Gary R., List: Again, thanks for your comments, which continue to be spot-on. Perhaps we should revert to Peirce's own words that loosely express what you suggested "could be stated better."
CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. Accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is One; and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake of an identical being. (CP 1.487, c. 1896) He did not work out his topical conception of continuity and the basics of his speculative grammar until several years later, and he never quite put them together as I have, at least not in writing. Nevertheless, I believe that doing so is faithful to his insights and intentions. After all, logical principles are *semeiotic *principles, and unifying the observed variety of the universe is recognizing its underlying *continuity*; hence, my metaphysical hypothesis of semiosic synechism, according to which the one root of all being--the common character that all subjects possess, by virtue of which they partake of an identical being--is the being of a sign. Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 22, 2025 at 2:01 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > This is a kind of addendum to my last post. I hope to take up your 2nd, > 3rd, and 4th points later, but for now I like to comment on just your first > point, namely, that semiosic synechism is *your own* hypothesis. I agree. > > The concept *semiosic synechism* captures something essential in the > mature development of Peirce's philosophical project: that his ongoing work > in semeiotic along with his analysis of* topical continuity* is where the > *logic > of signs* and the *metaphysics of continuity* merge (no doubt that could > be stated better). > > I think you'd agree that Peirce had been developing the idea of synechism > and the reality of continuity since at least the 1880s. Still, it is not > until his later writings, such as those on the topical conception of > continuity, that he begins to see continuity as not just as an intriguing > mathematical idea (as he and most other mathematicians who took it > seriously did) but, shall we say, he comes to see it as the operative(?) > principle of 3ns itself, the "vital principle" by which habit, mediation, > and law grow throughout the universe. "Symbols grow." Hopefully this idea > of semiosic synechism will someday become not only intelligible through > science, philosophy, art and all manner of humane disciplines, but > *effective* in our lives. Thank you, Jon, for your ongoing contribution > to what is certainly at least *my* *summum bonum*. > > Perhaps someday humanity will come to see that *the universe’s way of > being and its way of meaning are one and the same*: namely, *the > continuous flow of signs interpreting -- and developing -- signs.* > > Gary R > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2025 at 12:26 AM Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Thanks for your comments, with which I am almost entirely in agreement. >> Let me just offer a few important clarifications. >> >> First, as I have acknowledged previously, semiosic synechism is *my own* >> hypothesis--recognizably *Peircean *as a direct application of his late >> topical conception of continuity, but not something that Peirce *himself >> *ever explicitly formulated. >> >> Second, as I have said over and over, I understand the *continuous *process >> of semiosis to be *real*--it is as it is regardless of what anyone >> thinks about it, not in any way observer-dependent. However, distinguishing >> any one *individual *sign is in my view an act of prescission, >> deliberately introducing artificial "boundaries" to mark it off from other >> signs *within *the semiosic continuum that are otherwise indefinite. >> Only *after *we have done this can we go on to identify *that *sign's >> dynamical >> object and *that *sign's final interpretant, with which it is in a >> *genuine *triadic relation, as well as any dynamical interpretants >> produced by its instances in *actual *events of semiosis. >> >> Third, accordingly, I would *not *say that semiosis *tends toward* the >> general and the continuous--that would be a bottom-up conception. Instead, >> I maintain that semiosis *always already is *general and >> continuous--this is a top-down conception. A *discrete *event where a >> dynamical object determines a sign token to determine a dynamical >> interpretant is a *degenerate *manifestation of it, just as those three >> correlates are in a *degenerate *triadic relation--one that is reducible >> to the dyadic relations that it involves. In this case, the dynamical >> object *determines *the sign token, which *determines *the dynamical >> interpretant. >> >> Fourth, nevertheless, a top-down conception is *not *in any way >> *deterministic*--it is primarily a matter of *final *causation, not >> *efficient >> *(or mechanical) causation. "Efficient causation is that kind of >> causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that kind >> of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts" (CP 1.220, >> 1902). Moreover, "Rationality is being governed by final causes" (CP 2.66, >> 1902), and "Continuity is of a Rational nature" (LF 3/1:249n6, 1906). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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