List,
I wonder, can we symbolize the difference between strong and weak negation in a way not using language? "I don´t believe in God" is agnostic, "I believe that there is no God" is atheistic. I must admit, that "belief" is a concept, I have both not understood yet (logically), and understand (linguistically). Btw, "A believes", as part of an EG, is not a symbolization not using language. "Belief" is a term for not a logical concept, but for a hardened state of mind. Knowledge is due to deduction. To estimate a probability is due to induction, and to take something for possible is due to abduction. But to believe in something doesn´t have a logical background, only its fixation can be analysed to four kinds. "I know, that not" is a knowledge, "I don´t know, that" too. "It is possible, that not" is a possibility, "It is not possible, that" is not a possibility anymore. "It is probable, that not" and "It is not probable, that" are both probabilities. "I believe, that not" is a belief, but "I don´t believe, that" is not a belief anymore. So, belief logically works like possibility, and knowledge like probability. But, while the difference between strong and weak negation in the case of possibility is clear, in the case of belief it is not so: Both agnostics and atheists are regarded for heretics by believers. Ok, a term is not syntax, but a rogue term leads to a rogue syntax: Strong and weak negation easily confused with each other. Possibility, probability, and knowledge are a Peircean categorial trichotomy, and belief is something illogical, non-Peircean, something rogue. Jungle hunter/gatherer folks, who live in a paradise without hierarchies, don´t even have to use hierarchical phrases. City folks, who have lost their entanglement with former basic certainties, have to create illogical terms and syntaxes, unconsciously trying to get some certainty back. This leads to culture. So, culture is a deficiency symptom. But a progress too, though to unknown direction. However, intelligence is being outsourced to the AI, so de-evolution starts, and when we will be unable to maintain the computers anymore, when the last LED will have stopped flashing, we will all be in a dull paradise without hierarchies or beliefs. But before that happens, something else, quite Peircean, will happen, and everything will be completely different again, I believe.
Best, Helmut
8. Mai 2026 um 03:01
"Jerry LR Chandler" <[email protected]>
wrote:A la contra, the orthogonality of primitive languages with barely a nascent vocabulary and the hypothetical dynamics of so called “merge” (of three(!) n-dimensional matrices) is very clear to some members of the list.
That being said, I purchased one of your books and pursued the majority of the text.
While the style of the text (How Language Began) is your very own, I find it wanting from the perspective of both “merge” philosophy (raw or flawed mathematics so to speak) and CSP logic and philosophy.
Reading CSP may require a much greater depth than almost all philosophers can muster without the patience of Job. My 20+ years of reading postings here on this list serve suggest that very few are capable of crossing the linguistic thresholds, the scientific thresholds, the logical thresholds, the mathematical thresholds,...
Very often, CSP writes with a laser focus that requires deep knowledge of the taxonomy of the sciences as it stood in the second half of the 19th Century as well as the grammars of the epistemologies. For example, his works on mathematical models and copulative logic (related to chemical structures) both topics being remote current usage from second quarter of 21 st Century.
In my opinion, there is a vast structural difference between the linguistic difference of the three fold trichotomy with nine terms and the hyper reductive notion of “index, icon, symbol”.
If you would like a discussion of this issue, I suspect the old-timers here would welcome a clear assertion of how and why this revisionist interpretation was derived.
While I suspect that I understand why your works have been well received in the neuro-scientific and anthropological communities, assertions about relationships to CSP’s logic / philosophy is a different “can of worms”.
