List – I am concerned about some of the analyses written recently. JAS wrote: 1] “As I have pointed out previously, Peirce offers a clue about this already in 1903--the sign is the first correlate of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating, and thus the simplest; the object is its second correlate, and thus of middling complexity; and the interpretant is its third correlate, and thus the most complex (CP 2.235-42, EP 2:290). This is a half-quotation and misleading. Peirce did not say that the sign, as the first correlate, is the simplest. One has to define what is meant by ‘simplest’ – and it is not, in my view, referring to the category of Firstness, but to the relationship that correlate has with the other two correlates. As the first correlate, it is the first in the ordinal process of semiosis and Peirce actually writes that it is a ‘mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature and not being a law unless all three are of that nature”. 2.235 [my emphasis]. That is, this correlate is the least flexible of the triad. And the second correlate “is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either mere possibilities, actual existences or laws, then the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence.” 2.237. [my emphasis]. This, to me, suggests that this correlate has more flexibility and openness. And he did not say that the third correlate is the ‘most complex’ which does not suggest that it is in the mode of Thirdness, but it is “of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature’. 2.236.[my emphasis].And again, this to me, suggests that this correlate is the most open in its organization of meaning. I understand the terms of ‘simple, middling complex, and most complex,’ to refer not to the categories but to their relationship with the other correlates. . . The way JAS has interpreted Peirce, it’s setting up the Sign as in a categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, and the Interpretant in 3ns. Peirce did not write this…and if you see the ten classes, such a view is incorrect and even impossible. 2] JAS wrote: He eventually provides the definitive answer in his Logic Notebook, employing the terminology of phaneroscopic analysis. "A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian" (R 339:247r <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$467i>, 1905 Jul 7). Again, I consider this an incorrect interpretation. The terms of primam, secundan and tertian do not, as I understand them, refer to the categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness – but instead, to the order of semiosic processing. This order can be seen clearly in Peirce’s well-known example in 8,314, about the weather. 3] JAS writes: I trust that the equivalence of the "rational" and "normal" interpretants in these quotations with the final interpretant is not controversial, nor the alignment of "primarily Tertian" and "secundally Tertian" with doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and degenerate (2ns of 3ns), respectively. Again – I consider that these terms refer to the ordinal process of semiosis, not to the categories – and disagree with the interpretation that the Interpretants are in various modes of Thirdness. Again, just take a look at the ten classes of signs – and you’ll see that there is only ONE class where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness!!. And a bit of thought would lead one, surely, to wonder why the interpretants would be focused around common ‘habit generation’, which is the function of Thirdness – and ignore the immediate indexical reality of the world. I’ll also add that I disagree with JAS that “semiosis always already is general and continuous’ for this privileges Thirdness and ignores the realities of both Firstness [chance, freedom] and Secondness [ individual deviations and realities]. Certainly, I consider that semiosis is continuous in the universe – but consider that it includes all three categories. I am aware that my views will not affect JAS’s analysis – but I do feel that the List should realize that there are other interpretations of these areas in Peirce!
Edwina > On Oct 21, 2025, at 6:14 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Robert, List: > > RM: I don't change thread titles > > As the moderator has reminded us more than once recently, we should always > change the thread title whenever we start discussing a different subject. In > this case, we are still within the realm of speculative grammar, but not > indexicality. > > RM: it is inconceivable that you could claim to explain a triadic model > (whether that of 1903 without determinations or that of 1905 with two > determinations) using concepts from a hexadic model conceived in 1908. > > As I have said before, Peirce's later taxonomies for sign classification do > not constitute a complete break from those of 1903; on the contrary, they are > further developments of it. Just like in cosmology, it is not only fully > conceivable but often quite helpful to explain his earlier work in semeiotic > using concepts that he did not express in his writings until later. For > example, Peirce does not explicitly state the rule of determination until > 1908--"a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can > be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (SS 84, EP 2:481)--but applies it > in 1903 (without saying so) to derive ten sign classes (instead of 27) from > three trichotomies. He introduces the "hexadic model" in 1904--one sign, two > objects, three interpretants--along with the sign's additional external > relation with its dynamical interpretant (CP 8.333-9, SS 32-5, 1904 Oct 12), > without explaining why every sign has exactly two objects and exactly three > interpretants. > > As I have pointed out previously, Peirce offers a clue about this already in > 1903--the sign is the first correlate of the genuine triadic relation of > representing/mediating, and thus the simplest; the object is its second > correlate, and thus of middling complexity; and the interpretant is its third > correlate, and thus the most complex (CP 2.235-42, EP 2:290). He eventually > provides the definitive answer in his Logic Notebook, employing the > terminology of phaneroscopic analysis. "A sign is a Priman which is Secundan > to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity > to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is > degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has > three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the > dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is > genuinely Tertian" (R 339:247r > <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$467i>, 1905 Jul 7). > In later entries, he likewise affirms that "The Normal Interpretant is the > Genuine Interpretant" (R339:276r > <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$522i>, 1906 Apr 2) > and refers to "the Dynamical, or Genuine Object" (R 339:279r > <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$525i>, 1906 Apr 3). > > I trust that the equivalence of the "rational" and "normal" interpretants in > these quotations with the final interpretant is not controversial, nor the > alignment of "primarily Tertian" and "secundally Tertian" with doubly > degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and degenerate (2ns of 3ns), respectively. After all, > Peirce similarly states back in 1903, "Taking any class in whose essential > idea the predominant element is 3ns ... the self-development of that > essential idea ... results in a trichotomy giving rise to three subclasses, > or