List, I'd like to direct the List to two posts from 2013 that Michael Shapiro wrote on Chomsky and which appear on his blog, *Language Lore*: https://languagelore.net/?s=chomsky
Both posts argue -- in somewhat different ways -- the same thesis: that neostructuralism can replace Chomsky’s formal model with a teleological, semiotic, and evolutionary account of language. The first post contrasts static vs developmental views of language; the second continues that line of thought but with an emphasis on evolution including an argument that brain functions cannot be the ultimate explanation of language; rather, the evolutionary and developmental history of sign-use contribute to explaining why the brain has the structure it does. Best, Gary R On Sun, May 3, 2026 at 5:05 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote: > Not the correct interpretation. And my article at that time refuted their > claim. I have written several books on this topic and debated Fitch and > Pinker publicly on these matters. Here is a New Yorker article about me and > the controversy. > > The Interpreter > https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/16/the-interpreter-2 > DLE > > On May 3, 2026, at 16:57, Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Unnecessary prerequisite to comparing them. > DLE > > On May 3, 2026, at 14:34, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > > supplement: Sorry for this, but, before I raise anger, I feel I have to > explain, that I didn´t want to say, that anybody said it was a fallaciously > naturalized phenomenon, but that I think, that this at least should be the > accusation, to make Chomsky´s theory worth of, and vulnerable by, > refutation, or to see it put into competition with Peirce´s. > > Dan, List, > > in the Wikipedia article about generative grammar I have found: > > "In a 2002 paper, Noam Chomsky > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky>, Marc Hauser > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Hauser> and W. Tecumseh Fitch > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Tecumseh_Fitch> proposed that universal > grammar consists solely of the capacity for hierarchical phrase structure. > [30] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_grammar#cite_note-30>". > > So, just a quite special capacity, not a fallaciously naturalized > phenomenon. > > Best, Helmut > 3. Mai 2026 um 16:31 > "Everett, Daniel" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > The point that I try to make in my work, past, present and future, wrt to > interactions between Peircean linguistics and Chomskyan linguistics is > this, which this particular message does not address. > > While it is true that there are many aspects of human language a > generative theory in the Chomskyan tradition (there are many) can miss > because of its focused attention, that type of work is not going to > persuade many of the superiority of a Peircean approach. It might in fact > be such evidence to many of us, but it is not going to change many minds. > > One must begin with an assessment of what the central empirical problems > are for a particular theory - i.e. what has it assigned itself as its own > criteria of success. > > In Chomskyan grammar, this will not entail much about markedness or Roman > Jakobson’s excellent work these days. It has to begin by taking the central > problems of Chomskyan theory raise by Merge (Chomsky’s "basic operation”) > and show how the problem disappears in a Peircean perspective, in > particular via Peirce’s Foundational Habit (my term), of Sign —> Sign. > > To get at this, we need to take on Frege’s error (compositionality) and > show how inference (e.g. via Existential Graphs), can account for the > problems. > > There are plenty of examples that I address in various papers. One of the > key ones, as a good illustrative example, is the generative problem of > “Antecedent Contained Deletion” and how this disappears in an approach > based on EGs. I have written on this, but no one perhaps more so or with > greater clarity than John Sowa. > > But it is a vast field and no one should feel obligated to argue for one > conclusion or another. > > However, if one does wish for a head-to-head comparision with Chomskyan > theory as it is currently practiced, this is crucial . One of the most > cited papers today in this regard (though he ignores Peirce) is the paper > by Steve Piantadosi (Berkely psychology), a paper that was published in my > Festschrift, but is available online here (where it has already been > downloaded 53,000 times): https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180 > > What Steve misses, imho, is the Foundational Habit, which explains the > foundation of LLMs and AI more generally. > > - Dan > > On May 3, 2026, at 12:39 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Dan, Helmut, List, > > This has been a very fruitful thread for my thinking about language, > something I haven't given sufficient attention to these past few decades as > I concentrated on Peircean semeiotics, tricategoriality, pragmaticism, etc. > As earlier noted, knowing Michael Shapiro personally, having read many of > his published works, following his blog, *Language Lore * > https://languagelore.net/about-language-lore-2/, and having regular > conversations with him at a small Peirce-centered philosophy club which > meets