the last sentence has nothing to do with the others. > > HR: *This could be explained more explicitly by mentioning the two parts > of the object and the three parts of the interpretant, but my point works > anyway, so I think* > > Indeed, the first part of your question concerns the triadic sign. In the > second part, it is inconceivable that you could claim to explain a triadic > model (whether that of 1903 without determinations or that of 1905 with two > determinations) using concepts from a hexadic model conceived in 1908. You > are not the only one to make this mistake. > > If I come back to the first part of your first question, you initially > ask, *"Why is there so much emphasis put on the distinction between a > correlate (object, interpretant) and the relation between the sign and each > of both?"* I find your use of "on" to be excessive. Personally, I have > never attached any importance to this. Of course, we can talk about these > two relations, because they exist, of course, both in the triadic > representamen without determinations and in the triadic sign with two > determinations. In the first case, these are dyads induced by the triad; in > the second case, there are only O → S and S → I, which, by concatenation, > create O → I. > > Moreover, when I see that we write (S-O) or (S-Od) and talk about > trichotomizing this entity without mentioning the trichotomies of the > constituents, I believe that we are misinterpreting Peirce and creating > confusion. If we analyze it, there is the "-" which is a conventional sign > to express a binary relation (a Tertian), but without specifying its > direction. I don't see how we could trichotomize this relation > independently of the trichotomies of S and O (or Od), because it is the > valid combinations of pairs of natures that will dictate the choice of > direction. In fact, for Peirce, it is a way of speaking, and these things > are implied when he focuses on the sign S. It seems to me that your first > question begins by making this observation. Consequently, it contains the > correct answer and that you do not need to resort to another, later > conception of the sign to explain it... > Best regards, > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* >
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