I look forward to studying your future works,
Cheers
Jerry
On May 3, 2026, at 5:26 PM, Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I made the point earlier that Shapiro’s arguments here, however valid, are orthogonal to the larger issue which has to do with syntactic Merge.However no one on this list appears to know much about syntactic theory more generally or Chomskyan syntax more specifically. All the info is out there but it’s beyond my pay grade to point all this out.My apologies for intervening on this topic.DLE
On May 3, 2026, at 18:10, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:List,I'd like to direct the List to two posts from 2013 that Michael Shapiro wrote on Chomsky and which appear on his blog, Language Lore: https://languagelore.net/?s=chomskyBoth posts argue -- in somewhat different ways -- the same thesis: that neostructuralism can replace Chomsky’s formal model with a teleological, semiotic, and evolutionary account of language. The first post contrasts static vs developmental views of language; the second continues that line of thought but with an emphasis on evolution including an argument that brain functions cannot be the ultimate explanation of language; rather, the evolutionary and developmental history of sign-use contribute to explaining why the brain has the structure it does.Best,Gary R
On Sun, May 3, 2026 at 5:05 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote:Not the correct interpretation. And my article at that time refuted their claim. I have written several books on this topic and debated Fitch and Pinker publicly on these matters. Here is a New Yorker article about me and the controversy.The Interpreter
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/16/the-interpreter-2DLE
On May 3, 2026, at 16:57, Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote:Unnecessary prerequisite to comparing them.DLE
On May 3, 2026, at 14:34, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _supplement: Sorry for this, but, before I raise anger, I feel I have to explain, that I didn´t want to say, that anybody said it was a fallaciously naturalized phenomenon, but that I think, that this at least should be the accusation, to make Chomsky´s theory worth of, and vulnerable by, refutation, or to see it put into competition with Peirce´s._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Dan, List,in the Wikipedia article about generative grammar I have found:"In a 2002 paper, Noam Chomsky, Marc Hauser and W. Tecumseh Fitch proposed that universal grammar consists solely of the capacity for hierarchical phrase structure.[30]".So, just a quite special capacity, not a fallaciously naturalized phenomenon.Best, Helmut_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.The point that I try to make in my work, past, present and future, wrt to interactions between Peircean linguistics and Chomskyan linguistics is this, which this particular message does not address.3. Mai 2026 um 16:31"Everett, Daniel" <[email protected]>wrote:While it is true that there are many aspects of human language a generative theory in the Chomskyan tradition (there are many) can miss because of its focused attention, that type of work is not going to persuade many of the superiority of a Peircean approach. It might in fact be such evidence to many of us, but it is not going to change many minds.One must begin with an assessment of what the central empirical problems are for a particular theory - i.e. what has it assigned itself as its own criteria of success.In Chomskyan grammar, this will not entail much about markedness or Roman Jakobson’s excellent work these days. It has to begin by taking the central problems of Chomskyan theory raise by Merge (Chomsky’s "basic operation”) and show how the problem disappears in a Peircean perspective, in particular via Peirce’s Foundational Habit (my term), of Sign —> Sign.To get at this, we need to take on Frege’s error (compositionality) and show how inference (e.g. via Existential Graphs), can account for the problems.There are plenty of examples that I address in various papers. One of the key ones, as a good illustrative example, is the generative problem of “Antecedent Contained Deletion” and how this disappears in an approach based on EGs. I have written on this, but no one perhaps more so or with greater clarity than John Sowa.But it is a vast field and no one should feel obligated to argue for one conclusion or another.However, if one does wish for a head-to-head comparision with Chomskyan theory as it is currently practiced, this is crucial . One of the most cited papers today in this regard (though he ignores Peirce) is the paper by Steve Piantadosi (Berkely psychology), a paper that was published in my Festschrift, but is available online here (where it has already been downloaded 53,000 times): https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180What Steve misses, imho, is the Foundational Habit, which explains the foundation of LLMs and AI more generally.- Dan
On May 3, 2026, at 12:39 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:
Dan, Helmut, List,This has been a very fruitful thread for my thinking about language, something I haven't given sufficient attention to these past few decades as I concentrated on Peircean semeiotics, tricategoriality, pragmaticism, etc. As earlier noted, knowing Michael Shapiro personally, having read many of his published works, following his blog, Language Lore https://languagelore.net/about-language-lore-2/, and having regular conversations with him at a small Peirce-centered philosophy club which meets monthly in NYC (Michael lives in Vermont) has at least kept linguistics on my radar. Since the discussion so far has centered on the person and thought of Noam Chomsky, I would like to note that Shapiro was trained under Roman Jakobson at Harvard and is intellectually aligned with structuralist and semiotic traditions rather than Chomsky's generative program.