monthly in NYC (Michael lives in Vermont) has at least kept > linguistics on my radar. Since the discussion so far has centered on the > person and thought of Noam Chomsky, I would like to note that Shapiro was > trained under Roman Jakobson at Harvard and is intellectually aligned with > structuralist and semiotic traditions rather than Chomsky's generative > program. > > As I understand it, for Shapiro Jakobson's work represents the point at > which structuralism begins to 'overcome' itself. Jakobson's linguistics > already seems to anticipate a semiotic conception of language, yet he > doesn't fully get past formalism. So, in my view, Shapiro's > neostructuralism may best be understood as a Peircean completion of > Jakobson’s program, not a complete departure from it, but explicitly > articulating it in terms of semiosis and, so, teleology. > > It now seems to me that from a Peircean-semiotic standpoint, Michael > Shapiro’s critique of Chomsky principally concerns what Shapiro takes to be > *primary* in language. As previously noted, Chomsky’s theory treats > language as an internal, formal system -- an abstract grammar governed > by general rules such that questions of purpose, interpretation, and > communication are, shall we say, 'bracketed'. > Shapiro’s neostructuralism reverses that tendency and serves > as Shapiro's semiotic alternative. In his > work structuralism is revised such that 3ns, as mediation, habit, growth of > meaning, etc. is no longer excluded; rather, it actually *constitutes* > linguistic > structure. > Language in this view is not a 'given' system but, rather, an evolving > semiotic process and is intelligible only in terms of its development, and > especially its teleological tendency toward meaning. Contrariwise, > purposiveness, interpretant effects, and the continuity of semiosis are > excluded > from Chomsky's program. For Shapiro semiosis, sign-action, is precisely > where linguistic explanation needs to begin, thus his objection that > generative grammar is methodologically reductive because it detaches > grammar from semiosis, treats structure as fixed rather than developmental, > and so gives only an abstract understanding of the phenomenon of language. > > In sum: From the standpoint of neostructuralism, it is not that Chomsky's > work is without value -- and it most certainly has been influential! -- but > lacking a semiotic revision it cannot serve as a general theory of > language. I strongly agree with Shapiro. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > On Sat, May 2, 2026 at 5:55 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > No Noam would never say that. Never. General intelligence in his theory > has zero to do with L1 acquisition. > > My office was next to Chomsky’s for a year. > > In 2023 MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences held a conference in my honor. > But that dept and MIT linguistics have very different views of language. > > The talks at that conference are on youtube. The volume is also available. > Dan > > <maxresdefault.jpg> > > Tedlab > youtu.be > <https://youtu.be/06zefFkhuKI> > > On May 2, 2026, at 17:12, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dan, List, > > That´s great, that you know him! I would find it very interesting, whether > he either would say: > > -- "Ok, the language acquisition device may not differ from general > intelligence, and the universal grammar may not differ from general logic, > I just have called these things the way I did, because I am concerned with > linguistics, not with more general sciences such as biology, psychology or > logic" > > Or: > > -- "I think, that the language acquisition device and the universal > grammar are special innate abilities, that only genetically appear within > creatures who use language, esp. humans, but not in other creatures, who > are quite intelligent, esp. octopusses, who don´t communicate with > language, but by changing the colours, texture, and form of their skin" > > Or: Something else. > > I would find the answer interesting, because I don´t have a preference for > either answer, can´t have as a layman, and Chomsky is an expert, one of a > few. My last post, in this regard, was not a judgement, not even a > justified suspicion, only a layman´s utterance-in-progress, the kind of > question, experts are often bothered with. > > Best, Helmut > 30. April 2026 um 15:07 > "Everett, Daniel" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > > I knew Chomsky well for more than 40 years. He has given interviews about > me and I him (especially in the New Yorker and NY Times - cover story. And > a cover story in the Chronicle. > > The article i linked to earlier as well as the almost finished book > Peircean lingiistics discusses and compares Chomsky and Peirce in great > detail. > > Peirce’s theory wins hands down. > > > > Dan > > On Apr 30, 2026, at 08:56, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary, List, > > thank you! In this form, I understand the criticism. I guess, maybe a > scientist should compare his work with other scientific approaches to a > higher extent than Chomsky did or does. I also wonder, whether the innate > language acquisition device is something different from general > intelligence, and whether the universal grammar is different from logic > (incl. triadic) in general, or these are unnecessary