Gary R., List: Returning to your remark that I held off on addressing yesterday ...
GR: Perhaps the subtlest point regarding involution in all its expressions (not just the cosmic) is that *involution does not prioritize 3ns*--that is, it doesn't make it "fundamental" or "basic" (all three are 'basic'). In accordance with Peirce's late topical conception, I maintain that a true continuum (3ns) is an undivided whole that is *ontologically *prior to its parts, which are indefinite material parts (1ns) unless/until they are deliberately marked off as discrete actual parts (2ns). In other words, all three categories are always already present, but the whole is not an *assemblage *of its parts, just as 3ns is not (and cannot be) *built up* from 1ns and 2ns even though it *involves *both. As Peirce says about the *paradigmatic *true continuum, "the *continuity* of the flow ... makes of all time an individual object ... This continuity, or similarity of parts in respect to having parts, necessarily makes time an individual whole" (CP 8.114, c. 1900). It is another case of top-down vs. bottom-up, holism vs. reductionism, hierarchy vs. temporal sequence, and final causation vs. efficient/mechanical causation--as Peirce emphasizes in his blackboard lecture, 3ns *governs *1ns and 2ns, even though both are *independent *of 3ns. CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or 3ns, and, in order to secure to 3ns its really commanding function, I find it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a 3rd, and that 1ns, or chance, and 2ns, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which 3ns would not have anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. (CP 6.202, 1898) In fact, he *demonstrates *the independence of the three categories in accordance with his well-known "reduction thesis" in the following excerpt from an unpublished manuscript. CSP: That the three categories are independent of one another is proved as follows. 2ns involves 1ns, but it is discriminated from it by the circumstances that we may consider non-relative characters of subjects neglecting their dyadic relations. But a dyadic relation cannot be a result of non-relative characters, since if it were so there would be, besides the possession of non-relative characters of two objects, some connection between these facts; and this would be itself a dyadic relation. So 3ns involves 2ns and thereby involves 1ns too; but it can be discriminated from 2ns by the circumstance that 2ns may occur either with or without 3ns. 3ns cannot be reduced to 2ns and 1ns, since if this were possible every triadic relation could be expressed in terms of dyadic relations and of non-relative attributions. Now no triadic relation can be so expressed, for it would appear in such expression as a composite relation formed of dyadic relations. Now composition is itself a triadic relation. On the other hand, there is no independent 4ns or more complex mode or element of being; since it is easily demonstrable that every tetradic relation consists in a compound of triadic relations. (R L107 <https://www.depts.ttu.edu/pragmaticism/about/docs/CSP-Self-Biography.pdf>, 1904, p. 7) Again, we *prescind *1ns from 2ns, and we *prescind *both 1ns and 2ns from 3ns; but we *discriminate *2ns from 1ns, and we *discriminate *3ns from both 2ns and 1ns. Prescission "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other," while discrimination "consists in representing one of the two separands without representing the other. If A can be prescinded from, i.e. supposed without, B, then B can, at least, be discriminated from A" (EP 2:270, 1903). 1ns is *logically *possible without 2ns, and 1ns and 2ns are *logically *possible without 3ns; but this does not entail that 1ns is *metaphysically *possible without 2ns, nor that 1ns and 2ns are *metaphysically *possible without 3ns. We can *represent *2ns without 1ns, and we can *represent *3ns without 2ns and 1ns; but this does not entail that 2ns is ever *really* without 1ns, nor that 3ns is ever *really *without 2ns and 1ns. I would go on to discuss the implications for triadic relations, but they are relevant to Helmut's post today, so I will save them for a forthcoming reply to that. Regards, Jon On Tue, Oct 28, 2025 at 5:25 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > GR: Ransdell's affirmation of three-category involution as opposed to > giving priority to 1ns is remarkable given that his philosophical specialty > was iconicity which, of course, is rooted in 1ns > > > I would imagine that he recognized iconicity as 1ns of 3ns, not pure > 1ns--a qualitative aspect of signs and semiosis. > > GR: The principal point here is that once a universe has come into being > and there is semiosis, the categories never appear except together. > > > I agree. As early as 1867, Peirce recognizes in "A New List of > Categories," the article that four decades later he describes as "my one > contribution to philosophy" (CP 8.213, c. 1905), that we *prescind *them > from what he eventually calls the phaneron, and that we do so in the order > of involution--3ns as representation (later mediation), then 2ns as > relation (later reaction), then 1ns as quality. > > GR: I am certainly not alone in finding that Peirce's Blackboard argument > in the 1898 (so called "cosmic lectures") makes more sense--in my view, is > more *logical*--than thinking that something--a cosmos--can come out of > nothing, or out of 1ns. > > > Again, I agree. Even in "A Guess at the Riddle," the categories emerge > from "the womb of indeterminacy" (CP 1.412, EP 1:278, 1887-8), which Peirce > is contrasting with "the womb of homogeneity" as posited by "Thales and the > early Ionian philosophers" (CP 1.373, EP 1:256-7). In the blackboard > lecture, he further clarifies that the initial state is "the utter > vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality," such > that "It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of > everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of > forms comes about" (CP 6.193&196, 1898). In other words, vague potentiality > *is *generality (3ns)--"Continuity, as generality, is inherent in > potentiality, which is essentially general" (CP 6.204)--not a hodgepodge of > *individual > *possibilities (1ns), which only came about when "that unbounded > potentiality became potentiality of this or that sort--that is, of some > *quality*" (6.220). "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. ... It is > the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or > foreshadowed. ... So of *potential *being there was in that initial state > no lack" (CP 6.217)--nothing *actual *(2ns), but an inexhaustible > continuum (3ns) of *indefinite *possibilities (1ns). This is what the > blackboard itself represents as "a sort of diagram of the original vague > potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination" (CP > 6.203). > > GR: Perhaps the subtlest point regarding involution in all its expressions > (not just the cosmic) is that *involution does not prioritize 3ns*--that > is, it doesn't make it "fundamental" or "basic" (all three are 'basic'). > > > This is indeed a very subtle but important point, worth exploring at some > length, so I will save that exposition for a future post. > > GR: For me, the essential thing--the first thing, the most important > thing--is to grasp Peirce's ideas clearly, even if--perhaps *especially > *if--one > strongly disagrees with some aspect of his philosophy. Only then will the > real world application of his philosophy be adequately grounded and further > developed. > > > Once more, I heartily agree. As I have often said before, the problem with > trying to apply Peirce's ideas to today's challenges while using different > terms--besides blatantly violating his own ethics of terminology--is that > they all too often end up conveying different *concepts*. As you > mentioned a few days ago, describing semiosis with an input/output model is > an example of this, misleadingly (even if unintentionally) implying that > the same sign *always *produces the same interpretant for the same > object--just as a mathematical function *always *produces the same output > for the same input, even when the corresponding equation is nonlinear. On > the contrary, different instances of the same sign with the same > (dynamical) object routinely produce different (dynamical) interpretants, > not only for different interpreters, but often for the same interpreter at > different times. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >>
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