As I understand it, for Shapiro Jakobson's work represents the point at which structuralism begins to 'overcome' itself. Jakobson's linguistics already seems to anticipate a semiotic conception of language, yet he doesn't fully get past formalism. So, in my view, Shapiro's neostructuralism may best be understood as a Peircean completion of Jakobson’s program, not a complete departure from it, but explicitly articulating it in terms of semiosis and, so, teleology.It now seems to me that from a Peircean-semiotic standpoint, Michael Shapiro’s critique of Chomsky principally concerns what Shapiro takes to be primary in language. As previously noted, Chomsky’s theory treats language as an internal, formal system -- an abstract grammar governed by general rules such that questions of purpose, interpretation, and communication are, shall we say, 'bracketed'. Shapiro’s neostructuralism reverses that tendency and serves as Shapiro's semiotic alternative. In his work structuralism is revised such that 3ns, as mediation, habit, growth of meaning, etc. is no longer excluded; rather, it actually constitutes linguistic structure.Language in this view is not a 'given' system but, rather, an evolving semiotic process and is intelligible only in terms of its development, and especially its teleological tendency toward meaning. Contrariwise, purposiveness, interpretant effects, and the continuity of semiosis are excluded from Chomsky's program. For Shapiro semiosis, sign-action, is precisely where linguistic explanation needs to begin, thus his objection that generative grammar is methodologically reductive because it detaches grammar from semiosis, treats structure as fixed rather than developmental, and so gives only an abstract understanding of the phenomenon of language.In sum: From the standpoint of neostructuralism, it is not that Chomsky's work is without value -- and it most certainly has been influential! -- but lacking a semiotic revision it cannot serve as a general theory of language. I strongly agree with Shapiro.Best,Gary R
On Sat, May 2, 2026 at 5:55 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote:No Noam would never say that. Never. General intelligence in his theory has zero to do with L1 acquisition.My office was next to Chomsky’s for a year.In 2023 MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences held a conference in my honor. But that dept and MIT linguistics have very different views of language.The talks at that conference are on youtube. The volume is also available.DanDan, List,That´s great, that you know him! I would find it very interesting, whether he either would say:-- "Ok, the language acquisition device may not differ from general intelligence, and the universal grammar may not differ from general logic, I just have called these things the way I did, because I am concerned with linguistics, not with more general sciences such as biology, psychology or logic"Or:-- "I think, that the language acquisition device and the universal grammar are special innate abilities, that only genetically appear within creatures who use language, esp. humans, but not in other creatures, who are quite intelligent, esp. octopusses, who don´t communicate with language, but by changing the colours, texture, and form of their skin"Or: Something else.I would find the answer interesting, because I don´t have a preference for either answer, can´t have as a layman, and Chomsky is an expert, one of a few. My last post, in this regard, was not a judgement, not even a justified suspicion, only a layman´s utterance-in-progress, the kind of question, experts are often bothered with.Best, Helmut_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _30. April 2026 um 15:07"Everett, Daniel" <[email protected]>wrote:I knew Chomsky well for more than 40 years. He has given interviews about me and I him (especially in the New Yorker and NY Times - cover story. And a cover story in the Chronicle.The article i linked to earlier as well as the almost finished book Peircean lingiistics discusses and compares Chomsky and Peirce in great detail.Peirce’s theory wins hands down.Dan
On Apr 30, 2026, at 08:56, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.Gary, List,thank you! In this form, I understand the criticism. I guess, maybe a scientist should compare his work with other scientific approaches to a higher extent than Chomsky did or does. I also wonder, whether the innate language acquisition device is something different from general intelligence, and whether the universal grammar is different from logic (incl. triadic) in general, or these are unnecessary specifications.Best, Helmut_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _30. April 2026 um 01:17"Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>wrote:Helmut, List,I haven't a linguist's knowledge of Chomsky's theory. While over the years I've read a significant amount of material related to it, and especially in recent years that which appears in the work of that quintessentially Peircean linguist, Michael Shapiro, my comments are strictly those of a layman.So, necessarily, are my questions. So, for example, you suggest that "without the innate 'language acquisition device', a human would not be able to acquire language." Now since most researchers think Homo sapiens existed for tens of thousands, possibly over 100,000 years before spoken language emerged, did Chomsky's 'Universal Grammar, his innate cognitive architecture, simply lay dormant for that period of time? Or did it somehow evolve in the homo sapien brain over that vast period? Perhaps this question has been addressed in the literature, but I'm not aware of it.You wrote: " But [Universal Grammar] wouldn´t say, that a child would not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither would say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the structure of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted from, and adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of communication."I think you may have a point here as my understanding is that Chomsky’s theory does not logically exclude communication or semiotic considerations. However, his theory does not at all rely on them nor positively develop them. They remain peripheral rather than foundational, which is a point that critics like Shapiro make.To expand on this a bit, I suppose that in principle one could reinterpret Chomsky’s framework in semiotic terms. However, this would be an external reconstruction rather than something he himself developed. It is certainly possible to argue that the language faculty evolved under certain communicative pressures and that its structures reflect semiotic constraints. However, Chomsky does not derive UG from semiotic principles, nor does he treat grammar as emerging from a general theory of signs. And although he acknowledges communicative explanations, he challenges them in favor of internal constraints.So, in a word, language as sign activity is not denied by Chomsky but, to the extent that it appears at all, it is subordinated to formal internal constraints such that semiotics and a broader logic of communication is mainly absent from his framework.Best,Gary R
On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 5:42 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Gary, List,Does he really "reduce" language acquisition to a fixed internal mechanism, or just the ability of language acquisition? Because, if it is the ability, it is not a reduction of the thing language itself. It just would say, that, without the innate "language acquisiton device", a human would not be able to acquire language. But it wouldn´t say, that a child would not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither would say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the structure of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted from, and adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of communication.Best, Helmut29. April 2026 um 17:56"Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>wrote:Helmut, List,You wrote: " One then only might say that [Chomsky] limits his inquiry to linguistics . . ."While not a linguist, I've taken a keen interest in the field, especially after coming to know Michael Shapiro and his work a couple of decades ago. However, at this point I can't add more than what I've already written:Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. Michael [Shapiro] argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic structure abstracts language from communicative practice and, so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than a process of sign use).