specifications. > > Best, Helmut > 30. April 2026 um 01:17 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List, > > I haven't a linguist's knowledge of Chomsky's theory. While over the years > I've read a significant amount of material related to it, and especially in > recent years that which appears in the work of that quintessentially > Peircean linguist, Michael Shapiro, my comments are strictly those of a > layman. > > So, necessarily, are my questions. So, for example, you suggest that > "without the innate 'language acquisition device', a human would not be > able to acquire language." Now since most researchers think Homo sapiens > existed for tens of thousands, possibly over 100,000 years before spoken > language emerged, did Chomsky's 'Universal Grammar, his innate cognitive > architecture, simply lay dormant for that period of time? Or did it somehow > evolve in the homo sapien brain over that vast period? Perhaps this > question has been addressed in the literature, but I'm not aware of it. > > You wrote: " But [Universal Grammar] wouldn´t say, that a child would > not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither would > say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the structure > of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted from, and > adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of communication." > > I think you may have a point here as my understanding is that Chomsky’s > theory does not logically *exclude *communication or semiotic > considerations. However, his theory does not at all rely on them > nor positively develop them. They remain peripheral rather than > foundational, which is a point that critics like Shapiro make. > > To expand on this a bit, I suppose that in principle one could reinterpret > Chomsky’s framework in semiotic terms. However, this would be an external > reconstruction rather than something he himself developed. It is certainly > possible to argue that the language faculty evolved under certain > *communicative > pressures* and that its structures reflect *semiotic constraints*. > However, Chomsky does not derive UG from semiotic principles, nor does he > treat grammar as emerging from a general theory of signs. And although he > acknowledges communicative explanations, he challenges them in favor of > internal constraints. > > So, in a word, language as sign activity is not denied by Chomsky but, to > the extent that it appears at all, it is subordinated to formal internal > constraints such that semiotics and a broader logic of communication is > mainly absent from his framework. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 5:42 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > Does he really "reduce" language acquisition to a fixed internal > mechanism, or just the ability of language acquisition? Because, if it is > the ability, it is not a reduction of the thing language itself. It just > would say, that, without the innate "language acquisiton device", a human > would not be able to acquire language. But it wouldn´t say, that a child > would not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither > would say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the > structure of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted > from, and adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of > communication. > > Best, Helmut > 29. April 2026 um 17:56 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List, > > You wrote: " One then only might say that [Chomsky] limits his inquiry to > linguistics . . ." > > While not a linguist, I've taken a keen interest in the field, especially > after coming to know Michael Shapiro and his work a couple of decades ago. > However, at this point I can't add more than what I've already written: > > > Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate > cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition > consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. > Michael [Shapiro] argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic > structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, so, > renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic > (since language is approached as an internal code rather than a process of > sign use). > > > The point is *exactly* linguistic: In my view, *Chomsky reduces language > acquisition to a fixed internal mechanism and, further, abstracts language > from communicative practice. *Following Shapiro, I tried to make the > point that, very different from this, Peirce sees language not as a formal > system but as a *mode of sign activity* and all that follows from that in > his semeiotics. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 6:20 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > I have often wondered, whether Chomsky only "abstracts" or "renders" his > universal grammar as something innate to all humans, or claims it for basic > in the sense of axiomatic. Because, if he doesn´t do that latter thing, I > think he cannot be blamed of denying social, communicative, semiotic, and > logical deeper sources of universal grammar. One then only might say, that > he limits his inquiry to linguistics, which is his main interest and > research field. > > Best, Helmut > > 29. April 2026 um 05:10 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Dan, List, > > I've only had a chance to read the abstract of your paper, but I hope to > read it in its entirety in the next week or so as the thesis sounds most > interesting and, to me at least, a bit provocative. As you probably know -- > and as long term readers of the List may know -- I tend to agree with the > linguist, Michael Shapiro's, that supports Peirce's, as opposed to > Chomsky's, view of the acquisition of language. > > For Shapiro, the contrast between Chomsky and Peirce turns on > fundamentally different conceptions of language and its acquisition. As is > well known, Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an > innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language > acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing > 'cognitive system'. Michael argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal > syntactic structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, > so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and > non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than > a process of sign use). Shapiro, on the other hand, argues that “language > is not an autonomous formal system but a mode of sign activity,” and he > argues against “the hypostatization of grammar as an object independent of > its use.” As he sees it, generative grammar mistakes analytic constructs > for innate mental realities and, in the doing, obscures the fundamentally > semiotic character of linguistic phenomena. > > Shapiro finds in Peirce a model that situates language within semiosis -- > an ongoing, *socially embedded process of sign interpretation* in which > what is innate is, as I think you suggest in your abstract, less a > determinate structure than *a capacity for abductive inference*. Here > language acquisition is developmental and open-ended: this involves the > formation and revision of habits through interaction, *fallible > hypothesis formation* rather than the unfolding of a fixed system. So > Shapiro emphasizes that “grammar is *not* given in advance but emerges > from the functioning of signs in communicative life,” thus aligning > linguistic structure with evolving patterns of use. > > An essential difference, I think, lies in their respective notions of > instinct: for Chomsky, as noted, it is a structured internal grammar, > whereas for Peirce it is an evolutionary tendency toward successful > abduction, a probabilistic 'bias', shall we say, that integrates biological > predispositions with learning and language and cultural transmission. > > For Shapiro, the Peircean account is superior because it integrates > biology, learning, culture, and communication without reducing language to > a fixed internal mechanism. I've cc'd Michael who, I expect, will correct > me if I've misrepresented any of his views. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 7:23 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Semeiosis is the foundation of all inference. I refer to this in the paper > linked below as “The Foundational Habit.” It is: > > Sign —> Sign > > It is a recursive procedure and on this all of science emerges. > > CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCT IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION: PRAGMATIST VS. > RATIONALIST APPROACHES - lingbuzz/009854 > ling.auf.net > [image: favicon.ico] <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> > > DLE > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 19:13, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > *[EXTERNAL]:* This email originated from outside of Bentley University. > Do not click on any links or open any attachments unless you recognize the > sender and know the content is safe. Please contact Bentley Help Desk with > any questions or concerns. > > Gary R, List > > Yes, you are quite correct- the function is a* rule* of mediation - and I > said that quite clearly in my outline - when I referred to and gave > examples of the HABITS or rules or laws of mediation - and mediation is of > course, a ‘mode of connection - but, more, it is a mode of transformation, > where it transforms, via its rules, habits, knowledge base... input data > into a viable interpretation. . > > And yes, this semiosis triad, which I compare to the function [ and I am > hardly the only person to do so!!!] does lead to , at a specific time and > place, *one interpretation*. It has to -otherwise the world is chaos. And > since this function is a triad, with each node containing vital data - > it’s not a dyadic process - and you are quite incorrect to claim such - ie, > the function is not the same as a a mathematical equal sign - which IS > dyadic!!! > > . This triad/function/ is a vital action- I must interpret the input > sounds or images to be: one interpretation at this specific time and > space.Not multiple interpretations,but ONE. My neighbour is saying Hello - > and is NOT an evil witch putting a curse on me. …I must interpret the image > I see to be Rain- and not gold coins…or harmful chemicals or angels > dropping from the sky or... > > As for the concept of continuous semeiois - that’s basic to Peirce - but > my outline of ONE specific action of semiosis hardly nullifies the concept > of the world as a continuous semiosic process. > > > Edwina > > > > > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 6:40 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Doug, List, > > Since she mentioned it in her response to you, I must remark that Edwina > Taborsky's interpretation of Peirce’s semiosis as a function, *f(x) = y*, > where x is the object, f is the sign, and y is the interpretant, is > exceedingly problematic in my view. In her model the sign 'operates' on the > object to 'produce' the interpretant. This would mean that the interpretant > is generated through a* transformation *comparable to a mathematical > mapping*.