List, Recent discussions I've read concerning artificial intelligence often suggest that the question of whether AI is genuinely intelligent might be settled by determining whether AI is conscious, self-aware, emotional, embodied, morally responsible, etc. -- that is, *whether AI has subjective experience*. Whilethese questions are important, it is not not at all obvious to me that they are the questions that Peirce himself might have asked becaise they obscure a more fundamental issue: *What is intelligence;* and *what relation does it have to mind, semiosis, and inquiry?*
In my view Peirce's mature philosophy suggests that *intelligence cannot be identified simply with human consciousness*. His semeiotic investigates the conditions under which signs generate interpretants and, so, contribute to the growth of meaning. Of course human reasoning is an especially sophisticated expression of that semiosic process. However, Peirce repeatedly extends semiosis far beyond human thought and finds forms of intelligence in animal instinct, biological adaptation, habit-taking of all sorts, scientific inquiry itself, and even, in the broadest sense, throughout the evolutionary development of the cosmos. Whatever intelligence may ultimately be seen to be, it appears to me to be inseparable from the development of interpretants. It might be useful to distinguish amongst these three related concepts: *mind, intelligence, and inquiry*. *Mind* may be understood as *an organized field of semiosis possessing continuity through time*. *Intelligence* is a capacity operating within such an organized field, *a capacity for discovering, generating, evaluating, and developing meaningful relations among signs*.* Inquiry* is *the process through which intelligence contributes to the growth of meaning*. We human beings ordinarily exhibit all three. Yet, in principle, nothing requires that they occur together in the same way or to the same degree. >From this perspective, *intelligence* may be defined, at least provisionally, as *the capacity to participate in semiosis through the generation, evaluation, and development of interpretants*. It does not necessarily require consciousness, emotion, or personhood. It does, however, require *participation in the process by which signs give rise to further signs *such that hypotheses are generated, distinctions (e.g. terms) are made and clarified, consequences (for action, etc.) are explored and, in a word, meaning can develop. If one accepts this, then the question regarding AI changes considerably. The issue is no longer whether AI thinks as human beings do, nor whether it possesses the incredible range of those characters previously mentioned as associated with human mentality. The question becomes: *Can AI participate in semiosis in ways that exhibit genuine intelligence?* So, consider a few examples. Today one sees that AI systems can identify patterns within vast bodies of material (LLMs); they can (1) formulate explanatory summaries, (2) compare interpretations, (3) show previously unnoticed relationships, (4) generate hypotheses (I have seen this not infrequently in my work the past few months involving AI), (5) explore implications and (6) detect inconsistencies and errors. My own experience working with AI systems has repeatedly confirmed virtually all these capacities. Further, I have found that an AI system can actually assist in the refinement of arguments. These activities involve the *production of novel interpretants within ongoing semiotic 'processes'* such as those I've been experimenting with myself. However one chooses to describe these processes/operations -- as reasoning, abduction, etc. -- they seem to me to satisfy at least some of the conditions that Peirce associated with intelligence. *The most common objection* is that *AI merely recombines existing signs and therefore lacks genuine creativity*. Yet this objection proves difficult to hold from a Peircean standpoint. Peirce's account of abduction does not require creation *ex nihilo *(cf. his term, 'retroduction'). Rather, it involves *the creation/generation of plausible possibilities which might be capable of advancing inquiry*. As Peirce made clear, much of human scientific and philosophical *creativity consists in discovering previously unnoticed relations among existing signs*. If that activity counts as intelligence in human inquiry, I don't see why analogous activity shouldn't count as that simply because it occurs within an artificial -- a machine -- system. *A second serious objection* is that *AI lacks mind*. I think that this object is likely quite correct, while it seems to me irrelevant to my present argumentation. AI systems certainly do not possess minds in the full human sense (that is, as continuous centers of experience, action, memory, responsibility, etc.) But it does not follow that they therefore lack intelligence. To acknowledge the reality of AI intelligence does not require us to identify AI with human persons nor even human minds. What is required is the recognition that* mind and intelligence are distinct concepts*. Indeed, intelligence itself may admit degrees as well as forms. If, as Peirce argued, semiosis pervades reality, then intelligence may be understood not as an all-or-nothing property which only human beings have, but as a *family of capabilities emerging wherever signs result in the growth of order, habit, meaning, and reasonableness.* Of course human intelligence unquestionably remains uniquely rich and is an undeniably consequential expression of that semiosic process. Still, I see no reason why it needs to be considered its only manifestation. So, from a Peircean perspective the most interesting question -- at least for me -- is not whether AI is 'genuinely' intelligent. Rather, the deeper question may be *how different forms of intelligence participate in the ongoing life of inquiry*. Human, communal, institutional, and artificial intelligences unquestionably differ profoundly in their structure, limitations, and responsibilities (the last, of course, being an essentially human matter). Still, all of these may contribute to the increase of meaning through participation in semiosic activity. AI certainly does not possess human intelligence, and most certainly not mind in the full human sense. Nevertheless, there are, I believe, strong reasons to consider that AI is a form of intelligence. Peirce's semeiotic, with its emphasis on signs, interpretants, habit-taking, and the process of inquiry, does provide a framework for understanding this as opposed to theories that identify intelligence exclusively with consciousness and subjective experience. Peirce's expansive understanding of intelligence may, I hope, invite consideration of whether artificial systems participate in some form of intelligence, even if that form differs significantly from human intelligence. Best, Gary R
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