The point is exactly linguistic: In my view, Chomsky reduces language acquisition to a fixed internal mechanism and, further, abstracts language from communicative practice. Following Shapiro, I tried to make the point that, very different from this, Peirce sees language not as a formal system but as a mode of sign activity and all that follows from that in his semeiotics.Best,Gary R
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 6:20 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Gary, List,I have often wondered, whether Chomsky only "abstracts" or "renders" his universal grammar as something innate to all humans, or claims it for basic in the sense of axiomatic. Because, if he doesn´t do that latter thing, I think he cannot be blamed of denying social, communicative, semiotic, and logical deeper sources of universal grammar. One then only might say, that he limits his inquiry to linguistics, which is his main interest and research field.Best, Helmut29. April 2026 um 05:10"Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.Dan, List,I've only had a chance to read the abstract of your paper, but I hope to read it in its entirety in the next week or so as the thesis sounds most interesting and, to me at least, a bit provocative. As you probably know -- and as long term readers of the List may know -- I tend to agree with the linguist, Michael Shapiro's, that supports Peirce's, as opposed to Chomsky's, view of the acquisition of language.For Shapiro, the contrast between Chomsky and Peirce turns on fundamentally different conceptions of language and its acquisition. As is well known, Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. Michael argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic structure abstracts language from communicative practice and, so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than a process of sign use). Shapiro, on the other hand, argues that “language is not an autonomous formal system but a mode of sign activity,” and he argues against “the hypostatization of grammar as an object independent of its use.” As he sees it, generative grammar mistakes analytic constructs for innate mental realities and, in the doing, obscures the fundamentally semiotic character of linguistic phenomena.
Shapiro finds in Peirce a model that situates language within semiosis -- an ongoing, socially embedded process of sign interpretation in which what is innate is, as I think you suggest in your abstract, less a determinate structure than a capacity for abductive inference. Here language acquisition is developmental and open-ended: this involves the formation and revision of habits through interaction, fallible hypothesis formation rather than the unfolding of a fixed system. So Shapiro emphasizes that “grammar is not given in advance but emerges from the functioning of signs in communicative life,” thus aligning linguistic structure with evolving patterns of use.
An essential difference, I think, lies in their respective notions of instinct: for Chomsky, as noted, it is a structured internal grammar, whereas for Peirce it is an evolutionary tendency toward successful abduction, a probabilistic 'bias', shall we say, that integrates biological predispositions with learning and language and cultural transmission.
For Shapiro, the Peircean account is superior because it integrates biology, learning, culture, and communication without reducing language to a fixed internal mechanism. I've cc'd Michael who, I expect, will correct me if I've misrepresented any of his views.
Best,
Gary Richmond
On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 7:23 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote:Semeiosis is the foundation of all inference. I refer to this in the paper linked below as “The Foundational Habit.” It is:Sign —> SignIt is a recursive procedure and on this all of science emerges.