* While this model may seem appealing to those trained in > analytic philosophy or, say, Shannon's classical information theory -- > since it offers a clean *input-output *picture of semiosis -- > nonetheless, it replaces Peirce’s open and continuous semiotic mediation > with a closed system of transformation. > > Further, a function implies a dyadic and determinate relation: one value > of x leads to one value of y. Peirce’s semiosis, however, is at its very > heart triadic and relational. Yes, the object determines [in Peirce's sense > of 'constrains'] the sign which determines [constrains] the interpretant, > but *none of these determinations is mechanical*. For Peirce the sign > does not *transform *the object into an interpretant; rather, it *mediates > * between them within a process that remains open and continuous. In > reducing semiosis to transformation,Taborsky's model ignores the potential, > and the creative aspects which animate Peirce’s semeiotics, including as > regards his conception of meaning. > > In short, the formula f(x) = y collapses Peirce’s open-ended process of > mediation (3ns) into a fixed act of transformation (2ns) in that* it > substitutes function for a law of habit*. Whereas a function ends with an > output, Peirce’s semiosis generates new interpretants as new > signs indefinitely, each interpretant, in turn, becoming a sign. This > process has no definite closure. Some have called this 'infinite > semiosis': the process where the interpretant of a sign becomes a new sign > for the same object, and so initiates an endless chain of meaning. It > implies that meaning-making is never static or fully realized, but is > always open to further interpretation and unfolding. > > And there is one additional danger: that of over-formalizing Peirce’s > ideas. While it is true that Peirce himself sometimes used mathematical > analogies (although, and for prime example, he strongly argued against > using his system of Existential Graphs as a calculus), his semeiotic is > anything but computational. By turning semiosis into a neat function, one > is treating signs as static conversions rather than as *evolving acts of > interpretation* rooted in culture, experience, and inquiry (there are > biological analogies of these). In addition, it's important to note > that Peirce’s semeiotic is deeply entangled with his phenomenology and > metaphysics (see, for example,“An Outline Classification of the Sciences” > in the 1903 *Syllabus*) and is, in my view, not fully detachable from > them. > > There is, perhaps, a limited sense in which Taborsky’s metaphor might be > helpful. But if so, she would have to treat the 'function' *not as a > deterministic formula but as a rule of mediation*; that is to say as a > pattern of relational continuity rather than causal mapping. As such it > might serve as a shorthand for the way the sign organizes its reference. > But then Taborsky would have to acknowledge that* f* here is *not an > operator but a habit*: a mode of connection among object, sign, and > interpretant within a continuum of semiosis, something I think that she is > unlikely to do. > > Perhaps the greatest flaw in Taborsky’s model as I see it is that it > doesn’t capture the continuity -- the evolutionary continuity -- the > *vitality* in Peirce’s thought. His semeiotic came out of his own > evolving ideas about synechism and habit-formation, stressing the > continuity and growth of interpretation. A fixed function like *f(x)=y* > freezes what Peirce understood as a living, evolutionary process. For these > reasons, in my view such essentially dyadic models as Taborsky's > misunderstand and misinterpret Peirce’s semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM doug mackenzie <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi all, > > I've just joined this mailing list because I am finally taking the > opportunity to dig into Peirce's writings. I am a sessional instructor at > UBC and I will be teaching COGS 303 (Research Methods in Cognitive Systems) > this September for the second time. I taught the course last September and > hewed closely to the syllabus as it was designed by Dr. Ron Rensink > (details here > <https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/preparingUgrads-rr.pdf> > ). > > I've been sold on the Team-Based Learning approach and I'm in the process > of designing the modules which will compose the course. I'm now reading The > Fixation of Belief and How to Make Our Ideas Clear, and Peirce's ideas > about the scientific method and doubt seem really to fit with the course's > focus on self-awareness of cognitive biases. > > I was wondering if anyone has made use of Peirce's writings or ideas in > courses on research methods or the philosophy of science. > > Best, > > Doug Mackenzie > Vancouver, BC > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . 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