genera, involving respectively a relatively genuine 3ns, a relatively > reactional 3ns or 3ns of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a relatively > qualitative 3ns or 3ns of the last degeneracy" (CP 5.72, EP 2:162). > Accordingly, the final interpretant of the sign itself is "relatively > genuine," the dynamical interpretant of a sign token is "relatively > reactional," and the immediate interpretant of a sign type is "relatively > qualitative." > > RM: Moreover, when I see that we write (S-O) or (S-Od) and talk about > trichotomizing this entity without mentioning the trichotomies of the > constituents, I believe that we are misinterpreting Peirce and creating > confusion. > > Again in 1903, Peirce himself talks about the trichotomies for the sign's > (dyadic) relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant > without mentioning the trichotomies for those correlates themselves. The one > for Od-S is icon/index/symbol, and the one for S-If is > rheme/dicisign/argument (later seme/pheme/delome); while in 1906-8, the one > for Od is abstractive/concretive/collective, and the one for If is > gratific/actuous/temperative. When applying the rule of determination, the > Od-S and S-If trichotomies both come after the one for the sign itself in > 1903, which is qualisign/sinsign/legisign (later tone/token/type); and in > 1908, Od comes before S (now tentatively potisign/actisign/famisign), while > If comes after S (as do the other two interpretants). These are > straightforward factual observations of what Peirce's own words unambiguously > state, so they should not be objectionable or confusing to anyone. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 3:23 AM robert marty <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Helmut, List, >> >> I will answer the second question first, as the answer (from Peirce) may >> shed light on the first. My reply is a little late because I don't post >> several times a day, I don't change thread titles, and I strive to respect >> exact thinking by scrupulously following Peirce, which prevents me from >> attributing errors to him that he did not commit. >> >> To understand what a trichotomy is, we must look for where Peirce defines it >> precisely, because everyone knows that it is closely related to universal >> categories, but exact thinking must strive to define each term used clearly >> and unambiguously. Indeed, trichotomies are at work in the classification of >> the sciences, particularly in the sciences of discovery. It is in the first >> of the Lowell Lectures of November 1903 that Peirce constructs "the ladder >> into the Well of Truth by successive trichotomies" (see the Syllabus), a >> fractal-type progression. I have described it in C.S. Peirce's Reasoned >> Classification Of The Sciences. I have carefully distinguished between >> trichotomy and tripartition and have formalized the notion of trichotomy in >> this chapter. However, in the 5th lecture, in the context of triadic >> relations (MS 540), I find the following formulation: >> >> Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as >> the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere >> possibility, an actual existent, or a law. (CP 2.238; EP 2: 290) >> >> This is not yet a definition, as it is an attribution of nature to >> correlates, but it is very similar. If we further compare it to the way >> trichotomies operate in the classification of the sciences: >> >> It turns out that in most cases the divisions are trichotomic; the First of >> the three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second >> arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, >> the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and >> endeavoring to explain them. (An Outline Classification of the Sciences, CP >> 1.180; EP2: 258) >> >> So, a formal definition, applicable in all circumstances, would be something >> like: >> >> A trichotomy is a tripartite division of a phaneron into three parts defined >> by the natures of the elements it contains, each of which is characterized >> by one of the three classes: Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness. >> >> It follows that, since these categories are interdependent and verify >> relations of involvement a priori, then the elements with which each part is >> associated (which, for convenience, I call, as Peirce was, the fact, >> Tertians, Secondans, and Primans) must be such that Tertians govern >> Secondans, whose existence is by definition presupposed, and also Primans, >> which, by their definition, only exist when incarnated in Secondans. >> >> This is why I proposed the 3D diagram of the podium in "The 'Podium' of >> Universal Categories and their degenerate cases." >> >> Helmut, your question reflects a trouble you may feel when, proceeding with >> a tripartite division according to universal categories, you find yourself >> in the presence of parts which, to be trichotomies, must have relations. If >> this is indeed the case, then I hope these few reflections will have been >> helpful to you. >> >> As for your first question, it actually contains two questions, since, in my >> opinion, the last sentence has nothing to do with the others. >> >> HR: This could be explained more explicitly by mentioning the two parts of >> the object and the three parts of the interpretant, but my point works >> anyway, so I think >> >> Indeed, the first part of your question concerns the triadic sign. In the >> second part, it is inconceivable that you could claim to explain a triadic >> model (whether that of 1903 without determinations or that of 1905 with two >> determinations) using concepts from a hexadic model conceived in 1908. You >> are not the only one to make this mistake. >> >> If I come back to the first part of your first question, you initially ask, >> "Why is there so much emphasis put on the distinction between a correlate >> (object, interpretant) and the relation between the sign and each of both?" >> I find your use of "on" to be excessive. Personally, I have never attached >> any importance to this. Of course, we can talk about these two relations, >> because they exist, of course, both in the triadic representamen without >> determinations and in the triadic sign with two determinations. In the first >> case, these are dyads induced by the triad; in the second case, there are >> only O → S and S → I, which, by concatenation, create O → I. >> >> Moreover, when I see that we write (S-O) or (S-Od) and talk about >> trichotomizing this entity without mentioning the trichotomies of the >> constituents, I believe that we are misinterpreting Peirce and creating >> confusion. If we analyze it, there is the "-" which is a conventional sign >> to express a binary relation (a Tertian), but without specifying its >> direction. I don't see how we could trichotomize this relation independently >> of the trichotomies of S and O (or Od), because it is the valid combinations >> of pairs of natures that will dictate the choice of direction. In fact, for >> Peirce, it is a way of speaking, and these things are implied when he >> focuses on the sign S. It seems to me that your first question begins by >> making this observation. Consequently, it contains the correct answer and >> that you do not need to resort to another, later conception of the sign to >> explain it... >> Best regards, >> Robert Marty >> >> Honorary Professor; PhD Mathematics; PhD Philosophy >> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty> >> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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