On Apr 28, 2026, at 19:13, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:[EXTERNAL]: This email originated from outside of Bentley University. Do not click on any links or open any attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Please contact Bentley Help Desk with any questions or concerns.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Gary R, ListYes, you are quite correct- the function is a rule of mediation - and I said that quite clearly in my outline - when I referred to and gave examples of the HABITS or rules or laws of mediation - and mediation is of course, a ‘mode of connection - but, more, it is a mode of transformation, where it transforms, via its rules, habits, knowledge base... input data into a viable interpretation. .And yes, this semiosis triad, which I compare to the function [ and I am hardly the only person to do so!!!] does lead to , at a specific time and place, one interpretation. It has to -otherwise the world is chaos. And since this function is a triad, with each node containing vital data - it’s not a dyadic process - and you are quite incorrect to claim such - ie, the function is not the same as a a mathematical equal sign - which IS dyadic!!!. This triad/function/ is a vital action- I must interpret the input sounds or images to be: one interpretation at this specific time and space.Not multiple interpretations,but ONE. My neighbour is saying Hello - and is NOT an evil witch putting a curse on me. …I must interpret the image I see to be Rain- and not gold coins…or harmful chemicals or angels dropping from the sky or...As for the concept of continuous semeiois - that’s basic to Peirce - but my outline of ONE specific action of semiosis hardly nullifies the concept of the world as a continuous semiosic process.Edwina
On Apr 28, 2026, at 6:40 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:
Doug, List,Since she mentioned it in her response to you, I must remark that Edwina Taborsky's interpretation of Peirce’s semiosis as a function, f(x) = y, where x is the object, f is the sign, and y is the interpretant, is exceedingly problematic in my view. In her model the sign 'operates' on the object to 'produce' the interpretant. This would mean that the interpretant is generated through a transformation comparable to a mathematical mapping. While this model may seem appealing to those trained in analytic philosophy or, say, Shannon's classical information theory -- since it offers a clean input-output picture of semiosis -- nonetheless, it replaces Peirce’s open and continuous semiotic mediation with a closed system of transformation.
Further, a function implies a dyadic and determinate relation: one value of x leads to one value of y. Peirce’s semiosis, however, is at its very heart triadic and relational. Yes, the object determines [in Peirce's sense of 'constrains'] the sign which determines [constrains] the interpretant, but none of these determinations is mechanical. For Peirce the sign does not transform the object into an interpretant; rather, it mediates between them within a process that remains open and continuous. In reducing semiosis to transformation,Taborsky's model ignores the potential, and the creative aspects which animate Peirce’s semeiotics, including as regards his conception of meaning.
In short, the formula f(x) = y collapses Peirce’s open-ended process of mediation (3ns) into a fixed act of transformation (2ns) in that it substitutes function for a law of habit. Whereas a function ends with an output, Peirce’s semiosis generates new interpretants as new signs indefinitely, each interpretant, in turn, becoming a sign. This process has no definite closure. Some have called this 'infinite semiosis': the process where the interpretant of a sign becomes a new sign for the same object, and so initiates an endless chain of meaning. It implies that meaning-making is never static or fully realized, but is always open to further interpretation and unfolding.
And there is one additional danger: that of over-formalizing Peirce’s ideas. While it is true that Peirce himself sometimes used mathematical analogies (although, and for prime example, he strongly argued against using his system of Existential Graphs as a calculus), his semeiotic is anything but computational. By turning semiosis into a neat function, one is treating signs as static conversions rather than as evolving acts of interpretation rooted in culture, experience, and inquiry (there are biological analogies of these). In addition, it's important to note that Peirce’s semeiotic is deeply entangled with his phenomenology and metaphysics (see, for example,“An Outline Classification of the Sciences” in the 1903 Syllabus) and is, in my view, not fully detachable from them.
There is, perhaps, a limited sense in which Taborsky’s metaphor might be helpful. But if so, she would have to treat the 'function' not as a deterministic formula but as a rule of mediation; that is to say as a pattern of relational continuity rather than causal mapping. As such it might serve as a shorthand for the way the sign organizes its reference. But then Taborsky would have to acknowledge that f here is not an operator but a habit: a mode of connection among object, sign, and interpretant within a continuum of semiosis, something I think that she is unlikely to do.
Perhaps the greatest flaw in Taborsky’s model as I see it is that it doesn’t capture the continuity -- the evolutionary continuity -- the vitality in Peirce’s thought. His semeiotic came out of his own evolving ideas about synechism and habit-formation, stressing the continuity and growth of interpretation. A fixed function like f(x)=y freezes what Peirce understood as a living, evolutionary process. For these reasons, in my view such essentially dyadic models as Taborsky's misunderstand and misinterpret Peirce’s semiosis.Best,Gary Richmond
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM doug mackenzie <[email protected]> wrote:Hi all,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I've just joined this mailing list because I am finally taking the opportunity to dig into Peirce's writings. I am a sessional instructor at UBC and I will be teaching COGS 303 (Research Methods in Cognitive Systems) this September for the second time. I taught the course last September and hewed closely to the syllabus as it was designed by Dr. Ron Rensink (details here).I've been sold on the Team-Based Learning approach and I'm in the process of designing the modules which will compose the course. I'm now reading The Fixation of Belief and How to Make Our Ideas Clear, and Peirce's ideas about the scientific method and doubt seem really to fit with the course's focus on self-awareness of cognitive biases.I was wondering if anyone has made use of Peirce's writings or ideas in courses on research methods or the philosophy of science.Best,Doug MackenzieVancouver, BC
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